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ABSTRACT
QUALITY COMPETITION
IN
SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORKS
WITH APPLICATIONS TO
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, PRODUCT
DIFFERENTIATION, OUTSOURCING, AND SUPPLIER
SELECTION
SEPTEMBER 2015
DONG “MICHELLE” LI
Bachelor of Management, NANKAI UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Anna Nagurney
The quality of the products produced and delivered in supply chain networks is
essential for consumers’ safety, well-being, and benefits, and for firms’ profitability
and reputation. However, because of the complexity of today’s large-scale highly
globalized supply chain networks, along with issues such as the growth in outsourcing
and in global procurement, as well as the information asymmetry associated with
quality, supply chain networks are more exposed to both domestic and international
quality failures.
In this dissertation, I contribute to the equilibrium and dynamic modeling and
analysis of quality competition in supply chain networks under scenarios of informa-
tion asymmetry, product differentiation, outsourcing, and under supplier selection.
vii
The first part of the dissertation consists of a review of the relevant literature, the
research motivation, and an overview of methodologies.
The second part of the dissertation formulates quality competition with minimum
quality standards under the scenario of information asymmetry, specifically, when
there is no product differentiation by brands or labels. In the third part, in contrast,
quality competition is modeled under product differentiation, when firms engage in
distinguishing their products from their competitors’.
The fourth part concentrates on quality competition in supply chain networks with
outsourcing. The models yield the optimal make-or-buy and contractor selection deci-
sions for the firm(s) and the optimal pricing and quality decisions for the contractors.
The impacts of firms’ attitudes towards disrepute are also studied numerically.
In the fifth part, a multitiered supply chain network model of quality competition
with suppliers is developed. It consists of competing suppliers and competing firms
who purchase components for the assembly of their products and, if capacity permits,
produce their own components. The optimal supplier-selection decisions, optimal
component production and quality, and the optimal quality preservation levels of the
assembly processes are provided. Such issues as the values of the suppliers to the
firms, the impacts of capacity disruptions, and the potential investments in capacity
enhancements are explored numerically.
The models and analysis in this dissertation can be applied to numerous industries,
ranging from the food industry to the pharmaceutical industry, automobile industry,
and to the high technology industry.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH MOTIVATION
Supply chains are networks consisting of multiple decision-makers, such as man-
ufacturers, transporters/distributors, and retailers, that participate in the processes
of the production, delivery, and sales of goods as well as services so as to satisfy con-
sumers at the demand markets (cf. Nagurney (2006)). Nowadays, as an increasing
number of firms from around the globe interact and compete with one another to
provide products to geographically distributed locations, supply chain networks are
far more complex than ever before. As a consequence, they are also more exposed
to both domestic and international failures running the gamut from poor product
quality to unfilled demand (see, e.g., Nagurney, Yu, and Qiang (2011), Nagurney,
Masoumi, and Yu (2012), Liu and Nagurney (2013), and Yu and Nagurney (2013)).
Examples of recent vivid product quality failures have included adulterated infant
formula (Barboza (2008)), inferior pharmaceuticals (see Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney
(2012)), bacteria-laden food (see, e.g., Marsden (2004)), and even low-performing
high tech products (see Goettler and Gordon (2011)) as well as inferior durable goods
referred to a “lemons” in the case of automobiles as noted in Akerlof’s (1970) funda-
mental study. At the same time, quality has been recognized as “the single most im-
portant force leading to the economic growth of companies in international markets”
(Feigenbaum (1982)), and, in the long run, as the most important factor affecting a
business unit’s performance and competitiveness, relative to the quality levels of its
competitors (Buzzell and Gale (1987)). High quality products make an important
contribution to a firm’s long-term profitability, due to the fact that consumers expect
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good products and services, and are willing to pay higher prices for them. Products
of high quality can also ensure the reputation of the brand, since firms can obtain
certifications/labels and declarations. For instance, the ISO (International Organi-
zation for Standardization) 9000 series guarantees the safety and reliability of the
quality management processes of firms and, hence, the quality of their products. In
addition, firms who fail to produce and deliver products of good quality may have to
pay for the accompanying consequences, such as the costs of returns, replacements,
the loss of customer satisfaction and loyalty, and the loss of their reputation, which
can be priceless. Most importantly, poor quality products, whether inferior durable
goods, such as automobiles, or consumables such as pharmaceuticals and food, may
negatively affect the safety and the well-being of consumers, with, possibly, associated
fatal consequences.
It is, hence, puzzling and paradoxical that, since firms should have sufficient in-
centive to produce high quality products, why do low quality products still exist?
The reality of today’s supply chain networks, given their global reach from sourc-
ing locations to points of demand, is further challenged by such issues as the growth
in outsourcing and in global procurement as well as the information asymmetry as-
sociated with what producers know about the quality of their products and what
consumers know. Although much of the related literature has focused on the micro
aspects of supply chain networks, considering two or three decision-makers, it is es-
sential to capture the scale of supply chain networks that occurs in practice and to
evaluate and analyze the competition in a quantifiable manner. My focus, hence, is to
provide computable supply chain network models, the associated analysis, and com-
putational procedures, that enable decision-makers to evaluate the full complexity of
supply chain networks with an emphasis on product quality by capturing the objec-
tive functions that decision-makers are faced with, whether that of cost minimization,
profit-maximization, etc., along with the constraints.
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In this dissertation, I contribute to the equilibrium and dynamic modeling and
analysis of quality competition in supply chain networks in an environment of increas-
ing competitiveness in order to explore such critical issues as: the role of information
asymmetry and of product differentiation, as well as the impacts of outsourcing and of
supplier selection. Specifically, the dissertation addresses the following fundamental
questions:
(1). What are the equilibrium product quality levels of competing firms and how to
compute their values?
(2). How do these quality levels evolve over time until the equilibrium is achieved?
(3). How stable are the equilibria?
(4). What are the impacts on product quality, costs, and profits, of minimum quality
regulations?
In this dissertation, the equilibria and the associated dynamics of production, qual-
ity, and prices, are determined, under scenarios of, respectively, information asymme-
try, product differentiation, outsourcing, and under supplier selection.
Since quality competition is the main theme of the dissertation, I first present
definitions of quality and the quantification of quality and associated cost. I then
provide the literature review and give the outline of the chapters in this dissertation.
1.1. Definitions and Quantification of Quality and Cost of
Quality
Different definitions of quality have been presented at various times by researchers
in different fields. The definitions can be classified into four main categories: 1).
quality is excellence, 2). quality is value, 3). quality is meeting and/or exceeding cus-
tomers’ expectations, and 4). quality is the conformance to a design or specification.
According to the view that quality is excellence (e.g., Tuchman (1980), Garvin
(1984), and Pirsig (1992)), this perspective requires the investment of the best effort
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possible to produce the most admirable and uncompromising achievements possible.
Although striving for excellence may bring significant marketing benefits for firms,
one has to admit that excellence is a very abstract and subjective term, and it is very
difficult to articulate precisely what excellence is, let alone explain clearly what are
the standards for excellence, and how excellence can be measured, modeled, achieved,
and compared in practice.
Feigenbaum (1951), Abbott (1955), and Cronin and Taylor (1992) criticized the
quality-as-excellence definition and argued that the definition of quality should be
value. According to them, quality is the value of a product under certain conditions,
which include the actual use and the price of the product. Many attributes of quality
can be included in value, such as price and durability, but quality is actually not
synonymous with value (Stahl and Bounds (1991)). When consumers purchase prod-
ucts, they consider not only their quality but also their prices, which are two separate
concepts. The term value, hence, has the disadvantage of blending these two distinct
concepts together.
The extent to which a product or service meets and/or exceeds a customer’s
expectations is another definition of quality (e.g., Feigenbaum (1983), Parasuraman,
Zeithaml, and Berry (1985), Buzzell and Gale (1987), and Gro¨nroos (1990)). It is
argued that customers are the only ones who judge quality, and the quality of a
product should be just the perception of quality by consumers. This definition allows
firms to focus on factors that consumers care about. However, it is also very subjective
and, hence, very difficult to quantify and to measure. Different customers may have
different preferences as to the attributes of a product and it is often the case that
even consumers themselves may not know what their expectations are (Cameron and
Whetten (1983)).
Shewhart (1931), Juran (1951), Levitt (1972), Gilmore (1974), Crosby (1979),
Deming (1986), and Chase and Aquilano (1992), most of whom are operations man-
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agement scholars, are the major advocates of the conformance-to-specification def-
inition of quality. They define quality as “the degree to which a specific product
conforms to a design or specification,” which is how well the product is conform-
ing to an established specification. A major advantage of this definition is that it
makes quality relatively straightforward to quantify, which is essential for firms and
researchers who are eager to measure it, manage it, model it, compare it across time,
and to also make associated decisions (Shewhart (1931)).
Also, at first glance, it may seem that the conformance-to-specification definition
of quality focuses too much on internal quality measurement rather than on con-
sumers’ desires at the demand markets. However, with notice that consumers’ needs
and desires for a product are actually governed by specific requirements or standards
and these can be correctly translated to a specification by, for example, engineers
(Oliver (1981)), this feature makes the conformance-to-specification definition quite
general. In addition to consumers’ needs, the specification of a product can also in-
clude both international and domestic standards (Yip (1989)), and, in order to gain
marketing advantages in the competition with other firms, the competitors’ product
specifications.
All of the above four definitions of quality are still in use today (Wankhade and
Dabade (2010)). As one may notice from the above, each definition has both strengths
and weaknesses in criteria such as measurement, generalizability, and consumer rele-
vance.
In this dissertation, since the conformation-to-specification definition not only
makes quality quantifiable, but also is sufficiently general to include many dimensions
of quality, I define quality as “the degree to which a specific product conforms to a
design or specification.” Quality, hence, may vary from a 0% conformance level to
a 100% conformance level (see, e.g., Juran and Gryna (1988), Campanella (1990),
Feigenhaum (1983), Porter and Rayner (1992), and Shank and Govindarajan (1994)).
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When the quality of a particular product is at a 0% conformance level, the product
has no quality; when the quality achieves a 100% conformance level, the product is of
perfect quality. Therefore, quality levels are quantified as values between 0 and the
perfect quality level in Chapters 5, 6, and 7.
Quality levels with lower and upper bounds can also be found in Akerlof (1970)
(q ∈ [0, 2]), Leland (1979) (q ∈ [0, 1]), Chan and Leland (1982) (q ∈ [q0, qH ]), Lederer
and Rhee (1995) (q ∈ [0, 1]), Acharyya (2005) (q ∈ [q0, q¯]), and Chambers, Kouvelis,
and Semple (2006) (q ∈ [0, qmax]). Reyniers and Tapiero (1995), Tagaras and Lee
(1996), Baiman, Fischer, and Rajan (2000), Hwang, Radhakrishnan, and Su (2006),
Hsieh and Liu (2010), and Lu, Ng, and Tao (2012) modelled quality as probabilities,
which are between 0 and 1. These models believe that, due to the laws of physics,
the state of technology, and the ability of improving quality, there should be a quality
ceiling.
However, in the majority of economics and management science papers on quality
competition (see, e.g., Mussa and Rosen (1978), Gal-or (1983), Cooper and Ross
(1984), Riordan and Sappington (1987), Rogerson (1988), Ronnen (1991), Banker,
Khosla, and Sinha (1998), Johnson and Myatt (2003), Xu (2009), Xie et al. (2011),
and Kaya (2011)), quality levels are only assumed to be nonnegative, and there are
no upper bounds on quality. These models believe that, there is no “best” quality,
because there can always be a quality level that is even better than the best. Since
Chapters 3 and 4 are inspired by these papers, no upper bounds are assumed therein.
Moreover, the inclusion of upper bounds presents no technical difficulties.
Based on the conformance-to-specification definition of quality, the cost of qual-
ity, consumers’ sensitivity to quality, and the cost of quality disrepute (that is, the
loss of reputation due to low quality), all of which are crucial elements in model-
ing quality competition in supply chain networks, can be quantified and measured,
and the equilibrium quality level of each firm can also be determined. Following the
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conformance-to-specification definition of quality, quality cost is defined as the “cost
incurred in ensuring and assuring quality as well as the loss incurred when quality
is not achieved” (ASQC (1971) and BS (1990)). Although, according to traditional
cost accounting, quality cost may not be practically quantified in cost terms (Chi-
adamrong (2003)), there are a variety of schemes by which quality costing can be
implemented by firms, some of which have been described in Juran and Gryna (1988)
and Feigenbaum (1991).
Based on the quality management literature, four categories of quality-related
costs occur in the process of quality management. These are: the prevention cost,
the appraisal cost, the internal failure cost, and the external failure cost. They have
been developed and are widely applied in organizations (see, e.g., Crosby (1979),
Harrington (1987), Juran and Gryna (1993), and Rapley, Prickett, and Elliot (1999)).
Quality cost is usually understood as the sum of the four categories of quality-related
costs, and, it is widely believed that, the functions of the four quality-related costs
are convex functions of quality conformance level. Therefore, the cost of quality
is also convex in quality (see, e.g., Feigenhaum (1983), Juran and Gryna (1988),
Campanella (1990), Porter and Rayner (1992), Shank and Govindarajan (1994), and
Alzaman, Ramudhin, and Bulgak (2010)). Please see Table 1 for more details of the
four quality-related costs.
Among the four quality-related costs, the external failure cost, which is the com-
pensation cost incurred when customers are dissatisfied with the quality of the prod-
ucts, such as warranty charges and the complaint adjustment cost, is strongly related
to consumers’ satisfaction in terms of the firm’s product, and, hence, can be utilized
to measure the disrepute cost of the firm in addition to the cost of quality.
It is notable that, in addition to the cost of quality, the expenditures on R&D
have also widely been recognized as a cost depending on the quality level of the firm,
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Table 1.1. Categories of Quality-Related Costs
Category Definition Examples Shape of the Function
Prevention costs Investments to en-
sure the required
quality level in the
process of produc-
tion
Costs in quality en-
gineering, receiving
inspection, equipment
repair/maintenance, and
quality training
Continuous, convex,
monotonically increas-
ing. When the quality of
conformance is 0%, this
cost is zero.
Appraisal costs Costs incurred in
identifying poor
quality before
shipment
Incoming inspection and
testing cost, in-process
inspection and testing
cost, final inspection and
testing cost, and evalua-
tion of stock cost
Continuous, convex,
monotonically increas-
ing. When the quality of
conformance is 0%, this
cost is zero.
Internal failure
costs
Failure costs
incurred when de-
fects are discovered
before shipment
Scrap cost, rework cost,
failure analysis cost, re-
inspection and retesting
cost
Continuous, convex,
monotonically decreas-
ing. When the quality
of conformance is 100%,
this cost is zero.
External failure
costs
Failure costs asso-
ciated with defects
that are found after
delivery of defective
goods or services
Warranty charges cost,
complaint adjustment
cost, returned material
cost, and allowances cost
Continuous, convex,
monotonically decreas-
ing. When the quality
of conformance is 100%,
this cost is zero.
which is independent of production and sales (cf. Klette and Griliches (2000), Hoppe
and Lehmann-Grube (2001), and Symeonidis (2003)).
1.2. Literature Review
The literature review below discusses, respectively, models with information asym-
metry in quality, models of quality competition, models of quality in manufacturing
outsourcing, and models with suppliers’ quality.
1.2.1 Models with Quality Information Asymmetry Between Firms and
Consumers
To-date, markets with asymmetric information have been studied by many notable
economists, including Akerlof (1970), Spence (1975), and Stiglitz (1987, 2002), all of
whom shared the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. The seminal contribution in the
area of quality information asymmetry between firms and consumers is the classic
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work of Akerlof (1970)’s, which has stimulated the research in this domain. Following
Akerlof (1970), Leland (1979) modeled perfect competition in a market with quality
information asymmetry, and argued that such markets may benefit from minimum
quality standards. Smallwood and Conlisk (1979) investigated market share equilibria
in a multiperiod model considering quality positively related to the probability of
repeated purchases. Shapiro (1982) analyzed a monopolist’s behavior in a market
with imperfect information in quality, and noted that it was a reason for quality
deterioration. Chan and Leland (1982) developed a model with price and quality
competition among firms in which they could acquire price/quality information at a
cost and the average cost functions were identical for all firms. Schwartz and Wilde
(1985) considered markets where consumers were imperfectly informed about prices
and quality, and provided equilibria under cases where all consumers preferred higher
quality and lower quality.
Bester (1998) studied price and quality competition between two firms and noted
that imperfect information quality reduced the sellers’ incentives for differentiation.
Besancenot and Vranceanu (2004) studied quality information asymmetry among
firms who decided on prices and quality, and consumers who searched for the best offer
in a sequential way. Armstrong and Chen (2009) presented a model in which some
consumers shopped without attention to quality, and firms might cheat to exploit
these consumers. Baltzer (2012) considered two firms involved in price and quality
competition with specific underlying functional forms to study the impact of minimum
quality standards and labels.
Moreover, price and advertising have long been viewed as indicators of quality for
consumers. Examples are as follows. Wolinsky (1983) was concerned with markets
with price and quality competition in which consumers had imperfect information,
and concluded that price indicated quality. Cooper and Ross (1984) modeled perfect
quality competition among firms to examine the degree that prices conveyed informa-
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tion about quality. Rogerson (1988) considered quality and price competition among
identical firms and indicated that advertising was a signal of quality. Dubovik and
Janssen (2012) considered a quality and price competition model with heterogeneous
information on quality at the demand market, and showed that price indicated qual-
ity. Other contributors in this area are: Nelson (1974), Farrell (1980), Klein and
Leffler (1981), Gerstner (1985), Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Tellis and Wernerfelt
(1987), Bagwell and Riordan (1991), Linnemer (1998), Fluet and Garella (2002), and
Daughety and Reinganum (2008) .
1.2.2 Models of Quality Competition
The noncooperative competition problem among firms, each of which acts in its
own self-interest, is a classical problem in economics, and it is also an example of a
game theory problem, with the governing equilibrium conditions constituting a Nash
equilibrium (cf. Nash (1950, 1951)). Well-known formalisms for oligopolistic com-
petition include, in addition, to the Cournot (1838)-Nash framework in which firms
select their optimal production quantities, the Bertrand (1883) framework, in which
firms choose their product prices, as well as the von Stackelberg (1934) framework,
in which decisions are made sequentially in a leader-follower type of game.
However, as argued by Abbott (1955) and Dubovik and Janssen (2012), if one
focuses solely on the price or quantity competition among firms, one ignores a critical
component of consumers’ decision processes and the very nature of competition –
that of quality. Both price/quantity and quality have to be considered as strategic
variables for firms in a competitive market. In particular, as noted by Banker, Khosla,
and Sinha (1998), Hotelling’s (1929) paper, which considered price and quality com-
petition between two firms and modeled quality as a location decision, has inspired
the study of quality competition in economics as well as in marketing and operations
research / management science.
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Pioneers in the study of quality competition assumed that firms as well as their
decisions were identical. Examples are as follows. Abbott (1953) analyzed quality
equilibrium in a single-fixed-price market with entry, where firms only competed in
quality. Mussa and Rosen (1978) modeled a firm’s decisions on the price and quality
of its quality differentiated product line, and compared the associated monopoly and
competitive solutions. Dixit (1979) studied quantity and quality competition by con-
sidering several cases of oligopolistic equilibria and comparing them with the social
optimum. De Vany and Saving (1983) modeled quantity and capacity competition
for monopolists, where quality was related to capacity captured by the waiting cost.
Furthermore, Shaked and Sutton (1982) formulated quality competition between
two firms with no cost for quality improvement. Moorthy (1988) considered price
and quality competition between two identical firms with heterogeneous consumers.
Economides (1989) developed a model with quality and price competition between
two firms with quadratic quality cost functions. Motta (1993) studied quality and
price/quantity competition between two firms under cases of fixed costs and variable
costs of quality. Ma and Burgess (1993) explored the role of regulation in duopoly
markets where firms with costs of identical functional forms competed in both quality
and price for customers. Lehmann-Grube (1997) developed a two-firm two-stage
model of vertical product differentiation, where firms competed in quality in the
first stage and price in the second. Johnson and Myatt (2003) presented a model
of multiproduct quality competition under monopoly and duopoly cases. Acharyya
(2005) modeled quality and price competition between a domestic firm and a foreign
firm, and the cost of R&D was considered. Chambers, Kouvelis, and Semple (2006)
considered the impact of variable production costs on price and quality competition
in a duopoly.
Moreoever, Das and Donnenfeld (1989), Ronnen (1991), Crampes and Hollander
(1995), Ecchia and Lambertini (2001), and Baliamoune-Lutz and Lutz (2010) investi-
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gated the impact of minimum quality standards on the price and quality competition
between two firms. However, most models in this area, as mentioned above, are
developed under duopoly settings.
Oligopoly models with quality competition that considered more than two firms
have been proposed in both economics and management science. In addition to Dixit
(1979), Leland (1977) considered the quality choices of a finite number of firms com-
peting for conusmers, and used the “characteristics” approach to model consumers’
choices. Gal-or (1983) developed an oligopoly model with quality heterogenous con-
sumers, in which both prices and quality levels of the firms were determined at the
equilibrium. Lederer and Rhee (1995) modeled quality competition among firms
where the prices and the quality levels of the products were not related. Karmarkar
and Pitblado (1997) considered the competition among several identical firms where
the consumer’s utility which was a function related to quality. Scarpa (1998) de-
veloped a price and quality competition model with three firms to study the effects
of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated market. In addition,
Banker, Khosla, and Sinha (1998) modeled quality competition among firms with
quadratic cost functions in one demand market, and investigated the impact of num-
ber of competitors on quality. Brekke, Siciliani, and Straume (2010) investigated the
relationship between competition and quality via a spatial price-quality competition
model.
1.2.3 Models of Quality in Manufacturing Outsourcing
Outsourcing, a strategy capable of bringing potentially large benefits to firms, has
been attributed to product quality issues in global supply chain networks. As argued
by Marucheck et al. (2011), although such problems have long been viewed as a
technical problem in the domain of regulators, epidemiologists, and design engineers,
there has been a growing consciousness that operations management can provide fresh
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and effective approaches to managing product quality and safety. In this section, I
provide a literature review of contributions to the study of quality in manufacturing
outsourcing from the domain of operations management, and the related fields of
operations research and management science. Most of the studies, as noted earlier,
focus exclusively on supply chains with a limited number of firms and contractors
and without product differentiation.
The impact of outsourcing on quality, suggestions as to how to mitigate associated
quality issues, and the associated decision-making problems have been studied by
various scholars. Riordan and Sappington (1987) modeled the quantity and quality
choices of a firm with one contractor under information asymmetry, and analyzed the
firm’s choice of organizational mode. Sridhar and Balachandran (1997) developed a
model with one firm and two sequential contractors with information asymmetry to
select one of them as the inside contractor. Zhu, Zhang, and Tsung (2007) investigated
the roles of different parties in quality improvement by focusing on a model between
two entities. The cost of goodwill loss caused by bad quality was also considered. Kaya
and O¨zer (2009) modeled quality in outsourcing with one firm, one contractor, and
information asymmetry to determine how the firm’s pricing strategy affects quality
risk. Xie, Yue, and Wang (2011) utilized a quality standard to regulate quality
in a global supply chain with one firm and one contractor under cases of vertical
integration and decentralized settings.
In addition, Kaya (2011) considered a model in which the supplier makes the
quality decision and another model in which the manufacturer decides on the quality
with quadratic quality cost functions. Gray, Roth, and Leiblein (2011) studied the
effects of location decisions on quality risk based on real data from the drug industry.
Lu, Ng, and Tao (2012) developed a model with one firm and one contractor, and
argued that contract enforcement would help to mitigate the low quality led by out-
sourcing. Handley and Gray (2013) studied 95 contracting relationships and found
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that external failures had a positive effect on the contractors’ perception of quality
importance. Steven, Dong, and Corsi (2013) investigated empirically how outsourc-
ing was related to product recalls, and concluded that the relationship was positive.
Moreover, the paper by Xiao, Xia, and Zhang (2014) examined outsourcing decisions
for two competing manufacturers who have quality improvement opportunities and
product differentiation.
1.2.4 Models with Suppliers’ Quality
The quality of a finished/final product depends not only on the quality of the firm
that produces and delivers it, but also on the quality of the components provided by
the firm’s suppliers (Robinson and Malhotra (2005) and Foster (2008)). It is actually
the suppliers that determine the quality of the materials that they purchase as well
as the standards of their manufacturing activities.
Therefore, there has been increasing attention on supply chain networks with sup-
pliers’ quality in both management science and economics. However, in the literature,
most models are based on a single firm - single supplier - single component supply
chain network without the preservation/decay of quality in the assembly processes
of the products, and the possible in-house component production by the firms is not
considered. Given the reality of many finished product supply chains, these models
may be limiting in terms of both scope and practice. Specifically, although focused,
simpler models, may yield closed form analytical solutions, more general frameworks,
that are computationally tractable, are also needed, given the size and complexity of
real-world global supply chains.
A literature review of models focusing on suppliers’ quality in multitiered supply
chain networks is given. Specifically, in the literature, the relationships and contracts
between firms and suppliers in terms of quality and the associated decision-making
problems are analyzed. Reyniers and Tapiero (1995) modeled the effect of contract
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parameters on the quality choice of a supplier, the inspection policy of a producer,
and product quality. Tagaras and Lee (1996) studied the relationship between quality,
quality cost, and the manufacturing process in a model with one vendor. Economides
(1999) modeled a supplier-manufacturer problem with two components and two firms,
and concluded that vertical integration could guarantee higher quality. Baiman, Fis-
cher, and Rajan (2000) analyzed the effects of information asymmetry between one
firm and one supplier on the quality that can be contracted upon. Lim (2001) stud-
ied the contract design problem between a producer and its supplier with information
asymmetry of quality.
In addition, Lin et al. (2005) conducted empirical research to study the correlation
between quality management and supplier selection, based on data from practicing
managers. Hwang, Radhakrishnan, and Su (2006) examined a quality management
problem in a supply chain network with one supplier, and provided evidence of the
increasing use of certification. Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan (2009) considered two
contracts with recall cost sharing between a manufacturing and a supplier to induce
quality improvement. Hsieh and Liu (2010) studied the supplier’s and the manufac-
turer’s quality investment with different degrees of information revealed. Moreover,
Xie et al. (2011) investigated quality and price decisions in a risk-averse supply chain
with two entities under uncertain demand.
1.3. Dissertation Overview
This dissertation consists of eight chapters. Chapter 2 provides a review of the
methodologies that are utilized in this dissertation, mainly variational inequality the-
ory (Nagurney (1999)) and projected dynamical systems theory (Dupuis and Nagur-
ney (1993) and Nagurney and Zhang (1996)). The summary and conclusions of the
dissertation with future research plans are given in Chapter 8. Below, I detail the
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contributions in Chapters 3 through 7 and provide additional background for these
chapters.
1.3.1 Additional Motivation and Contributions in Chapter 3
Inspired by Akerlof (1970), the main topic in Chapter 3 is that of quality competi-
tion with quality information asymmetry between firms and consumers. The motiva-
tion for this chapter is as follows. Supply chain networks have transformed the manner
in which goods are produced, transported, and consumed around the globe and have
created more choices and options for consumers during different seasons. At the
same time, given the distances that may be involved as well as the types of products
that are consumed, there may be information asymmetry associated with knowledge
about the quality of the products. Stiglitz (2002) defined information asymmetry as
the “fact that different people know different things.” Specifically, when there is no
differentiation by brands or labels, products from different firms are viewed as being
homogeneous for consumers. Therefore, producers in certain industries are aware of
their product quality whereas consumers may not be aware of the product quality of
specific firms a priori.
Information asymmetry becomes increasingly complex when manufacturers (pro-
ducers) have, at their disposal, multiple manufacturing plants, which may be on-shore
or off-shore, with the ability to monitor the quality in the latter sometimes challeng-
ing. Indeed, major issues and quality problems associated with distinct manufacturing
plants, for example, in the pharmaceutical industry, have been the focus of increasing
attention. Since 2009, quality failures in several manufacturing plants of Hospira,
a leading manufacturer of injectable drugs, led to several major recalls of products
produced at manufacturing plants in, for example, North Carolina, California, and
Costa Rica (see Thomas (2013)). As another example, in 2011, Ben Venue, a division
of the German pharmaceutical company Boehringer Ingelheim, was forced to shut
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one of its plants, in Bedford, Ohio, due to quality issues investigated by the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) (Lopatto (2013)).
In Chapter 3, static and dynamic models of quality competition among firms,
each of which may have multiple plants at its disposal, are presented under infor-
mation asymmetry in quality in a supply chain network context using variational
inequality theory and projected dynamical systems theory, respectively. These mod-
els capture quality levels both on the supply side as well as on the demand side, with
linkages through the transportation costs, yielding an integrated economic network
framework. I model the competition among firms, which are spatially separated,
in a Cournot-Nash manner. The firms compete in product shipment and product
quality in multiple demand markets with each one seeking to maximize its profit,
where quality is associated with both the manufacturing plants and the transporta-
tion processes. Elastic demand in both prices and quality levels is assumed at the
demand markets. In addition, since minimum quality standards are imposed in many
industries, from pharmaceuticals to food to automobiles, by national authorities in
order to guarantee consumers’ welfare and safety (cf. Boom (1995)), in Chapter 3, I
also investigate quantitatively the effects of the imposition of minimum quality stan-
dards. The effectiveness of the imposition of minimum quality standards on quality
has been studied in economics, with or without information asymmetry, by Leland
(1979), Shapiro (1983), Besanko, Donnenfeld, and White (1988), Ronnen (1991), and
Baliamoune-Lutz and Lutz (2010). However, this has not been done previously in
a general supply chain network framework. Chapter 3 is based on Nagurney and Li
(2014a).
1.3.2 Additional Motivation and Contributions in Chapter 4
In Chapter 4, unlike in Chapter 3, product differentiation is considered in quality
competition among firms, but without any quality information asymmetry between
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firms and consumers. Please note that, in this dissertation, the product differenti-
ation is specifically horizontal product differentiation. In addition, I investigate the
costs associated with research and development (R&D). R&D plays a significant role
in the improvement of technology, and, hence, quality (Bernstein and Nadiri (1991),
Motta (1993), Cohen and Klepper (1996), and Acharyya (2005)). In the process of
R&D, for example, firms may gain competitive advantages from increased specializa-
tion of scientific and technological knowledge, skills and resources, and the state of
knowledge of a firm may, typically, be reflected in the quality of its product (Lilien
and Yoon (1990), Aoki (1991), Berndt et al. (1995), and Shankar, Carpenter, and
Krishnamurthi (1998)).
Because of the influence of R&D on quality improvement, value adding, and profit
enhancement, firms may invest in R&D activities, which is referred to as the cost of
quality improvement. Eli Lilly, one of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies,
invested billions of dollars in profits back into its R&D (Steiner et al. (2007)). The
18th biggest R&D spender, Apple, invested 2.6 billion US dollars in 2011 in R&D
and maintained a net profit of 13 billion dollars every three months (Krantz (2012)).
The framework for the competitive supply chain network model in this chapter is,
again, that of Cournot-Nash competition in which the firms compete by determining
their optimal product shipments as well as the quality levels of their products. I
present both the static model, in an equilibrium context, using variational inequality
theory, and its dynamic counterpart, using, as was done in Chapter 3, projected
dynamical systems theory. Stability analysis is conducted and numerical examples
given, along with the dynamic trajectories of the product shipments and quality levels
as they evolve over time. Chapter 4 is based on Nagurney and Li (2014b).
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1.3.3 Additional Motivation and Contributions in Chapter 5
As mentioned above, the supply chain network models established in Chapters
3 and 4 focus on two parties, firms and demand markets. In Chapters 5 and 6, in
contrast, quality competition in supply chain networks with outsourcing is analyzed
and formulated with another party added to the supply chain networks, that of the
contractors of the firms. In all the modeling chapters I also identify the underlying
network structure, which enhances the understanding of and the applicability of the
models.
Outsourcing of manufacturing/production has long been noted in supply chain
management and it has become prevalent in numerous manufacturing industries. One
of the main arguments for the outsourcing of production, as well as distribution, is
cost reduction (Insinga and Werle (2000), Cecere (2005), and Jiang, Belohlav, and
Young (2007)). Outsourcing, as a supply chain strategy, may also increase operational
efficiency and agility (Klopack (2000) and John (2006)), enhance a firm’s competi-
tiveness (cf. Narasimhan and Das (1999)), and even yield benefits from supportive
government policies (Zhou (2007)).
In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, in 2010, up to 40% of the drugs that
Americans consumed were imported, and more than 80% of the active ingredients for
drugs sold in the United States were outsourced (Ensinger (2010)), with the market
for outsourced pharmaceutical manufacturing expanding at the rate of 10% to 12%
annually in the US (Olson and Wu (2011)). In the fashion industry, according to the
ApparelStats Report released by the American Apparel and Footwear Association,
97.7% of the apparel sold in the United States in 2011 was produced outside the US
(AAFA (2012)). In addition, in the electronics industry, in the fourth quarter alone
of 2012, 100% of the 26.9 million iPhones sold by Apple were designed in California,
but assembled in China (Apple (2012) and Rawson (2012)).
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However, parallel to the dynamism of and growth in outsourcing, the nation’s
growing reliance on sometimes uninspected contractors has raised public and govern-
mental awareness and concern, with outsourcing firms being faced with quality-related
risks (cf. Doig et al. (2001), Helm (2006), and Steven, Dong, and Corsi (2013)). In
2003, the suspension of the license of Pan Pharmaceuticals, the world’s fifth largest
contract manufacturer of health supplements, due to quality failure, caused costly
consequences in terms of product recalls and credibility losses (Allen (2003)). In
2008, fake heparin made by a Chinese manufacturer not only led to recalls of drugs
in over ten European countries (Payne (2008)), but also resulted in the deaths of
81 Americans (Harris (2011)). Furthermore, in 2009, more than 400 peanut butter
products were recalled after 8 people died and more than 500 people in 43 states, half
of them children, were sickened by salmonella poisoning, the source of which was a
peanut butter plant in Georgia (Harris (2009)).
Therefore, with the increasing volume of outsourcing, it is imperative for firms to
be prepared to adopt best practices aimed at safeguarding the quality of their supply
chain networks and their reputations. Outsourcing makes supply chain networks more
complex and, hence, more vulnerable to quality risks (cf. Bozarth et al. (2009)). In
outsourcing, since contract manufacturers are not of the same brand names as the
original firms, they may have fewer incentives to be concerned with quality (Amaral,
Billington, and Tsay (2006)), which may lead them to expend less effort to ensure
high quality. Therefore, quality should be incorporated into the make-or-buy as well
as the contractor-selection decisions of firms.
In Chapter 5, a supply chain network model with outsourcing and quality compe-
tition among contractors, which takes into account the quality concerns in the context
of global outsourcing, is developed by utilizing a game theory approach. The firm is
engaged in determining the optimal product flows associated with its supply chain
network activities in the form of manufacturing and distribution. It seeks to mini-
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mize its total cost, with the associated function also capturing the firm’s weighted
disrepute cost caused by possible quality issues associated with the contractors, in ad-
dition to multimarket demand satisfaction. Simultaneously, the contractors, who pay
opportunity costs for their pricing strategies and compete with one another in prices
and quality, seek to maximize their profits. In-house quality levels are assumed to be
perfect. Unlike in Chapters 3 and 4, the demands at the demand markets are assumed
to be fixed. This is relevant to, for example, the pharmaceutical industry. The varia-
tional inequality formulation of the equilibrium conditions for the model is provided
with the dynamics modeled as projected dynamical system. The equilibrium model
yields the product flows associated with the supply chain in-house and outsourcing
network activities and provided the optimal make-or-buy and contractor-selection de-
cisions for the firm. An average quality level is used to facilitate the quantification
of the disrepute cost of the firm. In addition, the contractor equilibrium prices that
they charge the firm and their equilibrium quality levels are also given. Chapter 5 is
based on Nagurney, Li, and Nagurney (2013).
1.3.4 Additional Motivation and Contributions in Chapter 6
One may notice that, in addition to the increasing volume of outsourcing men-
tioned above, interestingly, the supply chain networks weaving the original manufac-
turers and the contractors are becoming increasingly complex. Firms may no longer
outsource exclusively to specific contractors, and there may be contractors engaging
with multiple firms, who are actually competitors. The US head office of Volvo was
outsourcing the production of components to companies such as Minda HUF, Vis-
teon, and Arvin Meritor, who actually obtained almost 100% of their components,
ranging from the engine parts to the electric parts, from Indian contractors (Klum
(2007)). Furthermore, in the IT industry, Apple, Compaq, Dell, Gateway, Lenovo,
and Hewlett-Packard are consumers of Quanta Computer Incorporated, a Taiwan-
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based Chinese manufacturer of notebook computers (Landler (2002)). Also, Fox-
conn, another Taiwan-based manufacturer, is currently producing tablet computers
for Apple, Google, Android, and Amazon (Nystedt (2010) and Topolsky (2010)).
Indeed, if quality issues in outsourcing are to be considered in complex supply
chain networks with multiple firms and contractors, product differentiation cannot
be ignored. When consumers observe a brand of a product, they consider the quality,
function, and reputation of that particular brand name. With outsourcing, chances
are that the product was manufactured by a completely different company than the
brand indicates, but the level of quality and the reputation associated with the out-
sourced product still remain with the “branded” original firm. If a product is recalled
for a faulty part and that part was outsourced, the original firm is the one that carries
the burden of correcting its damaged reputation.
Therefore, Chapter 6, which extends the model in Chapter 5, investigates further
the supply chain network problem with outsourcing and quality competition. A sup-
ply chain network game theory model with multiple original firms competing with one
another is developed, and the products of the distinct original firms are differentiated
by their brands. Moreover, the in-house quality levels are no longer assumed to be
perfect, but, rather, are strategic variables of the firms, since in-house quality failures
may also occur (cf. Beamish and Bapuji (2008)).
In the model in Chapter 6, the original firms compete in terms of in-house quality
levels and product flows while satisfying the fixed demands at multiple demand mar-
kets. The contractors, however, aiming at maximizing their own profits, are engaged
in the competition for the outsourced production and distribution in terms of prices
that they charge and their quality levels. The equilibrium conditions are formulated
as a variational inequality problem. The solution of the model provides each original
firm with its equilibrium in-house quality level as well as its equilibrium in-house and
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outsourced production and shipment quantities that minimize its total cost and its
weighted cost of disrepute. This chapter is based on Nagurney and Li (2015).
1.3.5 Additional Motivation and Contributions in Chapter 7
In recent years, there have been numerous examples of finished product failures
due to the poor quality of a suppliers’ components. For example, the toy manufac-
turer, Mattel, in 2007, recalled 19 million toy cars because of suppliers’ lead paint and
poorly designed magnets, which could harm children if ingested (Story and Barboza
(2007)). In 2013, four Japanese car-makers, along with BMW, recalled 3.6 million
vehicles because the airbags supplied by Takata Corp., the world’s second-largest
supplier of airbags, were at risk of rupturing and injuring passengers (Kubota and
Klayman (2013)). The recalls are still ongoing and have expanded to other companies
as well (Tabuchi and Jensen (2014)). Most recently, the defective ignition switches in
General Motors (GM) vehicles, which were produced by Delphi Automotive in Mex-
ico, have been linked to 13 deaths, due to the fact that the switches could suddenly
shut off engines with no warning (Stout, Ivory, and Wald (2014) and Bomey (2014)).
In addition, serious quality shortcomings and failures associated with suppliers have
also occurred in finished products such as aircraft (Drew (2014)), pharmaceuticals
(Rao (2014)), and also food (Strom (2013) and McDonald (2014)). In 2009, over 400
peanut butter products were recalled after 8 people died and more than 500 people,
half of them children, were sickened by salmonella poisoning, the source of which was
a peanut butter plant in Georgia (Harris (2009)).
Product quality is an important feature that enables firms to maintain and even
to improve their competitive advantage and reputation. However, numerous finished
products are made of raw materials as well as components and it is usually the case
that the components and materials are produced and supplied not by the firms that
process them into products but by suppliers in globalized supply chain networks. For
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example, Sara Lee bread, an everyday item, is made with flour from the US, vitamin
supplements from China, gluten from Australia, honey from Vietnam and India, and
other ingredients from Switzerland, South America, and Russia (Bailey (2007)), let
alone automobiles and aircrafts which are made up of thousands of different compo-
nents.
Suppliers may have less reason to be concerned with quality. In Mattel’s case, some
of the suppliers were careless, others flouted rules, and others simply avoided obeying
the rules (Tang (2008)). With non-conforming components, it may be challenging
and very difficult for firms to produce high quality finished products even if they
utilize the most superior production and transportation delivery techniques.
Furthermore, since suppliers may be located both on-shore and off-shore, supply
chain networks of firms may be more vulnerable to disruptions around the globe
than ever before. Photos of Honda automobiles under 15 feet of water were some
of the most appalling images of the impacts of the Thailand floods of 2011. Asian
manufacturing plants affected by the catastrophe were unable to supply components
for cars, electronics, and many other products (Kageyama (2011)). In the same year,
the triple disaster in Fukushima affected far more than the manufacturing industry
in Japan. A General Motors plant in Louisiana had to shut down due to a shortage of
Japanese-made components after the disaster took place (Lohr (2011)). Under such
disruptions, suppliers may not even be capable of performing their production tasks,
let alone guaranteeing the quality of the components.
Moreover, the number of suppliers that a firm may be dealing with can be vast.
For example, according to Seetharaman (2013), Ford, the second largest US car man-
ufacturer, had 1,260 suppliers at the end of 2012 with Ford purchasing approximately
80 percent of its parts from its largest 100 suppliers. Due to increased demand, many
of the suppliers, according to the article were running “flat out” with the consequence
that there were quality issues. In the case of Boeing, according to Denning (2013),
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complex products such as aircraft involve a necessary degree of outsourcing, since the
firm lacks the necessary expertise in some areas, such as, for example, engines and
avionics. Nevertheless, as noted therein, Boeing significantly increased the amount of
outsourcing for the 787 Dreamliner airplane over earlier planes to about 70 percent,
whereas for the 737 and 747 airplanes it had been at around 35-50 percent. Problems
with lithium-ion batteries produced in Japan grounded several flights and resulted
in widespread media coverage and concern for safety of the planes because of that
specific component (see Parker (2014)).
In Chapter 7, I formulate the supply chain network problem with multiple com-
peting firms and their potential suppliers. The proposed game theory model captures
the relationships between firms and suppliers in supply chain networks with quality
competition. Along with the general multitiered supply chain network model, I also
provide a computational procedure so as not to limit the number of suppliers and
competing firms.
Specifically, the potential suppliers may either provide distinct components to the
firms, or provide the same component, in which case, they compete noncooperatively
with one another in terms of quality and prices. The firms, in turn, are responsible
for assembling the products under their brand names using the components needed
and transporting the products to multiple demand markets. They also have the op-
tion of producing their own components, if necessary. The firms compete in product
quantities, the quality preservation levels of their assembly processes, the contracted
component quantities produced by the suppliers, and in in-house component quan-
tities and quality levels. Each of the firms aims to maximize profits. The quality
of an end product is determined by the qualities and quality levels of its compo-
nents, produced both by the firms and the suppliers, the importance of the quality of
each component to that of the end product, and the quality preservation level of its
assembly process. Chapter 7 is based on Li and Nagurney (2015).
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1.3.6 Concluding Comments
The main contributions of the results in this dissertation to the existing literature
are summarized below.
1. Shumpeter (1943) stated that “The essential point to grasp is that in dealing
with capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process.” In addition, Cabral
(2012) articulated the need for new dynamic oligopoly models, combined with network
features, as well as quality. As one can see from the literature review (cf. Section
1.2), almost no dynamic model has been constructed with quality competition. In
this dissertation, in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, the underlying dynamics, along with the
stability results, are presented, in addition to the equilibrium models.
2. Most models in the existing literature (cf. Section 1.2) consider a limited num-
ber of entities, such as manufacturing plants, suppliers, components, and/or demand
markets. However, supply chain network problems, in reality, are actually large-scale
network problems. The models described and developed in this dissertation, hence,
contribute to the existing literature in terms of generality and scope. They are all
network-based and the entities are not restricted to a specific number.
3. The underlying functions in the models in this dissertation are of general
form. First, given the impact of quality on production and transportation, quality
is considered in both the production and transportation cost functions in Chapters
3, 5, 6, and 7. In addition, the demand price functions and the cost functions are
not limited to specific functional forms, i.e., linear or quadratic. Furthermore, the
functions need not be separable and can depend on vectors of quantity and quality.
Such features capture more realistically the nature of competition in resources and
technologies.
4. In the supply chain network models with outsourcing, in Chapters 5 and 6,
the reputation loss caused by nonconforming quality is considered in order to model
the firms’ concerns as to their reputation associated with possible low quality due to
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outsourcing. Moreover, the opportunity cost of each contractor in terms of its pricing
strategies is also modeled, which has not been considered previously in the supply
chain literature in quality competition and outsourcing (cf. Section 1.2).
5. In the multitiered supply chain network model with suppliers’ quality in Chap-
ter 7, the in-house production by the firms in terms of the components needed for
assembling their branded products is allowed, limited by capacities. A multiplier is
used to model the preservation/decay of quality in the assembly process of the prod-
uct of each firm. In addition, the network topology and the model in Chapter 7 are
also able to capture the case of outsourcing as a special case.
6. In this dissertation, both qualitative results, including stability analysis results
for the dynamics, as well as an effective, and easy to implement, computational
procedure are provided, along with numerical examples with possible applications
and managerial insights.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGIES
In this chapter, the fundamental theories and methodologies that are utilized in
this dissertation are provided. First, variational inequality theory, which is utilized
throughout this dissertation as the essential methodology to analyze the equilibria of
quality competition in supply chain networks with information asymmetry in quality,
product differentiation, outsourcing, and supplier selection, is presented. In addition,
some of the relationships between variational inequality and game theory, which are
used in this dissertation to model the competition among firms in quantity and quality
and the competition among contractors/suppliers in price and quality, are further
discussed. I also recall the theory of projected dynamical systems, which is utilized
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 in this dissertation to analyze the dynamics of quantities and
quality levels and/or the dynamics of prices. The relationship between variational
inequality problems and projected dynamical systems is also provided, followed by
qualitative properties and stability analysis of projected dynamical systems.
For completeness, concepts of multicriteria decision-making and the weighted sum
method are recalled briefly; these are here utilized in Chapters 5 and 6 to model supply
chain network problems with quality competition and outsourcing.
Finally, I review the algorithms: the Euler method and the modified projection
method. The Euler method is employed to solve the variational inequality problems
in Chapters 3 through 6 in this dissertation. It is also utilized to provide discrete-time
realizations of the continuous-time adjustment processes associated with the projected
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dynamical systems in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. The modified projection method is used
to solve the variational inequality problem in Chapter 7.
Additional theorems and proofs associated with finite-dimensional variational in-
equality theory can be found in Nagurney (1999). Further details and proofs con-
cerning projected dynamical systems theory can be found in Dupuis and Nagurney
(1993) and Nagurney and Zhang (1996).
2.1. Variational Inequality Theory
In this section, I briefly recall the theory of variational inequalities. All definitions
and theorems are taken from Nagurney (1999).
Definition 2.1
The finite-dimensional variational inequality problem, VI(F,K), is to determine a
vector X∗ ∈ K ⊂ Rn, such that
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (2.1a)
where F is a given continuous function from K to Rn, K is a given closed convex set,
and 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in n-dimensional Euclidean space.
In (2.1a), F (X) ≡ (F1(X), F2(X), . . . , Fn(X))T , and X ≡ (X1, X2, . . . , Xn)T .
F (X) and X are both column vectors. Recall that for two vectors u, v ∈ Rn, the
inner product 〈u, v〉 = ‖u‖‖v‖cosθ, where θ is the angle between the vectors u and v,
and (2.1a) is equivalent to
n∑
i=1
Fi(X) · (Xi −X∗i ) ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.1b)
The variational inequality problem is a general problem that encompasses a wide
spectrum of mathematical problems, including, optimization problems, complemen-
tarity problems, and fixed point problems (see Nagurney (1999)). It has been shown
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that optimization problems, both constrained and unconstrained, can be reformulated
as variational inequality problems. The relationship between variational inequalities
and optimization problems, which is explored in this dissertation, is now briefly re-
viewed.
Proposition 2.1
Let X∗ be a solution to the optimization problem:
Minimize f(X) (2.2)
subject to:
X ∈ K,
where f is continuously differentiable and K is closed and convex. Then X∗ is a
solution of the variational inequality problem:
〈∇f(X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (2.3)
where ∇f(X) is the gradient vector of f with respect to X, where∇f(X) ≡ (∂f(X)
∂X1
, . . . ,
∂f(X)
∂Xn
)T .
Proposition 2.2
If f(X) is a convex function and X∗ is a solution to VI(∇f,K), then X∗ is a solution
to the optimization problem (2.2). In the case that the feasible set K = Rn, then the
unconstrained optimization problem is also a variational inequality problem.
The variational inequality problem can be reformulated as an optimization prob-
lem under certain symmetry conditions. The definitions of positive-semidefiniteness,
positive-definiteness, and strong positive-definiteness are recalled next, followed by a
theorem presenting the above relationship.
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Definition 2.2
An n× n matrix M(X), whose elements mij(X); i, j = 1, ..., n, are functions defined
on the set S ⊂ Rn, is said to be positive-semidefinite on S if
vTM(X)v ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.4)
It is said to be positive-definite on S if
vTM(X)v > 0, ∀v 6= 0, v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.5)
It is said to be strongly positive-definite on S if
vTM(X)v ≥ α‖v‖2, for some α > 0, ∀v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.6)
Theorem 2.1
Assume that F (X) is continuously differentiable on K and that the Jacobian matrix
∇F (X) =

∂F1
∂X1
. . . ∂F1
∂Xn
... . . .
...
∂Fn
∂X1
. . . ∂Fn
∂Xn
 (2.7)
is symmetric and positive-semidefinite. Then there is a real-valued convex function
f : K 7−→ R1 satisfying
∇f(X) = F (X) (2.8)
with X∗ the solution of VI(F,K) also being the solution of the mathematical program-
ming problem:
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Minimize f(X)
subject to:
X ∈ K,
where f(X) =
∫
F (X)Tdx, and
∫
is a line integral.
Thus, variational inequality is a more general problem formulation than opti-
mization problem formulation, since it can also handle a function F (X) with an
asymmetric Jacobian (see Nagurney (1999)). Next, the qualitative properties of vari-
ational inequality problems, especially, the conditions for existence and uniqueness of
a solution, are recalled.
Theorem 2.2
If K is a compact convex set and F (X) is continuous on K, then the variational
inequality problem admits at least one solution X∗.
Theorem 2.3
If the feasible set K is unbounded, then VI(F,K) admits a solution if and only if
there exists an R > 0 and a solution of VI(F,S), X∗R, such that ‖X∗R‖ < R, where
S = {X : ‖X‖ ≤ R}.
Theorem 2.4
Suppose that F (X) satisfies the coercivity condition
〈F (X)− F (X0), X −X0〉
‖X −X0‖ → ∞ (2.9)
as ‖X‖ → ∞ for X ∈ K and for some X0 ∈ K. Then VI(F,K) always has a solution.
According to Theorem 2.4, the existence condition of a solution to a variational
inequality problem can be guaranteed by the coercivity condition. Next, certain
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monotonicity conditions are utilized to discuss the qualitative properties of existence
and uniqueness. Some basic definitions of monotonicity are reviewed first.
Definition 2.3 (Monotonicity)
F (X) is monotone on K if
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 ≥ 0, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K. (2.10)
Definition 2.4 (Strict Monotonicity)
F (X) is strictly monotone on K if
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 > 0, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K, X1 6= X2. (2.11)
Definition 2.5 (Strong Monotonicity)
F (X) is strongly monotone on K if
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 ≥ α‖X1 −X2‖2, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K, (2.12)
where
α > 0.
Definition 2.6 (Lipschitz Continuity)
F (X) is Lipschitz continuous on K if there exists an L > 0, such that
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 ≤ L‖X1 −X2‖2, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K. (2.13)
L is called the Lipschitz constant.
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Theorem 2.5
Suppose that F (X) is strictly monotone on K. Then the solution to the VI(F,K)
problem is unique, if one exists.
Theorem 2.6
Suppose that F (X) is strongly monotone on K. Then there exists precisely one solu-
tion X∗ to VI(F,K).
In summary of Theorems 2.2, 2.5, and 2.6, strong monotonicity of the function F
guarantees both existence and uniqueness, in the case of an unbounded feasible set
K. If the feasible set K is compact, that is, closed and bounded, the continuity of F
guarantees the existence of a solution. The strict monotonicity of F is then sufficient
to guarantee its uniqueness provided its existence.
2.2. The Relationships between Variational Inequalities and
Game Theory
In this section, some of the relationships between variational inequalities and game
theory are briefly discussed.
Nash (1950, 1951) developed noncooperative game theory, involving multiple play-
ers, each of whom acts in his/her own interest. In particular, consider a game with
m players, each player i having a strategy vector Xi = {Xi1, ..., Xin} selected from a
closed, convex set Ki ⊂ Rn. Each player i seeks to maximize his/her own utility func-
tion, Ui: K → R, where K = K1 ×K2 × . . .×Km ⊂ Rmn. The utility of player i, Ui,
depends not only on his/her own strategy vector, Xi, but also on the strategy vectors
of all the other players, (X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xm). An equilibrium is achieved if
no one can increase his/her utility by unilaterally altering the value of its strategy
vector. The formal definition of the Nash equilibrium is recalled as following.
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Definition 2.7 (Nash Equilibrium)
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy vector
X∗ = (X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
m) ∈ K, (2.14)
such that
Ui(X
∗
i , Xˆ
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(Xi, Xˆ∗i ), ∀Xi ∈ Ki, ∀i, (2.15)
where Xˆ∗i = (X
∗
1 , . . . , X
∗
i−1, X
∗
i+1, . . . , X
∗
m).
It has been shown by Hartman and Stampacchia (1966) and Gabay and Moulin
(1980) that given continuously differentiable and concave utility functions, Ui, ∀i,
the Nash equilibrium problem can be formulated as a variational inequality problem
defined on K.
Theorem 2.7 (Variational Inequality Formulation of Nash Equilibrium)
Under the assumption that each utility function Ui is continuously differentiable and
concave, X∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if X∗ ∈ K is a solution of the variational
inequality
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, X ∈ K, (2.16)
where F (X) ≡ (−∇X1U1(X), . . . ,−∇XmUm(X))T, and ∇XiUi(X) = (∂Ui(X)∂Xi1 , . . . ,
∂Ui(X)
∂Xin
).
The conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium are now intro-
duced. As stated in the following theorem, Rosen (1965) presented existence under
the assumptions that K is compact and each Ui is continuously differentiable.
Theorem 2.8 (Existence Under Compactness and Continuous Differentia-
bility)
Suppose that the feasible set K is compact and each Ui is continuously differentiable.
Then existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed.
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Gabay and Moulin (1980), on the other hand, relaxed the assumption of the com-
pactness of K, and proved existence of a Nash equilibrium after imposing a coercivity
condition on F (X).
Theorem 2.9 (Existence Under Coercivity)
Suppose that F (X), as given in Theorem 2.7, satisfies the coercivity condition (2.9).
Then there always exists a Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, Karamardian (1969) demonstrated existence and uniqueness of a
Nash equilibrium under the strong monotonicity assumption.
Theorem 2.10 (Existence and Uniqueness Under Strong Monotonicity)
Assume that F (X), as given in Theorem 2.7, is strongly monotone on K. Then there
exists precisely one Nash equilibrium X∗.
Additionally, based on Theorem 2.5, uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium can be
guaranteed under the assumptions that F (X) is strictly monotone and an equilibrium
exists.
Theorem 2.11 (Uniqueness Under Strict Monotonicity)
Suppose that F (X), as given in Theorem 2.7, is strictly monotone on K. Then the
Nash equilibrium, X∗, is unique, if it exists.
2.3. Projected Dynamical Systems
In this section, the theory of projected dynamical systems (cf. Dupuis and Nagur-
ney (1993) and Nagurney and Zhang (1996)) is recalled, followed by the relationship
between projected dynamical systems and variational inequality problems. Finally,
some properties of the dynamic trajectories and the stability analysis of projected
dynamical systems are provided. All the definitions and theorems can be found in
Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and Nagurney and Zhang (1996).
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Definition 2.8
Given X ∈ K and v ∈ Rn, define the projection of the vector v at X (with respect to
K) by
ΠK(X, v) = lim
δ→0
(PK(X + δv)−X)
δ
(2.17)
with PK denoting the projection map:
PK(X) = argminX′∈K‖X ′ −X‖, (2.18)
where ‖ · ‖ = 〈x, x〉.
The class of ordinary differential equations that this dissertation focuses on takes
on the following form:
X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)), X(0) = X0 ∈ K, (2.19)
where X˙ denotes the rate of change of vector X, K is closed convex set, corresponding
to the constraint set in a particular application, and F (X) is a vector field defined
on K. I refer to the ordinary differential equation in (2.19) as ODE(F,K).
The classical dynamical system, in contrast to (2.19), takes the form:
X˙ = −F (X), X(0) = X0 ∈ K. (2.20)
Definition 2.9 (The Projected Dynamical Systems)
Define the projected dynamical system (referred to as PDS(F,K)) X0(t) : K×R 7→ K
as the family of solutions to the Initial Value Problem ( IVP) (2.19) for all X0 ∈ K.
37
Definition 2.10 (An Equilibrium Point)
The vector X∗ ∈ K is a stationary point or an equilibrium point of the projected
dynamical system PDS(F,K) if
X˙ = 0 = ΠK(X∗,−F (X∗)). (2.21)
In other words, X∗ is a stationary point or an equilibrium point if, once the pro-
jected dynamical system is at X∗, it will remain at X∗ for all future times. Definition
2.10 demonstrates that X∗ is an equilibrium point of the projected dynamical system
PDS(F,K) if the vector field F vanishes at X∗. However, it is only true when X∗ is
an interior point of the constraint set K. When X∗ lies on the boundary of K, we
may have F (X∗) 6= 0. Note that for classical dynamical systems, the necessary and
sufficient condition for an equilibrium point is that the vector field vanish at that
point, that is, −F (X∗) = 0.
Now, I recall the equivalence between the set of equilibria of a projected dynamical
system and the set of solutions of the corresponding variational inequality problem
by presenting the following theorem (see Dupuis and Nagurney (1993)).
Theorem 2.12
Assume that K is a convex polyhedron. Then the equilibrium points of the PDS(F,K)
coincide with the solutions of VI(F,K). Hence, for X∗ ∈ K and satisfying
X˙ = 0 = ΠK(X∗,−F (X∗)) (2.22)
also satisfies
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.23)
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Before addressing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the trajectory of
a projected dynamical system, I recall the following fundamental assumption, which
is implied by Lipschitz continuity (Definition 2.6).
Assumption 2.1
There exists a B < ∞ such that the vector field −F : Rn 7→ Rn satisfies the linear
growth condition ‖ F (X) ‖≤ B(1+ ‖ X ‖), X ∈ K, and also
〈−F (X) + F (y), X − y〉 ≤ B ‖ X − y ‖2, ∀X, y ∈ K. (2.24)
Theorem 2.13 (Existence, Uniqueness, and Continuous Dependence)
Assume the above assumption. Then
(i) For any X0 ∈ K, there exists a unique solution X0(t) to the initial value problem;
X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)), X(0) = X0; (2.25)
(ii) If Xn → X0 as n→∞, then Xn(t) converges to X0(t) uniformly on every compact
set of [0,∞).
The second statement of Theorem 2.13 is sometimes called the continuous de-
pendence of the solution path to ODE(F,K) on the initial value. Therefore, the
PDS(F,K) is well-defined and inhabits K whenever Assumption 2.1 holds.
The stability of a system is defined as the ability of the system to maintain or
restore its equilibrium when acted upon by forces tending to displace it. Since the
ordinary differential equation of PDS(F,K) (2.19) has a discontinuous right-hand
side, the question of the stability of the system arises. I now recall stability concepts
for projected dynamical systems at their equilibrium points.
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Definition 2.11 (Stability)
An equilibrium point X∗ is stable, if for any  > 0, there exists a δ > 0, such that for
all X ∈ B(X∗, δ) and all t ≥ 0
X · t ∈ B(X∗, ). (2.26)
The equilibrium point X∗ is unstable, if it is not stable.
B(X, r) is used to denote the open ball with radius r and center X.
Definition 2.12 (Exponential Stability)
An equilibrium point X∗ is exponentially stable, if there exists a δ > 0 and constants
B > 0 and µ > 0 such that
‖X · t−X∗‖ ≤ B‖X −X∗‖e−µt, ∀t ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ B(X∗, δ); (2.27)
X∗ is globally exponentially stable, if the above holds true for all X0 ∈ K.
Definition 2.13 (Monotone Attractor)
An equilibrium point X∗ is a monotone attractor, if there exists a δ > 0 such that for
all X ∈ B(X∗, δ),
d(X, t) =‖ X · t−X∗ ‖ (2.28)
is a nonincreasing function of t; X∗ is a global monotone attractor, if d(X, t) is
nonincreasing in t for all X ∈ K.
An equilibrium X∗ is a strictly monotone attractor, if there exists a δ > 0 such
that for all X ∈ B(X∗, δ), d(X, t) is monotonically decreasing to zero in t; X∗ is a
strictly global monotone attractor, if d(X, t) is monotonically decreasing to zero in t
for all X ∈ K.
The stability of a projected dynamical system is actually determined by the mono-
tonicity of the F (X) in the associated variational inequality problem. Next, I recall
the local and global stability directly under various monotonicity conditions.
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Theorem 2.14 (Monotone Attractor)
Suppose that X∗ solves VI(F,K). If F (X) is locally monotone at X∗, then X∗ is
a monotone attractor for the PDS(F,K); if F (X) is monotone, then X∗ is a global
monotone attractor.
Theorem 2.15 (Strict Monotone Attractor)
Suppose that X∗ solves VI(F,K). If F (X) is locally strictly monotone at X∗, then
X∗ is a strictly monotone attractor for the PDS(F,K); if F (X) is strictly monotone
at X∗, then X∗ is a strictly global monotone attractor.
Theorem 2.16 (Exponential Stability)
Suppose that X∗ solves VI(F,K). If F (X) is locally strongly monotone at X∗, then
X∗ is exponentially stable for the PDS(F,K); if F (X) is strongly monotone at X∗,
then X∗ is a globally exponentially stable.
2.4. Multicriteria Decision-Making
The goal of multicriteria decision-making (MCDM) is to evaluate a set of alterna-
tives in terms of a number of conflicting criteria (Keeney and Raiffa (1976), Cohon
(1978), and Triantaphyllou (2000)), according to the preferences of the decision-maker
(Gal, Stewart, and Hanne (1999), and Jones, Mirrazavi, and Tamiz (2002)). In this
section, the multiobjective optimization problem and the weighted sum method are
briefly reviewed.
The multiobjective optimization problem with n decision variables can be gener-
alized as (see Marler and Arora (2004)):
Minimize G(X) = [G1(X), G2(X), . . . , Gk(X)]
T (2.29)
subject to:
gj(X) ≤ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (2.30)
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hl(X) = 0, l = 1, 2, . . . , e, (2.31)
where k is the number of objective functions, m is the number of inequality con-
straints, e is the number of equality constraints, and X is the n-dimensional vector
of decision variables. The feasible set K1 is defined as:
K1 ≡ {X|(2.30) and (2.31) are satisfied}. (2.32)
The Pareto optimality of a solution to a multiobjective problem is defined by
Pareto (1971), as follows.
Definition 2.14 (Pareto Optimal)
A point, X∗ ∈ K1, is Pareto optimal iff there does not exist another point, X∗ ∈ K1,
such that G(X) ≤ G(X∗), and Gi(X) < Gi(X∗) for at least one function.
The weighted sum method, which is the most common approach to multiobjective
optimization problems (see Marler and Arora (2004)), is as following. Associated with
a vector of weights, denoted by w, representing the decision-maker’s preferences, the
multiobjective objective function (2.29) can be expressed as:
Γ =
k∑
i=1
wiGi(X). (2.33)
As noted by Zadeh (1963), the optimal solution to (2.33) is Pareto optimal if all of
the weights are positive.
2.5. Algorithms
In this section, I review the algorithms. The Euler method, which is based on the
general iterative scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993), and the modified projection
method of Korpelevich (1977) are presented.
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2.5.1 The Euler Method
The Euler method can be utilized to compute the solution to a variational prob-
lem (cf. (2.1a)), and can also be used for the computation of the solution to the
related projected dynamic system (cf. (2.19)) (see Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and
Nagurney and Zhang (1996)). This algorithm not only provides a discretization of
the continuous time trajectory defined by (2.19) but also yields a stationary, that is,
an equilibrium point that satisfies variational inequality (2.1a). It has been utilized
to solve a plethora of dynamic network problems (see, e.g., Nagurney and Zhang
(1996)).
Specifically, recall that, at an iteration τ of the Euler method (see also Nagurney
and Zhang (1996)), where τ denotes an iteration counter, one computes:
Xτ+1 = PK(Xτ − ατF (Xτ )), (2.34)
where F is the function in (2.1a), and PK is the projection on the feasible set K,
defined by
PK(X) = argminX′∈K‖X
′ −X‖. (2.35)
I now state the complete statement of the Euler method.
Step 0: Initialization
Set X0 ∈ K.
Let τ = 1 and set the sequence {ατ} so that
∑∞
τ=1 ατ = ∞, ατ > 0 for all τ , and
ατ → 0 as τ →∞.
Step 1: Computation
Compute Xτ ∈ K by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
〈Xτ + ατF (Xτ−1)−Xτ−1, X −Xτ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.36)
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Step 2: Convergence Verification
If max |Xτl − Xτ−1l | ≤ , for all l, with  > 0, a pre-specified tolerance, then stop;
otherwise, set τ := τ + 1, and go to Step 1.
The VI subproblem (2.36) is actually a quadratic programming problem. It can
be solved by the exact equilibration algorithm of Dafermos and Sparrow (1969) when
it has a special network structure. In this dissertation, where appropriate, I also
explore the network structure. This algorithm has been applied to many different
applications of networks with special structure (cf. Nagurney and Zhang (1996) and
Nagurney (1999)). See also Nagurney and Zhang (1997) for an application to fixed-
demand traffic network equilibrium problems. The exact equilibration algorithm is
used in Chapters 5 and 6 to solve some subproblems induced in the Euler method for
fixed-demand supply chain network problems with outsourcing.
An assumption is recalled, followed by the convergence conditions of the Euler
method in Theorem 2.17 and Corollary 2.1.
Assumption 2.2
Suppose we fix an initial condition X0 ∈ K and define the sequence {Xτ , τ ∈ N} by
(2.34). We assume the following conditions:
1.
∑∞
i=0 ai =∞, ai > 0, ai → 0 as i→∞.
2. d(Fτ (x), F (x))→ 0 uniformly on compact subsets of K as τ →∞.
3. Define φy to be the unique solution to X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)) that satisfies φy(0) =
y ∈ K. The ω-limit set of K
ω(K) = ∪y∈K ∩t≥0 ∪s≥t{φy(s)}
is contained in the set of stationary points of X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)).
4. The sequence {Xτ , τ ∈ N} is bounded.
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5. The solution to X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)) are stable in the sense that given any
compact set K1 there exists a compact set K2 such that ∪y∈K∩K1 ∪t≥0 {φy(t)} ⊂ K2.
Theorem 2.17
Let S denote the set of stationary point of the projected dynamical system (2.19),
equivalently, the set of solutions to the variational inequality problem (2.1a). Assume
Assuption 2.1 and Assumption 2.2. Suppose {Xτ , τ ∈ N} is the scheme generated by
(2.34). Then d(Xτ , S)→ 0 as τ →∞, where d(Xτ , S)→ 0 = infX∈S‖Xτ −X‖.
Corollary 2.1
Assume the conditions of Theorem 2.17, and also that S consists of a finite set of
points. Then limτ→∞Xτ exists and equals to a solution to the variational inequality.
Theorem 2.17 indicates that Assumption 2.2 is the elementary condition under
which the Euler method (2.34) converges. Proposition 2.3 and Proposition 2.4 below
suggest some alternative conditions that are better known in variational inequality
theory as sufficient conditions for Part 3 and Part 5 of Assumption 2.2.
Proposition 2.3
If the vector field F (X) is strictly monotone at some solution X∗ to the variational
inequality problem (2.1a), then Part 3 of Assumption 2.2 holds true.
Proposition 2.4
If the vector field F (X) is monotone at some solution X∗ to the variational inequality
problem (2.1a), then Part 5 of Assumption 2.2 holds true.
In the subsequent chapters, as appropriate, I adapt the convergence proofs to
specific supply chain network applications.
2.5.2 The Modified Projection Method
The modified projection method of Korpelevich (1977) can be utilized to solve a
variational inequality problem in standard form (cf. (2.1a)). This method is guaran-
teed to converge if the monotonicity (cf. (2.10)) and Lipschitz continuity (cf. (2.13))
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of the function F that enters the variational inequality (cf. (2.1a)) can be satisfied,
and a solution to the variational inequality exists.
I now recall the modified projection method, and let τ denote an iteration counter.
Step 0: Initialization
Set X0 ∈ K. Let τ = 1 and let α be a scalar such that 0 < α ≤ 1
L
, where L is the
Lipschitz continuity constant (cf. (2.13)).
Step 1: Computation
Compute X¯τ by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
〈X¯τ + αF (Xτ−1)−Xτ−1, X − X¯τ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.37)
Step 2: Adaptation
Compute Xτ by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
〈Xτ + αF (X¯τ )−Xτ−1, X −Xτ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.38)
Step 3: Convergence Verification
If max |Xτl −Xτ−1l | ≤ , for all l, with  > 0, a prespecified tolerance, then stop; else,
set τ := τ + 1, and go to Step 1.
Theorem 2.18 (Convergence of the Modified Projection Method)
If F (X) is monotone and Lipschitz continuous (and a solution exists), the modified
projection algorithm converges to a solution of variational inequality (2.1a).
In the following chapters, I derive the variational inequality formulations and
the projected dynamical systems of the supply chain network models with quality
competition with application to information asymmetry, production differentiation,
outsourcing, and supplier selection. The computational algorithms introduced in this
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chapter, which are the Euler method and the modified projection method, are also
adapted accordingly.
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CHAPTER 3
A SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK MODEL WITH
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY IN QUALITY, MINIMUM
QUALITY STANDARDS, AND QUALITY
COMPETITION
In this chapter, I construct a supply chain network model with information asym-
metry between firms and consumers in product quality. The competing, profit-
maximizing firms with, possibly, multiple manufacturing plants which may be located
on-shore or off-shore, are aware of their quality levels but do not have differentiated
brands or labels to distinguish their products from their competitors’. Therefore,
consumers at the demand markets view the products as well as their quality levels as
homogeneous. Such a framework is relevant to products ranging from certain foods
to pharmaceuticals.
In this model, firms compete with one another in both the shipment amounts pro-
duced as well as the quality levels at their manufacturing plants with the objective
of profit maximization. Quality is associated not only with the manufacturing plants
but also tracked through the transportation process, which is assumed to preserve the
product quality. I propose both the equilibrium model, with the equivalent variational
inequality formulation, and its dynamic counterpart, using projected dynamical sys-
tems theory, and demonstrate how minimum quality standards can be incorporated
into the framework. Both theoretical results, in the form of existence and uniqueness
results as well as stability analysis, are presented. The Euler method (cf. Section
2.5.1) is used to solve the model, and the convergence results are also given. The
numerical examples, accompanied by sensitivity analysis, reveal interesting results
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and insights for firms, consumers, as well as policy-makers, who impose the minimum
quality standards.
This chapter is based on Nagurney and Li (2014a), and is organized as follows.
In Section 3.1, I present both the static models (without and with minimum qual-
ity standards), along with their variational inequality formulations, as well as the
dynamic version using projected dynamical systems theory. In Section 3.2, I then
provide qualitative properties of the equilibrium solutions and establish that the set
of stationary points of the projected dynamical systems formulation coincides with
the set of solutions to the corresponding variational inequality problem. In Section
3.3, I describe the closed form expressions for the Euler method applied in computing
the equilibrium product shipments and quality levels, and establish convergence. In
Section 3.4, I provide numerical examples and conduct sensitivity analyses, which
yield valuable insights for firms, consumers, and policy-makers. In Section 3.5, I
summarize the results and present the conclusions.
3.1. The Supply Chain Network Model with Information
Asymmetry in Quality and Quality Competition
In this section, I construct the supply chain network equilibrium model in which
the firms compete in product quantities and quality levels and there is information
asymmetry in quality. I first consider the case without minimum quality standards
and them demonstrate how standards can be incorporated. Next, the dynamic coun-
terpart of the latter is developed, which contains the former as a special case. The
static equilibrium model(s) are given in Section 3.2.1 and the dynamic version in
Section 3.2.2.
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3.1.1 The Equilibrium Model Without and With Minimum Quality Stan-
dards
I first present the model without minimum quality standards and then show how
it can be extended to include minimum quality standards, which are useful policy
instruments in practice.
I consider I firms, with a typical firm denoted by i, which compete with one
another in a noncooperative Cournot-Nash manner in the production and distribution
of the product. Each firm i has, at its disposal, ni manufacturing plants. The firms
determine the quantities to produce at each of their manufacturing plants and the
quantities to ship to the nR demand markets. They also control the quality level of
the product at each of their manufacturing plants. Information asymmetry occurs in
that the firms are aware of the quality levels of the product produced at each of their
manufacturing plants but the consumers are only aware of the average quality levels
of the product at the demand markets.
I consider the supply chain network topology depicted in Figure 3.1. The top
nodes correspond to the firms, the middle nodes to the manufacturing plants, and
the bottom nodes to the common demand markets. I assume that the demand at
each demand market is positive; otherwise, the demand market (node) will be removed
from the supply chain network.
In Figure 3.1, the first set of links connecting the top two tiers of nodes corresponds
to the process of manufacturing at each of the manufacturing plants of firm i; i =
1, . . . , I. Such plants are denoted by M1i , . . . ,M
ni
i , respectively, for firm i, with a
typical one denoted by M ji ; j = 1, . . . , ni. The manufacturing plants may be located
not only in different regions of a country but also in different countries. The next
set of links connecting the two bottom tiers of the supply chain network corresponds
to transportation links joining the manufacturing plants with the demand markets,
with a typical demand market denoted by Rk; k = 1, . . . , nR.
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Figure 3.1. The Supply Chain Network Topology with Multiple Manufacturing
Plants
The nonnegative product amount produced at firm i’s manufacturing plant M ji
and shipped to demand market Rk is denoted by Qijk; i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni;
k = 1 . . . , nR. For each firm i, I group its Qijks into the vector Qi ∈ RninR+ , and then
group all such vectors for all firms into the vector Q ∈ R
∑I
i=1 ninR
+ .
The nonnegative production output of firm i’s manufacturing plant M ji is denoted
by sij, the demand for the product at demand market Rk is denoted by dk; k =
1, . . . , nR, and the quality level or, simply, quality, of the product produced by firm
i’s manufacturing plant M ji is denoted by qij. Note that different manufacturing
plants owned by a firm may have different quality levels. This is highly reasonable
since, for example, different plants may have different resources available in terms of
skilled labor and facilities as well as labor expertise and even infrastructure.
The output at firm i’s manufacturing plant M ji and the demand for the product at
each demand market Rk must satisfy, respectively, the conservation of flow equations
(3.1) and (3.2):
sij =
nR∑
k=1
Qijk, i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni, (3.1)
51
dk =
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
Qijk, k = 1, . . . , nR. (3.2)
Hence, the output produced at firm i’s manufacturing plant M ji is equal to the sum
of the amounts shipped to the demand markets, and the quantity consumed at a
demand market is equal to the sum of the amounts shipped by the firms to that
demand market. I group all sijs into the vector s ∈ R
∑I
i=1 ni
+ and all dks into the
vector d ∈ RnR+ . For each firm i, its own quality levels are grouped into the vector
qi ∈ Rni+ , and all such vectors for all firms are grouped into the vector q ∈ R
∑I
i=1 ni
+ .
The product shipments must be nonnegative, that is:
Qijk ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni; k = 1, . . . , nR, (3.3)
In addition, the quality levels cannot be lower than 0% conformance level (cf.
Section 1.1), thus,
qij ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni. (3.4)
The production cost at firm i’s manufacturing plant M ji is denoted by fij. Given
the impact of quality on production, I express the production cost function of each
firm as a function that depends on both production quantities and quality levels (see,
e.g., Spence (1975), Dixit (1979), Rogerson (1988), Shapiro (1982), Lederer and Rhee
(1995), Teng and Thompson (1996), and Salameh and Jaber (2000)). The cost of
quality (Section 1.1) is also included in the production cost. Hence, in this model,
I allow for the general situation where fij may depend upon the production pattern
and the vector of quality levels, that is,
fij = fij(s, q), i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni. (3.5a)
In view of (3.1), I define the plant manufacturing cost functions fˆij; i = 1, . . . , I; j =
1, . . . , ni, in shipment quantities and quality levels, that is,
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fˆij = fˆij(Q, q) ≡ fij(s, q). (3.5b)
Moreover, given the impact of quality on transportation (cf. Floden, Barthel,
and Sorkina (2010) and Saxin, Lammgard, and Floden (2005) and the references
therein), I also associate quality with respect to the distribution/transport activities
of the products to the demand markets. I accomplish this by having the transporta-
tion/distribution functions depend explicitly on both flows and quality levels, with
the assumption of quality preservation, that is, the product will be delivered at the
same quality level that it was produced at. Let cˆijk denote the total transportation
cost associated with shipping the product produced at firm i’s manufacturing plant
M ji to demand market Rk, that is,
cˆijk = cˆijk(Q, q), i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni; k = 1, . . . , nR. (3.6)
Note that, according to (3.6), the transportation cost is such that the quality of the
product is not degraded as it undergoes the shipment process. Transportation cost
functions in both quantities and quality levels were utilized by Nagurney and Wolf
(2014), Saberi, Nagurney, and Wolf (2014), and Nagurney et al. (2014) but in the
context of Internet applications and not supply chains.
Since the products of the I firms are, in effect, homogeneous, common resources
and technologies may be utilized in the processes of manufacturing and transporta-
tion. In this model, in order to capture the competition for resources and technologies
on the supply side, I allow for general production cost functions, which may depend
on the entire production pattern s and the entire vector of quality levels q (cf. (3.5a)),
and general transportation cost functions, which may depend on the vectors Q and
q (cf. (3.6)). These cost functions measure not only the monetary costs in the cor-
responding processes, but also other important factors, such as the time spent in
conforming the processes. Such general production and transportation cost functions
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in both quantities and quality levels are utilized, for the first time, in a supply chain
context. The production cost functions (3.5a) and the transportation functions (3.6)
are assumed to be convex and twice continuously differentiable.
Since firms do not differentiate the products as well as their quality levels, con-
sumers’ perception of the quality of all such products, which may come from different
firms, is the average quality level of all products, qˆk; k = 1, . . . , nR, where
qˆk =
∑I
i=1
∑ni
j=1Qijkqij
dk
, k = 1, . . . , nR (3.7)
with the average (perceived) quality levels grouped into the vector qˆ ∈ RnR+ . Here,
I utilize the average quality as proposed by the Nobel laureate George Akerlof (see
Akerlof (1970)) and further developed by the Nobel laureates Stiglitz (1987) and
Spence (1975). In this model, the quality of a product is not directly observable by
consumers, but it can be estimated by the average quality of all such products in the
same demand market (cf. Nagurney, Li, and Nagurney (2014)). This average quality
can be conveyed among consumers through word of mouth, their own consumption
experiences, advertising, etc.
The demand price at demand market Rk is denoted by ρk. Consumers located at
the demand markets, which are spatially separated, respond not only to the quantities
available of the products but also to their quality levels. Recall that Kaya and O¨zer
(2009) and Kaya (2011) considered demand functions in price and quality, which are
of the following form: q = a − bp + e + ε, where e is the quality effort. Xie et al.
(2011) utilized a demand function in the investigation of quality investment, of the
form D = a+αx−βp, where x is quality. Anderson and de Palma (2001) captured the
utility u of each consumer as u = q−p+ε in their research on asymmetric oligopolies,
with q being quality. In addition, Banker, Khosla, and Sinha (1998) considered a
duopoly case and utilized a demand function given by qi = kiα−βpi+γpj+λxi−µxj,
where x denotes quality. In the model in this chapter, because the products are
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homogeneous, the demand price function of all such products at a demand market
depends, in general, upon the entire demand pattern, as well as on the average quality
levels at all the demand markets, that is,
ρk = ρk(d, qˆ), k = 1, . . . , nR. (3.8a)
The generality of this expression enables modeling and application flexibility. Each
demand price function is, typically, assumed to be monotonically decreasing in prod-
uct quantity but increasing in terms of the average product quality. Demand functions
that are functions of the prices and the average quality levels were also used by Ak-
erlof (1970). Therein the producers, in the form of a supply market, are aware of
their product quality levels (cf. (3.5a)), while consumers at the demand markets are
aware only of the average quality levels. However, multiple manufacturing plants,
transportation, and multiple demand markets are not considered in Akerlof (1970),
and, the profit-maximizing behavior of individual, competing firms, as in this chapter,
is not modeled.
In light of (3.2) and (3.7), one can define the demand price function ρˆk; k =
1, . . . , nR, in quantities and quality levels of the firms, so that
ρˆk = ρˆk(Q, q) ≡ ρk(d, qˆ), k = 1, . . . , nR. (3.8b)
Functions (3.8a and b) are not limited to linear demand price functions, and they are
assumed to be continuous and twice continuously differentiable.
The strategic variables of firm i are its product shipments {Qi} and its quality
levels qi. The profit/utility Ui of firm i; i = 1, . . . , I, is given by:
Ui =
nR∑
k=1
ρk(d, qˆ)
ni∑
j=1
Qijk −
ni∑
j=1
fij(s, q)−
nR∑
k=1
ni∑
j=1
cˆijk(Q, q), (3.9a)
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which is the difference between its total revenue and its total costs (production and
transportation). By making use of (3.5b) and (3.8b), (3.9a) is equivalent to
Ui =
nR∑
k=1
ρˆk(Q, q)
ni∑
j=1
Qijk −
ni∑
j=1
fˆij(Q, q)−
nR∑
k=1
ni∑
j=1
cˆijk(Q, q). (3.9b)
In view of (3.1) - (3.9b), one may write the profit as a function solely of the
product shipment pattern and quality levels, that is,
U = U(Q, q), (3.10)
where U is the I-dimensional vector with components: {U1, . . . , UI}.
Let Ki denote the feasible set corresponding to firm i, where Ki ≡ {(Qi, qi)|Qi ≥
0, and qi ≥ 0} and define K ≡
∏I
i=1K
i.
I consider Cournot-Nash competition, in which the I firms produce and deliver
their product in a noncooperative fashion, each one trying to maximize its own profit.
They seek to determine a nonnegative product shipment and quality level pattern
(Q∗, q∗) ∈ K for which the I firms will be in a state of equilibrium as defined below
(cf. Definition 2.7).
Definition 3.1: A Supply Chain Network Cournot-Nash Equilibrium with
Information Asymmetry in Quality
A product shipment and quality level pattern (Q∗, q∗) ∈ K is said to constitute a supply
chain network Cournot-Nash equilibrium with information asymmetry in quality if for
each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I,
Ui(Q
∗
i , q
∗
i , Qˆ
∗
i , qˆ
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(Qi, qi, Qˆ∗i , qˆ∗i ), ∀(Qi, qi) ∈ Ki, (3.11)
where Qˆ∗i ≡ (Q∗1, . . . , Q∗i−1, Q∗i+1, . . . , Q∗I) and qˆ∗i ≡ (q∗1, . . . , q∗i−1, q∗i+1, . . . , q∗I ).
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According to (3.11), an equilibrium is established if no firm can unilaterally im-
prove upon its profits by selecting an alternative vector of product shipments and
quality level of its product.
I now present alternative variational inequality formulations of the above supply
chain network Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1: Variational Inequality Formulations
Assume that for each firm i the profit function Ui(Q, q) is concave with respect to the
variables in Qi and qi, and is continuous and continuously differentiable. Then the
product shipment and quality pattern (Q∗, q∗) ∈ K is a supply chain network Cournot-
Nash equilibrium with quality information asymmetry according to Definition 3.1 if
and only if it satisfies the variational inequality
−
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
∂Ui(Q
∗, q∗)
∂Qijk
× (Qijk −Q∗ijk)−
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
∂Ui(Q
∗, q∗)
∂qij
× (qij − q∗ij) ≥ 0,
∀(Q, q) ∈ K, (3.12)
that is,
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
[
−ρˆk(Q∗, q∗)−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρˆl(Q
∗, q∗)
∂Qijk
ni∑
h=1
Q∗ihl +
ni∑
h=1
∂fˆih(Q
∗, q∗)
∂Qijk
+
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
l=1
∂cˆihl(Q
∗, q∗)
∂Qijk
]
× (Qijk −Q∗ijk)
+
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
[
−
nR∑
k=1
∂ρˆk(Q
∗, q∗)
∂qij
ni∑
h=1
Q∗ihk +
ni∑
h=1
∂fˆih(Q
∗, q∗)
∂qij
+
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
k=1
∂cˆihk(Q
∗, q∗)
∂qij
]
×(qij − q∗ij) ≥ 0, ∀(Q, q) ∈ K; (3.13)
equivalently, (d∗, s∗, Q∗, q∗) ∈ K1 is an equilibrium production, shipment, and quality
level pattern if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality
nR∑
k=1
[−ρk(d∗, qˆ∗)]× (dk − d∗k) +
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
[
ni∑
h=1
∂fih(s
∗, q∗)
∂sij
]
× (sij − s∗ij)
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+
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
[
−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρl(d
∗, qˆ∗)
∂Qijk
ni∑
h=1
Q∗ihl +
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
l=1
∂cˆihl(Q
∗, q∗)
∂Qijk
]
× (Qijk −Q∗ijk)
+
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
[
−
nR∑
k=1
∂ρk(Q
∗, qˆ∗)
∂qij
ni∑
h=1
Q∗ihk +
ni∑
h=1
∂fih(s
∗, q∗)
∂qij
+
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
k=1
∂cˆihk(Q
∗, q∗)
∂qij
]
×(qij − q∗ij) ≥ 0, ∀(d, s,Q, q) ∈ K1, (3.14)
where K1 ≡ {(d, s,Q, q)|Q ≥ 0, q ≥ 0, and (3.1), (3.2), and (3.7) hold}.
Proof: (3.12) follows directly from Gabay and Moulin (1980) and Dafermos and
Nagurney (1987), as given in Theorem 2.7. For firm i’s manufacturing plant M ji ;
i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni and demand market Rk; k = 1, . . . , nR:
−∂Ui(Q, q)
∂Qijk
= −∂[
∑nR
l=1 ρˆl(Q, q)
∑ni
h=1Qihl −
∑ni
h=1 fˆih(Q, q)−
∑ni
h=1
∑nR
l=1 cˆihl(Q, q)]
∂Qijk
= −
nR∑
l=1
∂[ρˆl(Q, q)
∑ni
h=1 Qihl]
∂Qijk
+
ni∑
h=1
∂fˆih(Q, q)
∂Qijk
+
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
l=1
∂cˆihl(Q, q)
∂Qijk
= −ρˆk(Q, q)−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρˆl(Q, q)
∂Qijk
ni∑
h=1
Qihl +
ni∑
h=1
∂fˆih(Q, q)
∂Qijk
+
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
l=1
∂cˆihl(Q, q)
∂Qijk
. (3.15)
Also, for firm i’s manufacturing plant M ji ; i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni:
−∂Ui(Q, q)
∂qij
= −∂[
∑nR
k=1 ρˆk(Q, q)
∑ni
h=1Qihk −
∑ni
h=1 fˆih(Q, q)−
∑ni
h=1
∑nR
k=1 cˆihk(Q, q)]
∂qij
= −
nR∑
k=1
∂ρˆk(Q, q)
∂qij
ni∑
h=1
Qihk +
ni∑
h=1
∂fˆih(Q, q)
∂qij
+
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
k=1
∂cˆihk(Q, q)
∂qij
. (3.16)
Thus, variational inequality (3.13) is immediate. In addition, by re-expressing the
production cost functions and the demand price functions in (3.15) and (3.16) as in
(3.5b) and (3.8b) and using the conservation of flow equations (3.1) and (3.2) and
∂fih(s,q)
∂Qijk
= ∂fih(s,q)
∂sij
∂sij
∂Qijk
, the equivalence of variational inequalities (3.13) and (3.14)
holds true.2
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I now describe an extension of the above framework that incorporates minimum
quality standards. I integrate the framework with minimum quality standards and
the framework without, and present the equilibrium conditions of both through a
unified variational inequality formulation.
I retain the above notation, firm behavior, and constraints, but now nonnegative
lower bounds on the quality levels at the manufacturing plants are imposed, denoted
by q
ij
; i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni so that (3.4) is replaced by:
qij ≥ qij i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni (3.17)
with the understanding that, if the lower bounds are all identically equal to zero, then
(3.17) collapses to (3.4) and, if the lower bounds are positive, then they represent
minimum quality standards.
I define a new feasible set K2 ≡ {(Q, q)|Q ≥ 0 and (3.17) holds}. Then the follow-
ing Corollary is immediate.
Corollary 3.1: Variational Inequality Formulations with Minimum Quality
Standards
Assume that for each firm i the profit function Ui(Q, q) is concave with respect to
the variables in Qi and qi, and is continuous and continuously differentiable. Then
the product shipment and quality pattern (Q∗, q∗) ∈ K2 is a supply chain network
Cournot-Nash equilibrium with quality information asymmetry in the presence of min-
imum quality standards if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality
−
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
∂Ui(Q
∗, q∗)
∂Qijk
× (Qijk −Q∗ijk)−
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
∂Ui(Q
∗, q∗)
∂qij
× (qij − q∗ij) ≥ 0,
∀(Q, q) ∈ K2, (3.18)
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that is,
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
[
−ρˆk(Q∗, q∗)−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρˆl(Q
∗, q∗)
∂Qijk
ni∑
h=1
Q∗ihl +
ni∑
h=1
∂fˆih(Q
∗, q∗)
∂Qijk
+
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
l=1
∂cˆihl(Q
∗, q∗)
∂Qijk
]
× (Qijk −Q∗ijk)
+
I∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
[
−
nR∑
k=1
∂ρˆk(Q
∗, q∗)
∂qij
ni∑
h=1
Q∗ihk +
ni∑
h=1
∂fˆih(Q
∗, q∗)
∂qij
+
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
k=1
∂cˆihk(Q
∗, q∗)
∂qij
]
×(qij − q∗ij) ≥ 0, ∀(Q, q) ∈ K2. (3.19)
Variational inequality (3.19) contains variational inequality (3.13) as a special case
when the minimum quality standards are all zero, and it will play a crucial role in
the next section when the underlying dynamics associated with the firms’ adjustment
processes in product shipments and quality levels is described.
I now put variational inequality (3.19) into standard form (cf. (2.1a)): determine
X∗ ∈ K where X is a vector in RN , F (X) is a continuous function such that F (X) :
X 7→ K ⊂ RN , and
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (3.20)
where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product in the N -dimensional Euclidean space, and K is closed
and convex. I define the vector X ≡ (Q, q) and the vector F (X) ≡ (F 1(X), F 2(X)).
Also, here N =
∑I
i=1 ninR+
∑I
i=1 ni. F
1(X) consists of components F 1ijk = −∂Ui(Q,q)∂Qijk ;
i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni; k = 1, . . . , nR, and F
2(X) consist of components F 2ij =
−∂Ui(Q,q)
∂qij
; i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni. In addition, I define the feasible set K ≡ K2.
Hence, (3.19) can be put into standard form (2.1a).
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3.1.2 The Dynamic Model
I now describe the underlying dynamics for the evolution of product shipments and
quality levels under information asymmetry in quality until the equilibrium satisfying
variational inequality (3.19) is achieved.
Observe that, for a current vector of product shipments and quality levels at time
t, X(t) = (Q(t), q(t)), −F 1ijk(X(t)) = ∂Ui(Q(t),q(t))∂Qijk is the marginal utility (profit) of firm
i with respect to the volume produced at its manufacturing plant j and distributed to
demand market Rk. −F 2ij(X(t)) = ∂Ui(Q(t),q(t))∂qij is firm i’s marginal utility with respect
to the quality level of its manufacturing plant j. In this framework, the rate of change
of the product shipment between firm i’s manufacturing plant j and demand market
Rk is in proportion to −F 1ij(X), as long as the product shipment Qijk is positive.
Namely, when Qijk > 0,
Q˙ijk =
∂Ui(Q, q)
∂Qijk
, (3.21)
where Q˙ijk denotes the rate of change of Qijk. However, when Qijk = 0, the non-
negativity condition (3.3) forces the product shipment Qijk to remain zero when
∂Ui(Q,q)
∂Qijk
≤ 0. Hence, one is only guaranteed of having possible increases of the ship-
ment, that is, when Qijk = 0,
Q˙ijk = max{0, ∂Ui(Q, q)
∂Qijk
}. (3.22)
One may write (3.21) and (3.22) concisely as:
Q˙ijk =

∂Ui(Q,q)
∂Qijk
, if Qijk > 0
max{0, ∂Ui(Q,q)
∂Qijk
}, if Qijk = 0.
(3.23)
As for the quality levels, when qij > qij, then
q˙ij =
∂Ui(Q, q)
∂qij
, (3.24)
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where q˙ij denotes the rate of change of qij; when qij = qij,
q˙ij = max{qij,
∂Ui(Q, q)
∂qij
}, (3.25)
since qi cannot be lower than qij according to the feasible set K = K2.
Combining (3.24) and (3.25), one may write:
q˙ij =

∂Ui(Q,q)
∂qij
, if qij > qij
max{q
ij
, ∂Ui(Q,q)
∂qij
}, if qij = qij.
(3.26)
Applying (3.23) to all firm and manufacturing plant pairs (i, j); i = 1, . . . , I; j =
1, . . . , ni and all demand markets Rk; k = 1, . . . , nR, and then applying (3.26) to all
firm and manufacturing plant pairs (i, j); i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni, and combining
the resultants, yields the following pertinent ordinary differential equation (ODE) (cf.
(2.19)) for the adjustment processes of the product shipments and quality levels, in
vector form:
X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)), (3.27)
where −F (X) = ∇U(Q, q), and ∇U(Q, q) is the vector of marginal utilities as de-
scribed above.
I now further interpret ODE (3.27) in the context of the supply chain network
competition model with information asymmetry in quality. First, observe that ODE
(3.27) guarantees that the product shipments are always nonnegative and the quality
levels never go below the minimum quality standards. In addition, ODE (3.27) states
that the rate of change of the product shipments and the quality levels is greatest
when the firm’s marginal utilities are greatest. If the marginal utility of a firm with
respect to its quality level is positive, then the firm will increase its quality level; if
it is negative, then it will decrease the quality level, and the quality levels will also
never be outside their lower bounds. A similar adjustment behavior holds for the
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firms in terms of their product shipments. This type of behavior is rational from an
economic standpoint. Therefore, ODE (3.27) corresponds to reasonable continuous
adjustment processes for the supply chain network competition model with informa-
tion asymmetry in quality.
3.2. Qualitative Properties
Since ODE (3.27) is nonstandard due to its discontinuous right-hand side, I further
discuss the existence and uniqueness of (3.27). The fundamental theory with regards
to existence and uniqueness of projected dynamical systems is provided in Theorem
2.13.
As given in Theorem 2.12, the necessary and sufficient condition for a product
shipment and quality level pattern X∗ = (Q∗, q∗) to be a supply chain network equi-
librium with information asymmetry in quality, according to Definition 3.1, is that
X∗ = (Q∗, q∗) is a stationary point of the adjustment processes defined by ODE
(3.27), that is, X∗ is the point at which X˙ = 0.
I now investigate whether, and, under what conditions, the dynamic adjustment
processes defined by (3.27) approach a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Recall that Lip-
schitz continuity of F (X) (cf. Definition 2.6) guarantees the existence of a unique
solution to (2.19) (cf. Theorem 2.13), where X0(t) satisfies ODE (2.19) with initial
shipment and quality level pattern (Q0, q0).
In addition, if the utility functions are twice differentiable and the Jacobian matrix
of F (X), denoted by ∇F (X), is positive-definite, then the corresponding F (X) is
strictly monotone, and the solution to variational inequality (3.20) is unique, if it
exists, according to Theorem 2.5.
Assumption 3.1
Suppose that in the supply chain network model with information asymmetry in quality
there exists a sufficiently large M , such that for any (i, j, k),
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∂Ui(Q, q)
∂Qijk
< 0, (3.28)
for all shipment patterns Q with Qijk ≥ M and that there exists a sufficiently large
M¯ , such that for any (i, j),
∂Ui(Q, q)
∂qij
< 0, (3.29)
for all quality level patterns q with qij ≥ M¯ ≥ qij.
I now give an existence result.
Proposition 3.1
Any supply chain network problem with information asymmetry in quality that sat-
isfies Assumption 3.1 possesses at least one equilibrium shipment and quality level
pattern satisfying variational inequality (3.19) (or (3.20)).
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 2.3 and Proposition 1 in Zhang and Nagurney
(1995). 2
For completeness, a uniqueness result is now presented, see also Theorem 2.5.
Proposition 3.2
Suppose that F is strictly monotone at any equilibrium point of the variational in-
equality problem defined in (3.20). Then it has at most one equilibrium point.
In addition, an existence and uniqueness result is recalled (cf. Theorem 2.6).
Theorem 3.2
Suppose that F is strongly monotone. Then there exists a unique solution to varia-
tional inequality (3.20); equivalently, to variational inequality (3.19).
Moreover, the stability properties of the utility gradient processes are summarized
(cf. Theorems 2.14, 2.15, and 2.16), under various monotonicity conditions on the
marginal utilities (cf. Definitions 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5).
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Theorem 3.3
(i). If F (X) is monotone, then every supply chain network equilibrium with infor-
mation asymmetry, X∗, provided its existence, is a global monotone attractor for the
projected dynamical system. If F (X) is locally monotone at X∗, then it is a monotone
attractor for the projected dynamical system.
(ii). If F (X) is strictly monotone, then there exists at most one supply chain net-
work equilibrium with information asymmetry in quality, X∗. Furthermore, given
existence, the unique equilibrium is a strictly global monotone attractor for the pro-
jected dynamical system. If F (X) is locally strictly monotone at X∗, then it is a
strictly monotone attractor for the projected dynamical system.
(iii). If F (X) is strongly monotone, then the unique supply chain network equilibrium
with information asymmetry in quality, which is guaranteed to exist, is also globally
exponentially stable for the projected dynamical system. If F (X) is locally strongly
monotone at X∗, then it is exponentially stable.
3.3. Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the
Supply Chain Network Model with Information Asym-
metry in Quality and Quality Competition
Here, I describe the realization of the Euler method, which is fully discussed in
Section 2.5.1, for the computation of the solution to variational inequality (3.19).
The Euler method yields, at each iteration, explicit formulae for the computation
of the product shipments and quality levels. In particular, for the product shipments,
for i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , ni; k = 1, . . . , nR:
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Qτ+1ijk = max{0, Qτijk + aτ (ρˆk(Qτ , qτ ) +
nR∑
l=1
∂ρˆl(Q
τ , qτ )
∂Qijk
ni∑
h=1
Qτihl −
ni∑
h=1
∂fˆih(Q
τ , qτ )
∂Qijk
−
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
l=1
∂cˆihl(Q
τ , qτ )
∂Qijk
)} (3.30)
and the following closed form expressions for the quality levels for i = 1, . . . , I; j =
1, . . . , ni:
qτ+1ij = max{qij, qτij + aτ (
nR∑
k=1
∂ρˆk(Q
τ , qτ )
∂qij
ni∑
h=1
Qτihk −
ni∑
h=1
∂fˆih(Q
τ , qτ )
∂qij
−
ni∑
h=1
nR∑
k=1
∂cˆihk(Q
τ , qτ )
∂qij
)}. (3.31)
I now provide the convergence result. The proof follows using similar arguments
as those in Nagurney and Zhang (1996) and Theorem 2.17.
Theorem 3.4
In the supply chain network model with information asymmetry in quality, let F (X) =
−∇U(Q, q), where all Ui; i = 1, . . . , I, are grouped into the vector U(Q, q), be strictly
monotone at any equilibrium shipment pattern and quality levels and assume that
Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Furthermore, assume that F is uniformly Lipschitz con-
tinuous. Then there exists a unique equilibrium product shipment and quality level
pattern (Q∗, q∗) ∈ K2, and any sequence generated by the Euler method as given by
(2.34), with explicit formulae at each iteration given by (3.30) and (3.31), where {aτ}
satisfies
∑∞
τ=0 aτ =∞, aτ > 0, aτ → 0, as τ →∞ converges to (Q∗, q∗).
3.4. Numerical Examples and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I present numerical supply chain network examples with informa-
tion asymmetry in quality, which were solved via the Euler method (cf. (3.30) and
(3.31)). I provide a spectrum of examples, accompanied by sensitivity analysis. The
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Euler method was implemented using Matlab on a Lenovo E46A. The convergence
tolerance is 10−6, so that the algorithm is deemed to have converged when the ab-
solute value of the difference between each successive product shipment and quality
level is less than or equal to 10−6. The sequence {aτ} is set to: .3{1, 12 , 12 , 13 , 13 , 13 , . . .}. I
initialized the algorithm by setting the product shipments equal to 20 and the quality
levels equal to 0.
Example 3.1
The supply chain network topology of Example 3.1 is given in Figure 3.2. There
are two firms, both of which have a single manufacturing plant and serve the same
demand market R1. The data are as follows.
lR1
M11
l M12l? ?
l1 l2Firm 1 Firm 2
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
QQs





+
Figure 3.2. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 3.1
The production cost functions at the manufacturing plants, M11 and M
1
2 , are:
fˆ11(Q111, q11) = 0.8Q
2
111 + 0.5Q111 + 0.25Q111q11 + 0.5q
2
11, (3.32)
fˆ21(Q211, q21) = Q
2
211 + 0.8Q211 + 0.3Q211q21 + 0.65q
2
21. (3.33)
The total transportation cost functions from the plants to the demand market R1
are:
cˆ111(Q111, q11) = 1.2Q
2
111 +Q111 + 0.25Q211 + 0.25q
2
11, (3.34)
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cˆ211(Q211, q21) = Q
2
211 +Q211 + 0.35Q111 + 0.3q
2
21. (3.35)
The demand price function at the demand market R1 is:
ρˆ1(Q, qˆ) = 2250− (Q111 +Q211) + 0.8qˆ1, (3.36)
with the average quality expression given by:
qˆ1 =
Q111q11 +Q211q21
Q111 +Q211
. (3.37)
Also, I assume there are no positive imposed minimum quality standards, so that:
q
11
= q
21
= 0.
The Euler method converges in 437 iterations and yields the following equilibrium
solution. The equilibrium product shipments are:
Q∗111 = 323.42, Q
∗
211 = 322.72,
with the equilibrium demand at the demand market being, hence, d∗1 = 646.14.
The equilibrium quality levels are:
q∗11 = 32.43, q
∗
21 = 16.91,
with the average quality level at R1, qˆ1, being 24.68.
The incurred demand market price at the equilibrium is:
ρˆ1 = 1623.60.
The profits of the firms are, respectively, 311,926.68 and 313,070.55.
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In terms of qualitative analysis, the Jacobian matrix of F (X) = −∇U(Q, q),
denoted by J(Q111, Q211, q11, q21), for this problem and evaluated at the equilibrium
point X∗ = (Q∗111, Q
∗
211, q
∗
11, q
∗
21) is:
J(Q111, Q211, q11, q21) =

5.99 1.01 −0.35 −0.20
0.99 6.01 −0.20 −0.30
−0.35 2.00 1.50 0
0.20 −0.30 0 1.90

.
The eigenvalues of 1
2
(J + JT ) are: 1.47, 1.88, 5.03, and 7.02, and are all positive.
Thus, the equilibrium solution is unique, and the conditions for convergence of the
algorithm are also satisfied (cf. Theorem 3.4). Moreover, according to Theorem 3.3,
the equilibrium solution X∗ is exponentially stable.
Then I conducted sensitivity analysis by varying q
11
and q
21
beginning with their
values set at 0 and increasing them to reflect the imposition of minimum quality
standards set to 200, 400, 600, 800, and 1000. I display the results of this sensitivity
analysis in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
As the imposed minimum quality standard of a firm increases, its equilibrium
quality level increases (cf. Figures 3.3.c and 3.3.d), which results in increasing pro-
duction and transportation costs for the firm. Thus, in order to alleviate increasing
costs, its equilibrium shipment quantity decreases as does its profit (cf. Figures 3.4.b
and 3.4.c). However, due to competition, its competitor’s product shipment increases
or at least remains the same (cf. Figures 3.3.a and 3.3.b).
Moreover, since consumers at the demand market do not differentiate between the
products from different firms, the average quality level at the demand market as well
as the price, which are determined by the quality levels of both firms (cf. (3.36) and
(3.37)), are for both firms’ products. Firms prefer a higher average quality, since,
at the same demand level, a higher average quality results in a higher price of the
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Figure 3.3. Equilibrium Product Shipments, Equilibrium Quality Levels, Average
Quality at the Demand Market, and Price at the Demand Market as q
11
and q
21
Vary
in Example 3.1
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Figure 3.4. Demand at R1 and the Profits of the Firms as q11 and q21 Vary in
Example 3.1
product. However, once a firm increases its own quality level, of course, the average
quality level and, hence, the price increases, but its total cost will also increase due
to the higher quality. Furthermore, the price increase is not only for the firm’s own
product, but also for its competitor’s product. If a firm increases its own quality,
both the firm and its competitor would get the benefits of the price increase, but only
the firm itself would pay for the quality improvement. Thus, a firm prefers a free
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ride, that is, it prefers that the other firm improve its product quality and, hence, the
price, rather than have it increase its own quality.
Consequently, a firm may not be willing to increase its quality levels, while the
other firm is, unless it is beneficial both cost-wise and profit-wise. This explains why,
as the minimum quality standard of one firm increases, its competitor’s quality level
increases slightly or remains the same (cf. Figures 3.3.c and 3.3.d).
When there is an enforced higher minimum quality standard imposed on a firm’s
plant(s), the firm is forced to achieve a higher quality level, which may bring its
own profit down but raise the competitor’s profit (cf. Figures 3.4.b and 3.4.c), even
though the latter firm may actually face a lower minimum quality standard. When
the minimum quality standard of a firm increases to a very high value, but that of its
competitor is low, the former firm will not be able to afford the high associated cost
with decreasing profit, and, hence, it will produce no product for the demand market
and will be forced to leave the market.
The above results and discussion indicate the same result, but in a much more
general supply chain network context, as found in Ronnen (1991), who, in speaking
about minimum quality standards, on page 492, noted that: “low-quality sellers
can be better off ... and high-quality sellers are worse off.” Also the computational
results support the statement on page 490 in Akerlof (1970) that “good cars may
be driven out of the market by lemons.” Moreover, the results also show that the
lower the competitor’s quality level, the more harmful the competitor is to the firm
with the high minimum quality standard, as shown in Figures 3.4.b and 3.4.c. The
implications of the sensitivity analysis for policy-makers are clear – the imposition of
a one-sided quality standard can have a negative impact on the firm in one’s region
(or country). Moreover, policy-makers, who are concerned about the products at
particular demand markets, should prevent firms located in regions with very low
minimum quality standards from entering the market; otherwise, they may not only
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bring the average quality level at the demand market(s) down and hurt the consumers,
but such products may also harm the profits of the other firms with much higher
quality levels and even drive them out of the market.
Therefore, it would be beneficial and fair for both firms and consumers if the
policy-makers at the same or different regions or even countries could impose the same
or at least similar minimum quality standards on plants serving the same demand
market(s). In addition, the minimum quality standards should be such that they will
not negatively impact either the high quality firms’ survival or the consumers at the
demand market(s).
Example 3.2
Example 3.2 is built from Example 3.1. In Example 3.2, there is an additional man-
ufacturing plant available for each of the two firms, and I assume that the new plant
for each firm has the same associated data as its original one. This would represent a
scenario in which each firm builds an identical plant in proximity to its original one.
Thus, the forms of the production cost functions associated with the new plants, M21
and M22 , and the total transportation cost functions associated with the new links to
R1 are the same as those for their counterparts in Example 3.1 (but depend on the
corresponding variables). This example has the topology given in Figure 3.5.
The data associated with the new plants are as below.
The production cost functions at the new manufacturing plants, M21 and M
2
2 , are:
fˆ12(Q121, q12) = 0.8Q
2
121 + 0.5Q121 + 0.25Q121q12 + 0.5q
2
12,
fˆ22(Q221, q22) = Q
2
221 + 0.8Q221 + 0.3Q221q22 + 0.65q
2
22.
The total transportation cost functions on the new links are:
cˆ121(Q121, q12) = 1.2Q
2
121 +Q121 + 0.25Q221 + 0.25q
2
12,
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Figure 3.5. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Examples 3.2 and 3.3
cˆ221(Q221, q22) = Q
2
221 +Q221 + 0.35Q121 + 0.3q
2
22.
The demand price function retains its functional form, but with the new potential
shipments added so that:
ρˆ1 = 2250− (Q111 +Q211 +Q121 +Q221) + 0.8qˆ1,
with the average quality at R1 expressed as:
qˆ1 =
Q111q11 +Q211q21 +Q121q12 +Q221q22
Q111 +Q211 +Q121 +Q211
.
Also, at the new manufacturing plants I have that, as in the original ones:
q
12
= q
22
= 0.
The Euler method converges in 408 iterations to the following equilibrium solution.
The equilibrium product shipments are:
Q∗111 = 225.96, Q
∗
121 = 225.96, Q
∗
211 = 225.54, Q
∗
221 = 225.54.
The equilibrium demand at R1 is, hence, d
∗
1 = 903.
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The equilibrium quality levels are:
q∗11 = 22.65, q
∗
12 = 22.65, q
∗
21 = 11.83, q
∗
22 = 11.83,
with the average quality level, qˆ1, now equal to 17.24. Note that the average quality
level has dropped precipitously from its value of 24.68 in Example 3.1.
The incurred demand market price at R1 is:
ρˆ1 = 1, 360.78.
The profits of the firms are, respectively, 406,615.47 and 407,514.97.
I now discuss the results. Since, for each firm, its new manufacturing plant and
the original one are assumed to be identical, the equilibrium product shipments and
the quality levels associated with the two plants are identical for each firm.
The availability of an additional manufacturing plant for each firm leads to the
following results. First, the total cost of manufacturing and transporting the same
amount of products is now less than in Example 3.1 for each firm, which can be
verified by substituting Q111 +Q121 for Q111 and Q211 +Q221 for Q211 in (3.32) - (3.35)
and comparing the total cost of each firm in Example 3.1 with that in Example 3.2.
Hence, although the product shipments produced by the same manufacturing plant
decrease in comparison to the associated values in Example 3.1, the total amount
supplied by each firm increases, as does the total demand. The strategy of building
an identical plant at the same location as the original one appears to be cost-wise and
profitable for the firms; however, at the expense of a decrease in the average quality
level at the demand market, as reflected in the results for Example 3.2. Policy-makers
may wish to take note of this.
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The Jacobian matrix of F (X) = −∇U(Q, q), J(Q111, Q121, Q211, Q221, q11, q12, q21,
q22), and evaluated at X
∗ for Example 3.2, is
J(Q111, Q121, Q211, Q221, q11, q12, q21, q22)
=

5.99 1.99 1.00 1.00 −0.25 −0.10 −0.10 −0.10
1.00 6.00 1.00 1.00 −0.10 −0.25 −0.10 −0.10
1.00 1.00 6.00 2.01 −0.10 −0.10 −0.20 −0.10
1.00 1.00 2.00 6.00 −0.10 −0.10 −0.10 −0.20
−0.25 −0.10 0.10 0.10 1.50 0 0 0
−0.10 −0.25 0.10 0.10 0 1.50 0 0
0.10 0.10 −0.20 −0.10 0 0 1.90 0
0.10 0.10 −0.10 −0.20 0 0 0 1.90

.
The Jacobian matrix for this example is strictly diagonally dominant, which guar-
antees its positive-definiteness. Thus, the equilibrium solution X∗ is unique, the
conditions for convergence of the algorithm are satisfied, and the equilibrium solution
is exponentially stable.
Example 3.3
Example 3.3 is constructed from Example 3.2, but now the new plant for firm 1,
M21 , is located in a country where the production cost is much lower but the total
transportation cost to the demand market R1 is higher, in comparison to the data in
Example 3.2. In addition, the location of the second plant of firm 2, M22 , also changes,
resulting in both a higher production cost and a higher transportation cost to R1.
Thus, the new manufacturing plants for each firm now have different associated cost
functions as given below.
The production cost functions of the new plants, M21 and M
2
2 , are:
fˆ12(Q121, q12) = 0.3Q
2
121 + 0.1Q121 + 0.3Q121q12 + 0.4q
2
12,
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fˆ22(Q221, q22) = 1.2Q
2
221 + 0.5Q221 + 0.3Q221q22 + 0.5q
2
22.
The total transportation cost functions on the new links are now:
cˆ121(Q121, q12) = 1.8Q
2
121 +Q121 + 0.25Q221 + 0.25q
2
12,
cˆ221(Q221, q22) = 1.5Q
2
221 + 0.8Q221 + 0.3Q121 + 0.3q
2
22.
The Euler method converges in 498 iterations, yielding the equilibrium product
shipments:
Q∗111 = 232.86, Q
∗
121 = 221.39, Q
∗
211 = 240.82, Q
∗
221 = 178.45,
with an equilibrium demand d∗1 = 873.52. The equilibrium quality levels are:
q∗11 = 25.77, q
∗
12 = 19.76, q
∗
21 = 10.64, q
∗
22 = 9.37,
with the average quality level at R1, qˆ1, equal to 16.73. The incurred demand market
price is
ρˆ1 = 1, 389.86.
The profits of the firms are, respectively, 415,706.05 and 378,496.95,
Although the production cost of firm 1’s foreign plant, M21 , is lower than that
of the original plant, M11 , because of the high transportation cost to the demand
market, the quantity produced at and shipped from M21 decreases, in comparison to
the value in Example 3.2. In addition, because of the higher manufacturing cost at
firm 2’s foreign plant, M22 , the total supply of the product from firm 2 now decreases.
The other results are: the demand at demand market R1 decreases and the average
quality there decreases slightly.
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The Jacobian matrix of F (X) = −∇U(Q, q) at equilibrium, denoted by J(Q111,
Q121, Q211, Q221, q11, q12, q21, q22), for this example, is
J(Q111, Q121, Q211, Q221, q11, q12, q21, q22)
=

5.99 1.99 1.01 1.01 −0.27 −0.10 −0.11 −0.08
1.99 6.20 1.00 1.00 −0.10 −0.21 −0.11 −0.08
0.99 1.00 6.01 2.01 −0.11 −0.11 −0.20 −0.08
0.99 1.00 2.01 7.41 −0.11 −0.11 −0.11 −0.17
−0.27 −0.10 0.11 0.11 1.50 0 0 0
−0.10 −0.21 0.11 0.11 0 1.30 0 0
0.11 0.11 −0.20 −0.11 0 0 1.90 0
0.08 0.08 −0.08 −0.17 0 0 0 1.60

.
This Jacobian matrix is strictly diagonally dominant. Thus, it is positive-definite,
and the uniqueness of the computed equilibrium is guaranteed. Also, the conditions
for convergence of the algorithm are satisfied. The equilibrium solution for Example
3.3 has the same qualitative properties as the solution to Example 3.2.
Example 3.4
Example 3.4 considers the following scenario. Please refer to Figure 3.6 for the supply
chain network topology for this example. There is a new demand market, R2, added
to Example 3.3, which is located closer to both firms’ manufacturing plants than the
original demand market R1. The total transportation cost functions for transporting
the product to R2 for both firms, respectively, are:
cˆ112(Q112, q11) = 0.8Q
2
112 +Q112 + 0.2Q212 + 0.05q
2
11, (3.38)
cˆ122(Q122, q12) = 0.75Q
2
122 +Q122 + 0.25Q222 + 0.03q
2
12, (3.39)
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Figure 3.6. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 3.4
cˆ212(Q212, q21) = 0.6Q
2
212 +Q212 + 0.3Q112 + 0.02q
2
21, (3.40)
cˆ222(Q222, q22) = 0.5Q
2
222 + 0.8Q222 + 0.25Q122 + 0.05q
2
22. (3.41)
The production cost functions at the manufacturing plants have the same func-
tional forms as in Example 3.3, but now they include the additional shipments to the
new demand market, R2, that is:
fˆ12(Q121, Q122, q12) = 0.3(Q121+Q122)
2+0.1(Q121+Q122)+0.3(Q121+Q122)q12+0.4q
2
12,
fˆ22(Q221, Q222, q22) = 1.2(Q221+Q222)
2+0.5(Q221+Q222)+0.3(Q221+Q222)q22+0.5q
2
22.
fˆ11(Q111, Q112, q11) = 0.8(Q111+Q112)
2+0.5(Q111+Q112)+0.25(Q111+Q112)q11+0.5q
2
11,
fˆ21(Q211, Q212, q21) = (Q211 +Q212)
2 +0.8(Q211 +Q212)+0.3(Q211 +Q212)q21 +0.65q
2
21.
In addition, consumers at the new demand market R2 are more sensitive to the
quality of the product than consumers at the original demand marketR1. The demand
price functions for both the demand markets are, respectively:
ρˆ1 = 2250− (Q111 +Q211 +Q121 +Q221) + 0.8qˆ1,
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ρˆ2 = 2250− (Q112 +Q122 +Q212 +Q222) + 0.9qˆ2,
where
qˆ1 =
Q111q11 +Q211q21 +Q121q12 +Q221q22
Q111 +Q211 +Q121 +Q211
,
and
qˆ2 =
Q112q11 +Q212q21 +Q122q12 +Q222q22
Q112 +Q212 +Q122 +Q222
.
The Euler method converges in 597 iterations, and the equilibrium solution is as
below. The equilibrium product shipments are:
Q∗111 = 208.70, Q
∗
121 = 211.82, Q
∗
211 = 203.90, Q
∗
221 = 129.79,
Q∗112 = 165.39, Q
∗
122 = 352.11, Q
∗
212 = 182.30, Q
∗
222 = 200.05.
The equilibrium demands at the two demand markets are now d∗1 = 754.21 and
d∗2 = 899.85.
The equilibrium quality levels are:
q∗11 = 53.23, q
∗
12 = 79.08, q
∗
21 = 13.41, q
∗
22 = 13.82.
The value of qˆ1 is 42.94 and that of qˆ2 is 46.52.
The incurred demand market prices are:
ρˆ1 = 1, 530.15, ρˆ2 = 1, 392.03.
The profits of the firms are, respectively, 882,342.15 and 651,715.83.
Due to the addition of R2, which has associated lower transportation costs, each
firm ships more product to demand market R2 than to R1, and, at the same time,
some of the previous demand at R1 is shifted to R2. Hence, the total demand d1 + d2
is now 88.76% larger than the total demand d1 in Example 3.2.
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In addition, firm 1 is the one with larger market shares, and is able to achieve
higher profit by attaining higher quality levels. Thus, as the total demand increases,
the quality levels of firm 1 increase significantly. However, since it is not cost-wise for
firm 2 to do so, due to its higher costs and lower market shares, firm 2 prefers a “free
ride” from firm 1 with its quality levels basically remaining the same. The average
quality levels, nevertheless, increase substantially anyway, which leads to the increase
in the prices and both firms’ profits.
The Jacobian matrix of −∇U(Q, q), for Example 3.4, evaluated at the equilibrium,
and denoted by J(Q111, Q121, Q211, Q221, Q112, Q122, Q212, Q222, q11, q12, q21, q22), is
J(Q111, Q121, Q211, Q221, Q112, Q122, Q212, Q222, q11, q12, q21, q22)
=

5.99 1.98 1.02 1.02 1.60 0 0 0 −0.29 −0.10 −0.10 −0.06
1.98 6.17 1.04 1.04 0 0.60 0 0 −0.10 −0.25 −0.10 −0.06
0.98 0.96 6.03 2.03 0 0 2.00 0 −0.12 −0.13 −0.17 −0.08
0.98 0.96 2.03 7.43 0 0 0 2.40 −0.12 −0.13 −0.12 −0.13
1.60 0 0 0 5.19 1.98 1.02 1.02 −0.34 −0.15 −0.08 −0.09
0 0.60 0 0 1.98 4.07 1.03 1.03 −0.07 −0.37 −0.08 −0.09
0 0 2.00 0 0.98 0.97 5.24 2.04 −0.10 −0.20 −0.19 −0.12
0 0 0 2.40 0.98 0.97 2.04 5.44 −0.10 −0.20 −0.10 −0.20
−0.29 −0.10 0.12 0.12 −0.34 −0.07 0.10 0.10 1.60 0 0 0
−0.10 −0.25 0.13 0.13 −0.15 −0.37 0.20 0.20 0 1.36 0 0
0.10 0.10 −0.17 −0.12 0.08 0.08 −0.19 −0.10 0 0 1.94 0
0.06 0.06 −0.08 −0.13 0.09 0.09 −0.12 −0.20 0 0 0 1.70

.
The eigenvalues of 1
2
(J + JT ) are all positive and are: 1.29, 1.55, 1.66, 1.71,
1.93, 2.04, 3.76, 4.73, 6.14, 7.55, 8.01, and 11.78. Therefore, both the uniqueness
of the equilibrium solution and the conditions for convergence of the algorithm are
guaranteed. The equilibrium solution to Example 3.4 is exponentially stable.
I now explore the impact of the firms’ proximity to the second demand market
R2. I multiply the coefficient of the second Qijk term, that is, the linear one, in each
of the transportation cost functions cˆijk (3.38) – (3.41) by a positive factor β, but
retain the other transportation cost functions as in Example 3.4. I vary β from 0 to
50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, and 350. The results are reported in Figure 3.7.
As β increases, that is, as R2 is located farther, the transportation costs to R2
increase. In order to decrease their total costs and increase their profits, firms ship
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Figure 3.7. The Equilibrium Demands, Average Quality Levels, Prices at the De-
mand Markets, and the Profits of the Firms as β Varies in Example 3.4
less of the product to R2 while their shipments to R1 increase, as shown in Figure
3.7.a. In addition, at the same time, firms cannot afford higher quality as the total
costs of both firms increase, so the average quality levels at both demand markets
decrease, as indicated in Figure 3.7.b. Due to the changes in the demands and the
average quality levels, the price at R1 decreases, but that at R2 increases, and the
profits of both firms decrease, as in Figures 3.7.c and 3.7.d. When β = 350, demand
market R2 will be removed from the supply chain network, due to the demand there
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dropping to zero. Thus, when β = 350, the results of Example 3.4 are the same as
those for Example 3.3.
The numerical examples in this section, along with the sensitivity analysis results,
reveal the type of questions that can be explored and addressed through computations.
Moreover, the analyses demonstrate the impacts of minimum quality standards even
“across borders” as well as the importance of the location of manufacturing plants
vis a vis the demand markets. The insights gained from the numerical examples are
useful to firms, to consumers at demand markets, as well as to policy-makers.
3.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I developed a framework for the modeling, analysis, and computa-
tion of solutions to competitive supply chain network problems in static and dynamic
settings in which there is information asymmetry in quality. I also demonstrated
how this framework can capture the inclusion of policy interventions in the form of
minimum quality standards.
This chapter adds to the literature on information asymmetry with imperfect
competition, and which has focused on analytical results for stylized problems. It
also contributes to the literature on supply chains with quality competition and re-
veals the spectrum of insights that can be obtained through computations, supported
by theoretical analysis. Finally, it contributes to the integration of economics with
operations research and the management sciences.
The model discussed in this chapter focuses on information asymmetry in quality
without product differentiation. As revealed by the model and the numerical exam-
ples, without product differentiation, no matter how high a firm’s quality level(s)
is, the quality level perceived by consumers at the demand market is only the av-
erage quality level of all firms. Thus, it is important for firms to differentiate their
products from the other products, in order to prevent the “free ride” from the other
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firms. In the next chapter, Chapter 4, a dynamic Cournot-Nash model with quality
competition and product differentiation is established. Numerical examples are also
provided.
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CHAPTER 4
A SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK MODEL WITH
TRANSPORTATION COSTS, PRODUCT
DIFFERENTIATION, AND QUALITY COMPETITION
In this chapter, I develop both static and dynamic models of Cournot-Nash com-
petition that include production and transportation costs, product differentiation,
and quality levels in a supply chain network framework. The production costs cap-
ture the cost of quality, which, in turn, can also represent the R&D cost. I first
present the equilibrium version of the model and derive alternative variational in-
equality formulations. The projected dynamical systems model, which provides a
continuous-time evolution of the firms’ product shipments and product quality levels,
is also constructed. In addition, I establish stability analysis results using theorems
given in Section 2.3, and construct a discrete-time version of the continuous-time ad-
justment process using the Euler method discussed in Section 2.5.1. This algorithm
is then utilized to compute solutions to several numerical examples.
The framework established in this chapter can serve as the foundation for the
modeling and analysis of competition among firms in industries ranging from food to
pharmaceuticals to durable goods and high tech products, as well as Internet services,
where quality and product differentiation are seminal.
In this chapter, the supply chain network model of Cournot-Nash competition
with transportation costs, product differentiation, and quality levels is established
without minimum quality standards (cf. Chapter 3). However, using the methodolo-
gies provided in Chapter 2, minimum quality standards can be easily embedded in
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both the static and the dynamic models as well as the computational procedure of
the models.
This chapter is based on Nagurney and Li (2014b), and is organized as follows. In
Section 4.1, I present the static version of the supply chain network model, and es-
tablish alternative variational inequality formulations of the governing Cournot-Nash
equilibrium conditions. I then present its dynamic counterpart and show that the
set of equilibria coincides with the set of stationary points of the projected dynami-
cal systems supply chain network model. In Section 4.2, I present stability analysis
results, and illustrate the concepts with several numerical examples. In Section 4.3,
I propose the discrete-time adjustment process, which provides an approximation to
the continuous-time trajectories of the firm’s product shipments and quality levels
over time. In Section 4.4, the algorithm is applied to track the trajectories over time
and to compute the stationary points; equivalently, the equilibria. I summarize the
results and present the conclusions in Section 4.5.
4.1. The Supply Chain Network Model with Transportation
Costs, Product Differentiation, and Quality Competi-
tion
In this section, I develop a supply chain network model with product differen-
tiation and quality competition. It is assumed that the firms compete under the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept of non-cooperative behavior and select both their
product shipments as well as the quality levels of their products. The consumers, in
turn, signal their preferences for the products through the demand price functions
associated with the demand markets, which are spatially separated. The demand
price functions are, in general, functions of the demands for the products at all the
demand markets as well as the quality levels of the products.
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Figure 4.1. The Supply Chain Network Topology
I first develop the equilibrium model and derive the variational inequality formu-
lation. Then, the underlying dynamics associated with the firms’ production outputs
as well as quality levels and the projected dynamical systems model whose set of sta-
tionary points corresponds to the set of solutions of the variational inequality problem
is presented.
Please refer to Figure 4.1 for the underlying network structure of the supply chain
network with product differentiation.
There are I firms and nR demand markets that are generally spatially separated.
There is a distinct (but substitutable) product produced by each of the I firms and is
consumed at the nR demand markets. Let si denote the nonnegative product output
produced by firm i and let dik denote the demand for the product of firm i at demand
market Rk. Let Qik denote the nonnegative shipment of firm i’s product to demand
market Rk. I group the production outputs into the vector s ∈ RI+, the demands into
the vector d ∈ RInR+ , and the product shipments into the vector Q ∈ RInR+ . Here qi
denotes the quality level, or, simply, the quality, of product i, which is produced by
firm i. The quality levels of all firms are grouped into the vector q ∈ RI+. All vectors
here are assumed to be column vectors, except where noted.
The following conservation of flow equations must hold:
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si =
nR∑
k=1
Qik, i = 1, . . . , I; (4.1)
dik = Qik, i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR, (4.2)
Qik ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR, (4.3)
and since the quality levels must also be nonnegative, as in Chapter 3 (cf. (3.4)),
qi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I. (4.4)
Hence, the quantity of the product produced by each firm is equal to the sum
of the amounts shipped to all the demand markets, and the quantity of a firm’s
product consumed at a demand market is equal to the amount shipped from the firm
to that demand market. Both the shipment volumes and the quality levels must be
nonnegative.
A production cost fˆi is associated with each firm i. Although the products pro-
duced by the firms are differentiated by brands, they are still substitutes. Common
factors maybe utilized in the process of manufacturing. Hence, I allow for the general
situation where the production cost of a firm i may depend upon the entire production
pattern and on its own quality level, that is,
fˆi = fˆi(s, qi), i = 1, . . . , I. (4.5)
It is assumed here that the functions in (4.5) also capture the quality cost (cf.
Section 1.1), since, as a special case, the above functions can take on the form
fˆi(s, qi) = fi(s, qi) + gi(qi), i = 1, . . . , I, (4.6)
where the first term depends on both quality and production outputs and the second
term only depends on the quality. Interestingly, the second term in (4.6) can also be
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interpreted as the R&D cost of the firm, which is assumed to depend on the quality
level of its products (cf. Section 1.1).
The production cost functions (4.5) (and (4.6)) are assumed to be convex and
twice continuously differentiable.
Similar as in Chapter 3 (cf. 3.8a and b), the demand price function for a product
at a demand market is presented by function (4.7):
ρik = ρik(d, q), i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR. (4.7)
Unlike functions (3.8a) and (3.8b) in Chapter 3, (4.7) is the demand price function
under product differentiation. It also depends, in general, not only on the entire
consumption pattern, but also on all the levels of quality of all the products.
The demand price functions are, typically, assumed to be monotonically decreasing
in product quantity but increasing in terms of product quality.
Let cˆik denote the total transportation cost associated with shipping firm i’s prod-
uct to demand market Rk, where the total transportation cost is given by the function:
cˆik = cˆik(Qik), i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR. (4.8)
In contrast to the transportation cost functions in Chapter 3 (cf. (3.6)), in (4.8), I
assume that transportation activities will not affect product quality.
The demand price functions (4.7) and the total transportation cost functions (4.8)
are assumed to be continuous and twice continuously differentiable.
The strategic variables of firm i are its product shipments {Qi} where Qi =
(Qi1, . . . , QinR) and its quality level qi. The profit or utility Ui of firm i; i = 1, . . . , I,
is, hence, given by the expression
Ui =
nR∑
k=1
ρikdik − fˆi −
nR∑
k=1
cˆik, (4.9)
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which is the difference between its total revenue and its total cost.
In view of (4.1) - (4.9), one may write the profit as a function solely of the shipment
pattern and quality levels, that is,
U = U(Q, q), (4.10)
where U is the I-dimensional vector with components: {U1, . . . , UI}.
Let Ki denote the feasible set corresponding to firm i, where Ki ≡ {(Qi, qi)|Qi ≥
0, and qi ≥ 0} and define K ≡
∏I
i=1K
i.
I consider the market mechanism in which the I firms supply their products in
a non-cooperative fashion, each one trying to maximize its own profit. They seek
to determine a nonnegative product shipment and quality level pattern (Q∗, q∗) for
which the I firms will be in a state of equilibrium as defined below (cf. Definition
2.7).
Definition 4.1: A Supply Chain Network Cournot-Nash Equilibrium with
Product Differentiation and Quality Levels
A product shipment and quality level pattern (Q∗, q∗) ∈ K is said to constitute a
supply chain network Cournot-Nash equilibrium if for each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I,
Ui(Q
∗
i , q
∗
i , Qˆ
∗
i , qˆ
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(Qi, qi, Qˆ∗i , qˆ∗i ), ∀(Qi, qi) ∈ Ki, (4.11)
where
Qˆ∗i ≡ (Q∗1, . . . , Q∗i−1, Q∗i+1, . . . , Q∗I); and qˆ∗i ≡ (q∗1, . . . , q∗i−1, q∗i+1, . . . , q∗I ). (4.12)
According to (4.11), an equilibrium is established if no firm can unilaterally im-
prove upon its profits by selecting an alternative vector of product shipments and
quality level of its product.
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I now present alternative variational inequality formulations of the above supply
chain network Cournot-Nash equilibrium with product differentiation in the following
theorem.
Theorem 4.1
Assume that, for each firm i, the profit function Ui(Q, q) is concave with respect to the
variables {Qi1, . . . , QinR}, and qi, and is continuous and continuously differentiable.
Then (Q∗, q∗) ∈ K is a supply chain network Cournot-Nash equilibrium according to
Definition 4.1 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality
−
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
∂Ui(Q
∗, q∗)
∂Qik
× (Qik −Q∗ik)−
I∑
i=1
∂Ui(Q
∗, q∗)
∂qi
× (qi − q∗i ) ≥ 0, ∀(Q, q) ∈ K,
(4.13)
or, equivalently, (s∗, Q∗, d∗, q∗) ∈ K1 is an equilibrium production, shipment, con-
sumption, and quality level pattern if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality
I∑
i=1
∂fˆi(s
∗, q∗i )
∂si
× (si− s∗i ) +
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
[
∂cˆik(Q
∗
ik)
∂Qik
−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρil(d
∗, q∗)
∂dik
× d∗il
]
× (Qik −Q∗ik)
−
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
ρik(d
∗, q∗)× (dik − d∗ik)
+
I∑
i=1
[
∂fˆi(s
∗, q∗i )
∂qi
−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρil(d
∗, q∗)
∂qi
× d∗il
]
× (qi − q∗i ) ≥ 0, ∀(s,Q, d, q) ∈ K1,
(4.14)
where K1 ≡ {(s,Q, d, q)|Q ≥ 0, q ≥ 0, and (4.1) and (4.2) hold}.
Proof: (4.13) follows directly from Gabay and Moulin (1980) and Dafermos and
Nagurney (1987), as given in Theorem 2.7.
In order to obtain variational inequality (4.14) from variational inequality (4.13),
it is noted that:
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− ∂Ui
∂Qik
=
[
∂fˆi
∂si
+
∂cˆik
∂Qik
− ρik −
nR∑
l=1
∂ρil
∂dik
× dil
]
; i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR;
(4.15)
and
−∂Ui
∂qi
=
[
∂fˆi
∂qi
−
nR∑
k=1
∂ρil
∂qi
× dil
]
; i = 1, . . . , I. (4.16)
Multiplying the right-most expression in (4.15) by (Qik − Q∗ik) and summing the
resultant over all i and all k; similarly, multiplying the right-most expression in (4.16)
by (qi − q∗i ) and summing the resultant over all i yields, respectively:
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
[
∂fˆi
∂si
+
∂cˆik
∂Qik
− ρik −
nR∑
l=1
∂ρil
∂dik
× dil
]
× (Qik −Q∗ik) (4.17)
and
I∑
i=1
[
∂fˆi
∂qi
−
nR∑
l=1
∂ρil
∂qi
× dil
]
× (qi − q∗i ). (4.18)
Finally, summing (4.17) and (4.18) and then using constraints (4.1) and (4.2), yields
variational inequality (4.14). 2
I now put the above supply chain network equilibrium problem with product
differentiation and quality levels into standard variational inequality form, as in (2.1a),
that is,
Determine X∗ ∈ K ⊂ RN , such that
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (4.19)
where F is a given continuous function from K to RN and K is a closed and convex
set.
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I define the (InR+I)-dimensional vector X ≡ (Q, q) and the (InR+I)-dimensional
row vector F (X) = (F 1(X), F 2(X)) with the (i, k)-th component, F 1ik, of F
1(X) given
by
F 1ik(X) ≡ −
∂Ui(Q, q)
∂Qik
, (4.20)
the i-th component, F 2i , of F
2(X) given by
F 2i (X) ≡ −
∂Ui(Q, q)
∂qi
, (4.21)
and with the feasible set K ≡ K. Then, clearly, variational inequality (4.13) can be
put into standard form (2.1a).
In a similar manner, one can establish that variational inequality (4.14) can also
be put into standard variational inequality form (2.1a).
I now propose a dynamic adjustment process for the evolution of the firms’ product
shipments and product quality levels. Observe that, for a current product shipment
and quality level pattern at time t, X(t) = (Q(t), q(t)), −F 1ik(X(t)) = ∂Ui(Q(t),q(t))∂Qik ,
given by (4.20), is the marginal utility (profit) of firm i with respect to its prod-
uct shipment to demand market Rk. Similarly, −F 2i (X(t)) = ∂Ui(Q(t),q(t))∂qi , given by
(4.21), is the firm’s marginal utility (profit) with respect to its quality level. In this
framework, the rate of change of the product shipment between a firm and demand
market pair (i, k) is in proportion to −F 1ik(X), as long as the product shipment Qik
is positive. Namely, when Qik > 0,
Q˙ik =
∂Ui(Q, q)
∂Qik
, (4.22)
where Q˙ik denotes the rate of change of Qik. However, when Qik = 0, the nonnegativ-
ity condition (4.3) forces the product shipment Qik to remain zero when
∂Ui(Q,q)
∂Qik
≤ 0.
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Hence, in this case, One is only guaranteed of having possible increases of the ship-
ment. Namely, when Qik = 0,
Q˙ik = max{0, ∂Ui(Q, q)
∂Qik
}. (4.23)
One may write (4.22) and (4.23) concisely as:
Q˙ik =

∂Ui(Q,q)
∂Qik
, if Qik > 0
max{0, ∂Ui(Q,q)
∂Qik
}, if Qik = 0.
(4.24)
As for the quality levels, when qi > 0, then
q˙i =
∂Ui(Q, q)
∂qi
, (4.25)
where q˙i denotes the rate of change of qi; otherwise:
q˙i = max{0, ∂Ui(Q, q)
∂qi
}, (4.26)
since qi must be nonnegative.
Combining (4.25) and (4.26), one may write:
q˙i =

∂Ui(Q,q)
∂qi
, if qi > 0
max{0, ∂Ui(Q,q)
∂qi
}, if qi = 0.
(4.27)
Applying (4.24) to all firm and demand market pairs (i, k); i = 1, . . . , I; k =
1, . . . , nR, and applying (4.27) to all firms i; i = 1, . . . , I, and combining the resultants,
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yields the following pertinent ordinary differential equation (ODE) (cf. (2.19)) for the
adjustment processes of the product shipments and quality levels, in vector form, as:
X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)), (4.28)
where, F (X) = −∇U(Q, q), where ∇U(Q, q) is the vector of marginal utilities with
components given by (4.20) and (4.21).
I now interpret the ODE (4.28) in the context of the supply chain network model
with product differentiation and quality competition. First, note that ODE (4.28)
ensures that the production shipments and quality levels are always nonnegative.
Indeed, if one were to consider, instead, the ordinary differential equation: X˙ =
−F (X), or, equivalently, X˙ = ∇U(X), such an ODE would not ensure that X(t) ≥ 0,
for all t ≥ 0, unless additional restrictive assumptions were to be imposed. ODE
(4.28), however, retains the interpretation that if X at time t lies in the interior of K,
then the rate at which X changes is greatest when the vector field −F (X) is greatest.
Moreover, when the vector field −F (X) pushes X to the boundary of the feasible
set K, then the projection ΠK ensures that X stays within K. Hence, the product
shipments and quality levels are always nonnegative.
Although the use of the projection on the right-hand side of ODE (4.28) guarantees
that the product shipments and the quality levels are always nonnegative, it also raises
the question of existence of a solution to ODE (4.28), since this ODE is nonstandard
due to its discontinuous right-hand side. The fundamental theory of existence and
uniqueness of projected dynamical systems is given in Theorem 2.13.
In addition, as in Theorem 2.12, the necessary and sufficient condition for a prod-
uct shipment and quality level pattern X∗ = (Q∗, q∗) to be a supply chain network
Cournot-Nash equilibrium, according to Definition 4.1, is that X∗ = (Q∗, q∗) is a
stationary point of the adjustment process defined by ODE (4.28), that is, X∗ is the
point at which X˙ = 0.
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Consider now the competitive system consisting of firm who, in order to maximize
their utilities, adjust their product shipment and quality level patterns by instantly
responding to the marginal utilities, according to (4.28). The following questions
naturally arise and are of interest. Does the utility gradient process defined by (4.28),
approach a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, and how does it approach an equilibrium in
term of the convergence rate? Also, for a given Cournot-Nash equilibrium, do all the
disequilibrium shipment and quality level patterns that are close to this equilibrium
always stay near by? Motivated by these questions, I now present some stability
analysis results for the Cournot-Nash equilibrium, under the above utility gradient
process.
4.2. Stability Under Monotonicity
As provided in Theorem 2.13, Lipschitz continuity of F (X) (cf. Definition 2.6)
guarantees the existence of a unique solution to (4.28), where X0(t) satisfies ODE
(4.28) with initial shipment and quality level pattern (Q0, q0). In other words, X0(t)
solves the initial value problem (4.28).
In the context of the supply chain network problem with product differentiation
and quality competition, where F (X) is the vector of negative marginal utilities as
in (4.20) – (4.21), if the utility functions are twice differentiable and the Jacobian of
the negative marginal utility functions (or, equivalently, the negative of the Hessian
matrix of the utility functions) is positive-definite, then the corresponding F (X) is
strictly monotone.
In a practical supply chain network model, it is reasonable to expect that the
utility of any firm i, Ui(Q, q), would decrease whenever its output has become suffi-
ciently large, that is, when Ui is differentiable,
∂Ui(Q,q)
∂Qik
is negative for sufficiently large
Qik; the same holds for sufficiently large qi. Hence, the following assumption is not
unreasonable:
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Assumption 4.1
Suppose that in the supply chain network model there exists a sufficiently large M ,
such that for any (i, k),
∂Ui(Q, q)
∂Qik
< 0, (4.29)
for all shipment patterns Q with Qik ≥ M and that there exists a sufficiently large
M¯ , such that for any i,
∂Ui(Q, q)
∂qi
< 0, (4.30)
for all quality level patterns q with qi ≥ M¯ .
I now give an existence result.
Proposition 4.1
Any supply chain network problem, as described above, that satisfies Assumption 4.1
possesses at least one equilibrium shipment and quality level pattern.
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 2.3 and Zhang and Nagurney (1995). 2
For completeness, a uniqueness result is now presented (cf. Theorem 2.5).
Proposition 4.2
Suppose that F is strictly monotone at any equilibrium point of the variational in-
equality problem defined in (4.19). Then it has at most one equilibrium point.
In addition, an existence and uniqueness result is recalled (cf. Theorem 2.6).
Theorem 4.2
Suppose that F is strongly monotone. Then there exists a unique solution to varia-
tional inequality (4.19); equivalently, to variational inequality (4.14).
Additionally, the following theorem presents the stability results of the projected
dynamical system described in (4.28) (cf. Theorems 2.14, 2.15, and 2.16).
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Theorem 4.3
(i). If −∇U(Q, q) is monotone, then every supply chain network Cournot-Nash equi-
librium, provided its existence, is a global monotone attractor for the utility gradient
process.
(ii). If −∇U(Q, q) is strictly monotone, then there exists at most one supply chain
network Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, provided existence, the unique spa-
tial Cournot-Nash equilibrium is a strictly global monotone attractor for the utility
gradient process.
(iii). If −∇U(Q, q) is strongly monotone, then there exists a unique supply chain
network Cournot-Nash equilibrium, which is globally exponentially stable for the utility
gradient process.
I now present two examples in order to illustrate some of the above concepts and
results.
Example 4.1
Consider a supply chain network problem consisting of two firms and one demand
market, as depicted in Figure 4.2.
R1 Demand Market
@
@
@
@
 
 
 
 R	
Firm 1 1 Firm 22
Figure 4.2. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 4.1
The production cost functions are:
fˆ1(s, q1) = s
2
1 + s1s2 + 2q
2
1 + 39, fˆ2(s, q2) = 2s
2
2 + 2s1s2 + q
2
2 + 37,
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the total transportation cost functions are:
cˆ11(Q11) = Q
2
11 + 10, cˆ21(Q21) = 7Q
2
21 + 10,
and the demand price functions are:
ρ11(d, q) = 100− d11 − 0.4d21 + 0.3q1 + 0.05q2,
ρ21(d, q) = 100− 0.6d11 − 1.5d21 + 0.1q1 + 0.5q2.
The utility function of firm 1 is, hence:
U1(Q, q) = ρ11d11 − fˆ1 − cˆ11,
whereas the utility function of firm 2 is:
U2(Q, q) = ρ21d21 − fˆ2 − cˆ21.
The Jacobian matrix of -∇U(Q, q), denoted by J(Q11, Q21, q1, q2), is
J(Q11, Q21, q1, q2) =

6 1.4 −0.3 −0.5
2.6 21 −0.1 −0.5
−0.3 0 4 0
0 −0.5 0 2

.
This Jacobian matrix is positive-definite, since it is strictly diagonally dominant,
and, hence, minus the gradient of the utility functions, that is, -∇U(Q, q) is strongly
monotone (see also Nagurney (1999)). Thus, both the existence and uniqueness of the
solution to variational inequality (4.13) with respect to this example are guaranteed
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(Theorem 4.2). Moreover, the equilibrium solution, which is: Q∗11 = 16.08, Q
∗
21 =
2.79, q∗1 = 1.21, and q
∗
2 = 0.70, is globally exponentially stable, according to Theorem
4.3.
Example 4.2
Another example with two firms and two demand markets, as depicted in Figure 4.3,
is presented.
Demand Markets  ? ?
Firm 1  Firm 2HHHHHHHH
 j
1 2
R1 R2
Figure 4.3. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 4.2
The production cost functions of the two firms are:
fˆ1(s, q1) = s
2
1 + s1s2 + 2q
2
1 + 39, fˆ2(s, q2) = 2s
2
2 + 2s1s2 + q
2
2 + 37,
the total transportation cost functions are:
cˆ11(Q11) = Q
2
11 + 10, cˆ12(Q12) = 5Q
2
12 + 7,
cˆ21(Q21) = 7Q
2
21 + 10, cˆ22(Q22) = 2Q
2
22 + 5,
and the demand price functions are:
ρ11(d, q) = 100− d11 − 0.4d21 + 0.3q1 + 0.05q2,
ρ12(d, q) = 100− 2d12 − d22 + 0.4q1 + 0.2q2,
100
ρ21(d, q) = 100− 0.6d11 − 1.5d21 + 0.1q1 + 0.5q2,
ρ22(d, q) = 100− 0.7d12 − 1.7d22 + 0.01q1 + 0.6q2.
The utility function of firm 1 is:
U1(Q, q) = ρ11d11 + ρ12d12 − fˆ1 − (cˆ11 + cˆ12)
with the utility function of firm 2 being:
U2(Q, q) = ρ21d21 + ρ22d22 − fˆ2 − (cˆ21 + cˆ22).
The Jacobian of −∇U(Q, q), denoted by J(Q11, Q12, Q21, Q22, q1, q2), is
J(Q11, Q12, Q21, Q22, q1, q2) =

6 2 1.4 1 −0.3 −0.05
2 16 1 2 −0.4 −0.2
2.6 2 21 4 −0.1 −0.5
2 2.7 4 7.4 −0.01 −0.6
−0.3 −0.4 0 0 4 0
0 0 −0.5 −0.6 0 2

.
This Jacobian matrix is positive-definite. Hence, -∇U(Q, q) is strongly monotone,
and both the existence and the uniqueness of the solution to variational inequality
(4.13) with respect to this example are guaranteed. Moreover, the equilibrium solution
(stationary point) is: Q∗11 = 14.27, Q
∗
12 = 3.81, Q
∗
21 = 1.76, Q
∗
22 = 4.85, q
∗
1 = 1.45,
q∗2 = 1.89, and it is globally exponentially stable.
The stationary points of both Examples 4.1 and 4.2 are computed using the Euler
method. In the next section, I present the induced closed form expressions at each
iteration, along with the convergence result.
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4.3. Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the
Supply Chain Network Model with Transportation Costs,
Product Differentiation and Quality Competition
The projected dynamical system yields continuous-time adjustment processes.
However, as provided in Section 2.5.1, for computational purposes, a discrete-time
algorithm, the Euler method, which serves as an approximation to the continuous-
time trajectories, is needed.
The explicit formulae yielded by the Euler method are as following. In particular,
the following closed form expression for all the product shipments, i = 1, . . . , I; k =
1, . . . , nR, is:
Qτ+1ik = max{0, Qτik + aτ (ρik(dτ , qτ ) +
nR∑
l=1
∂ρil(d
τ , qτ )
∂dik
dτil −
∂fˆi(s
τ , qτi )
∂si
− ∂cˆik(Q
τ
ik)
∂Qik
)},
(4.31)
and the following closed form expression for all the quality levels, i = 1, . . . , I, is:
qτ+1i = max{0, qτi + aτ (
nR∑
l=1
∂ρil(d
τ , qτ )
∂qi
dτil −
∂fˆi(s
τ , qτi )
∂qi
)} (4.32)
with the demands being updated according to:
dτ+1ik = Q
τ+1
ik ; i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR, (4.33)
and the supplies being updated according to:
sτ+1i =
nR∑
k=1
Qτ+1ik , i = 1, . . . , I. (4.34)
I now provide the convergence result. The proof is direct from Theorem 2.17 and
Nagurney and Zhang (1996).
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Theorem 4.4
In the supply chain network problem with product differentiation and quality levels let
F (X) = −∇U(Q, q) be strictly monotone at any equilibrium pattern and assume that
Assumption 4.1 is satisfied. Also, assume that F is uniformly Lipschitz continuous.
Then there exists a unique equilibrium product shipment and quality level pattern
(Q∗, q∗) ∈ K and any sequence generated by the Euler method as given by (2.34),
where {aτ} satisfies
∑∞
τ=0 aτ =∞, aτ > 0, aτ → 0, as τ →∞ converges to (Q∗, q∗).
In the next section, I apply the Euler method to compute solutions to numerical
supply chain network problems.
4.4. Numerical Examples
I implemented the Euler method (cf. (4.31) - (4.34)), using Matlab on a Lenovo
E46A. The convergence criterion is  = 10−6; that is, the Euler method is considered
to have converged if, at a given iteration, the absolute value of the difference between
each successive product shipment and quality level is no more than .
The sequence {aτ} is: .1(1, 12 , 12 , 13 , 13 , 13 . . .). I initialized the algorithm by setting
each product shipment Qik = 2.5, ∀i, k, and by setting the quality level of each firm
qi = 0.00, ∀i.
In Section 4.3, I discussed stability analysis and present results for two numerical
examples. I now provide additional results for these two examples.
Example 4.1 Revisited
The Euler method requires 39 iterations for convergence to the equilibrium pattern
for Example 4.1. A graphical depictions of the iterates, consisting of the product
shipments and the quality levels, is given, respectively, in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The
utility/profit of firm 1 is 723.89 and that of firm 2 is 34.44.
One can see from these figures, that, as predicted by the stability analysis results,
the convergence is exponentially fast.
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Figure 4.4. Product Shipments for Example 4.1
Figure 4.5. Quality Levels for Example 4.1
As shown in Figure 4.5, the equilibrium quality level of firm 1 is 42.15% higher
than that of firm 2, which happens because customers are more quality-sensitive to
firm 1’s product, as described in the demand price functions.
Example 4.2 Revisited
For Example 4.2, the Euler method requires 45 iterations for convergence. A graphical
depiction of the product shipment and quality level iterates is given in Figures 4.6
and 4.7. One can see from the figures that the convergence to the equilibrium solution
is exponentially fast. The profit of firm 1 is 775.19, whereas that of firm 2 is 145.20.
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In the next example, there is another firm, firm 3, entering the market, and its
quality cost is much higher than those of firms 1 and 2.
Figure 4.6. Product Shipments for Example 4.2
Figure 4.7. Quality Levels for Example 4.2
Example 4.3
The third numerical supply chain network example consists of three firms and two
demand markets, as depicted in Figure 4.8.
This example is built from Example 4.2 with the production cost functions of the
original two firms expanded and the original demand price functions as well. I also
add new data for the new firm. The complete data for this example are given below.
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Figure 4.8. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 4.3
The production cost functions are:
fˆ1(s, q1) = s
2
1 + s1s2 + s1s3 + 2q
2
1 + 39,
fˆ2(s, q2) = 2s
2
2 + 2s1s2 + 2s3s2 + q
2
2 + 37,
fˆ3(s, q3) = s
2
3 + s1s3 + s3s2 + 8q
2
3 + 60.
The total transportation cost functions are:
cˆ11(Q11) = Q
2
11 + 10, cˆ12(Q12) = 5Q
2
12 + 7,
cˆ21(Q21) = 7Q
2
21 + 10, cˆ22(Q22) = 2Q
2
22 + 5,
cˆ31(Q31) = 2Q
2
31 + 9, cˆ32(Q32) = 3Q
2
32 + 8,
and the demand price functions are:
ρ11(d, q) = 100− d11 − 0.4d21 − 0.1d31 + 0.3q1 + 0.05q2 + 0.05q3,
ρ12(d, q) = 100− 2d12 − d22 − 0.1d32 + 0.4q1 + 0.2q2 + 0.2q3,
ρ21(d, q) = 100− 0.6d11 − 1.5d21 − 0.1d31 + 0.1q1 + 0.5q2 + 0.1q3,
ρ22(d, q) = 100− 0.7d12 − 1.7d22 − 0.1d32 + 0.01q1 + 0.6q2 + 0.01q3,
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ρ31(d, q) = 100− 0.2d11 − 0.4d21 − 1.8d31 + 0.2q1 + 0.2q2 + 0.7q3,
ρ32(d, q) = 100− 0.1d12 − 0.3d22 − 2d32 + 0.2q1 + 0.1q2 + 0.4q3.
The utility function expressions of firm 1, firm 2, and firm 3 are, respectively:
U1(Q, q) = ρ11d11 + ρ12d12 − fˆ1 − (cˆ11 + cˆ12),
U2(Q, q) = ρ21d21 + ρ22d22 − fˆ2 − (cˆ21 + cˆ22),
U3(Q, q) = ρ31d31 + ρ32d32 − fˆ3 − (cˆ31 + cˆ32).
The Jacobian of −∇U(Q, q), denoted by J(Q11, Q12, Q21, Q22, Q31, Q32, q1, q2, q3),
is
J(Q11, Q12, Q21, Q22, Q31, Q32, q1, q2, q3)
=

6 2 1.4 1 1.1 1 −0.3 −0.05 −0.05
2 16 1 2 1 1.1 −0.4 −0.2 −0.2
2.6 2 21 4 2.1 2 −0.1 −0.5 −0.5
2 2.7 4 7.4 2 2.1 −0.01 −0.6 −0.01
1.2 1 1.4 1 9.6 2 −0.2 −0.2 −0.7
1 1.1 1 1.3 2 12 −0.2 −0.1 −0.4
−0.3 −0.4 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
0 0 −0.5 −0.6 0 0 0 2 0
0 0 0 0 −0.7 −0.4 0 0 16

.
This Jacobian matrix is positive-definite. Thus, −∇U(Q, q) is strongly monotone,
and both the existence and uniqueness of the solution to variational inequality (4.13)
with respect to this example are guaranteed.
The Euler method converges to the equilibrium solution: Q∗11 = 12.63, Q
∗
12 = 3.45,
Q∗21 = 1.09, Q
∗
22 = 3.21, Q
∗
31 = 6.94, Q
∗
32 = 5.42, q
∗
1 = 1.29, q
∗
2 = 1.23, q
∗
3 = 0.44, in 42
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iterations. The profits of the firms are: U1 = 601.67, U2 = 31.48, and U3 = 403.97.
Graphical depictions of the product shipment and the quality level iterates are given,
respectively, in Figures 4.9 and 4.10.
Figure 4.9. Product Shipments for Example 4.3
Figure 4.10. Quality Levels for Example 4.3
The properties of the Jacobian matrix are verified above in order to also evaluate
the stability of the utility gradient process as well as to check whether conditions
for convergence of the algorithm are satisfied. One should realize, however, that the
algorithm does not require strong monotonicity of minus the gradient of the utility
functions for convergence (cf. Theorem 4.4). Moreover, if the algorithm converges, it
converges to a stationary point of the projected dynamical systems; equivalently, to a
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solution of the variational inequality problem governing the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
conditions for the supply chain network model.
In addition, with these examples, I illustrate the types of problems with not unre-
alistic features and underlying functions that can be theoretically effectively analyzed
as to their qualitative properties and also their solutions computed.
Example 4.4
Example 4.4 is constructed from Example 4.3 to consider the following scenario. The
consumers at demand market R2 have become more sensitive as to the quality of the
products. To reflect this, the new demand price functions associated with demand
market R2 are now:
ρ12(d, q) = 100− 2d12 − d22 − 0.1d32 + 0.49q1 + 0.2q2 + 0.2q2,
ρ22(d, q) = 100− 0.7d12 − 1.7d22 − 0.1d32 + 0.01q1 + 0.87q2 + 0.01q3,
and
ρ32(d, q) = 100− 0.1d12 − 0.3d22 − 2d32 + 0.2q1 + 0.1q2 + 1.2q3.
The Jacobian of −∇U(Q, q) is now:
J(Q11, Q12, Q21, Q22, Q31, Q32, q1, q2, q3)
=

6 2 1.4 1 1.1 1 −0.3 −0.05 −0.05
2 16 1 2 1 1.1 −0.49 −0.2 −0.2
2.6 2 21 4 2.1 2 −0.1 −0.5 −0.5
2 2.7 4 7.4 2 2.1 −0.01 −0.87 −0.01
1.2 1 1.4 1 9.6 2 −0.2 −0.2 −0.7
1 1.1 1 1.3 2 12 −0.2 −0.1 −1.2
−0.3 −0.49 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
0 0 −0.5 −0.87 0 0 0 2 0
0 0 0 0 −0.7 −1.2 0 0 16

.
This Jacobian matrix is also positive-definite. Therefore, for this example, the
existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium product shipment and quality level
pattern are guaranteed. Moreover, the utility gradient processes for both Examples
4.3 and 4.4 are globally exponentially stable.
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The computed equilibrium solution is now: Q∗11 = 13.41, Q
∗
12 = 3.63, Q
∗
21 = 1.41,
Q∗22 = 4.08, Q
∗
31 = 3.55, Q
∗
32 = 2.86, q
∗
1 = 1.45, q
∗
2 = 2.12, q
∗
3 = 0.37. The profits of
the firms are now: U1 = 682.44, U2 = 82.10, and U3 = 93.19.
Figure 4.11. Product Shipments for Example 4.4
Figure 4.12. Quality Levels for Example 4.4
The Euler method requires 47 iterations for convergence. Please refer to Figures
4.11 and 4.12 to view the iterates of the product shipments and the quality levels
generated by the Euler method. Due to the fact that, in each iteration, the values
of Q12 and Q22 are very close, the trajectories of these two almost overlap in Figure
4.11.
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The results are now discussed. As consumers become more sensitive to the quality
of the substitutable product, the equilibrium quality levels of the three firms change,
with those of firm 1 and firm 2 increasing, relative to their values in Example 4.3.
Since it costs much more for firm 3 to achieve higher quality levels than firm 1 and firm
2, the profit of firm 3 decreases by 76.9%, while the profits of firms 1 and 2 increase by
13.4% and 160.8%, respectively. Hence, the pressure on the consumers’ side through
the demand price functions in quality can result not only in higher quality but also
in higher profits for those firms that have lower quality costs.
Example 4.5
Example 4.5 is constructed, for completeness. The data are as in Example 4.4 except
for the production cost functions, which are now:
fˆ1(s, q1) = 2s
2
1 + 0.005s1q1 + 2q
2
1 + 30, fˆ2(s, q2) = 4s
2
2 + 0.005s2q2 + q
2
2 + 30,
fˆ3(s, q3) = 4s
2
3 + 0.005s3q3 + 8q
2
3 + 50.
The Jacobian of −∇U(Q, q), denoted by J(Q11, Q12, Q21, Q22, Q31, Q32, q1, q2, q3),
is
J(Q11, Q12, Q21, Q22, Q31, Q32, q1, q2, q3)
=

8 4 0.4 0 0.1 0 −0.295 −0.05 −0.05
4 18 0 1 0 0.1 −0.395 −0.2 −0.2
0.6 0 25 8 0.1 0 −0.1 −0.495 −0.1
0 0.7 8 15.4 0 0.1 −0.01 −0.595 −0.01
0.2 0 0.4 0 9.6 2 −0.2 −0.2 −0.695
0 0.1 0 0.3 2 12 −0.2 −0.1 −0.395
−0.295 −0.395 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
0 0 −0.495 −0.595 0 0 0 2 0
0 0 0 0 −0.695 −0.395 0 0 16

.
This Jacobian matrix is positive-definite, and both the existence and the unique-
ness of the equilibrium solution to this example are guaranteed.
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The Euler method converges to the equilibrium solution: Q∗11 = 10.95, Q
∗
12 = 2.84,
Q∗21 = 2.04, Q
∗
22 = 5.34, Q
∗
31 = 4.47, Q
∗
32 = 3.49, q
∗
1 = 1.09, q
∗
2 = 2.10, q
∗
3 = 0.28 in 46
iterations. The profits of the firms are: U1 = 1222.89, U2 = 668.03, and U3 = 722.03.
Graphical depictions of the product shipment and the quality level iterates are given
in Figures 4.13 and 4.14.
Figure 4.13. Product Shipments for Example 4.5
Figure 4.14. Quality Levels for Example 4.5
4.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I developed a new supply chain network model and presented
both its static and dynamic realizations. The model handles product differentiation
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and includes transportation costs as well as quality cost functions and demand price
functions that capture both demand for the substitutable products as well as their
quality levels. The model is a Cournot-Nash model in which the strategic variables
associated with each firm are its product shipments as well as the quality level of each
firm’s product.
I derived the governing equilibrium conditions and provided alternative variational
inequality formulations. A continuous-time adjustment process was also proposed. I
provided qualitative properties of existence and uniqueness of the dynamic trajectories
and also gave results, using a monotonicity approach, for stability analysis.
I presented the closed form expressions for the product shipment and quality
levels at each iteration, which provide discrete-time realizations of the continuous-
time product shipment and quality level trajectories. A convergence result was also
given. Through several numerical examples, I illustrated the model and the theoretical
results.
Given that supply chain networks with differentiated products as well as quality
issues are relevant to many industries, ranging from food to high tech, and even the
Internet, I believe that the results in this chapter are relevant to many application
domains.
Unlike Chapters 3 and 4, in the next chapter, Chapter 5, I consider a supply chain
network problem with outsourcing and price and quality competition among the con-
tractors. The optimal make-or-buy and contractor-selection decisions are provided.
In addition, in Chapters 3 and 4, demands are assumed to be elastic. In contrast, the
analysis in Chapter 5 assumes non-elastic demand, in order to capture the original
firm’s projected/forecasted demand in multiple demand markets.
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CHAPTER 5
A SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK MODEL WITH
OUTSOURCING AND QUALITY AND PRICE
COMPETITION
In this chapter, I develop both the equilibrium and the dynamic versions of the
supply chain network game theory model which takes into account the quality con-
cerns in the context of global outsourcing. Unlike Chapters 3 and 4, this chapter
captures the behaviors of a firm and its potential contractors with consideration of
the transactions between them and the quality of the outsourced product. The de-
mand of the product of the firm is assumed to be fixed at multiple demand markets,
since the firm can be expected to have good demand forecasting abilities. Specifi-
cally, the demand of some products, such as pharmaceuticals, vaccines, and food, is
actually inelastic because they are necessities for consumers.
In addition, the impact of outsourced quality on a firm’s reputation is also consid-
ered in this chapter through the incorporation of the disrepute cost, which is a cost
determined by the quality of the product produced by its contractors and the amount
of product that is outsourced.
In this model, the firm that is engaged in determining its in-house and outsourced
optimal product flows seeks to minimize its total cost and its weighted disrepute cost,
and to satisfy the demand of its product in multiple demand markets. The potential
contractors of the firm, however, compete with one another by determining the prices
that they charge the firm for manufacturing and delivering the product to the demand
markets and the quality levels in order to maximize their profits. The opportunity
cost of each contractor in terms of the price it charges the firm is considered.
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This game theory model allows for the determination of the optimal product flows
associated with the supply chain in-house and outsourcing network activities and
provides the firm with its optimal make-or-buy decisions and the optimal contractor-
selection. In this chapter, I state the governing equilibrium conditions and derive the
equivalent variational inequality formulation of the model, and propose the dynamic
adjustment processes for the evolution of the product flows, the quality levels, and
the prices, along with stability analysis results. The algorithm, which is the Euler
method (cf. Section 2.5.1), yields a discretization of the continuous-time adjustment
processes. I also present convergence results and compute solutions to numerical
examples to illustrate the generality and applicability of the framework.
This chapter is based on Nagurney, Li, and Nagurney (2013). It is organized as
follows. In Section 5.1, I describe the decision-making behavior of the firm and the
competing contractors. I then develop the game theory model, state the equilibrium
conditions, and derive the equivalent variational inequality formulation. It is assumed
that the projected demand for the product is known at the various demand markets
since the firm can be expected to have good in-house forecasting abilities. Hence, I
focus on cost minimization associated with the firm but profit maximization for the
contractors who compete in prices and quality.
In Section 5.2, I provide a dynamic version of the model through a description of
the underlying adjustment processes associated with the product flows, the quality
levels, and the contractor prices. The projected dynamical system has stationary
points that coincide with the solutions for relevant corresponding the variational
inequality problem. Stability analysis results are also provided.
In Section 5.3, I describe the closed form expressions yielded by the Euler method
at each iteration, for the contractor prices and the quality levels, with the product
flows being solved exactly using an equilibration algorithm. The Euler method pro-
vides a discrete-time version of the continuous-time adjustment processes given in
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Section 5.2. I illustrate the concepts through small examples with sensitivity analysis
results. I then apply the Euler method in Section 5.4 to demonstrate the modeling
and computational framework on larger examples. The case of a disruption in the
supply chain network and two cases focused on opportunity costs are also discussed.
I summarize the results and give the conclusions in Section 5.5.
5.1. The Supply Chain Network Model with Outsourcing
and Quality and Price Competition
In this section, I develop the supply chain network model with outsourcing and
with price and quality competition among the contractors. It is assumed that a firm
is involved in the processes of in-house manufacturing and distribution of a product,
and may also contract its manufacturing and distribution activities to contractors,
who may be located overseas. I seek to determine the optimal product flows of the
firm to its demand markets, along with the prices the contractors charge the firm for
production and distribution, and the quality levels of their products.
For clarity and definiteness, I consider the network topology of the firm depicted
in Figure 5.1. In the supply chain network, there are nM manufacturing facilities or
plants that the firm owns and nR demand markets. Some of the links from the top-
tiered node 0, representing the firm, are connected to its manufacturing facility/plant
nodes, which are denoted, respectively, by: M1, . . . ,MnM and these, in turn, are
connected to the demand nodes: R1, . . . , RnR .
As also depicted in Figure 5.1, the outsourcing of the product in terms of its pro-
duction and delivery is captured. There are nO contractors available to the firm. The
firm may potentially contract to any of these contractors who then also distribute
the outsourced product that they manufacture to the nR demand markets. The first
set of outsourcing links directly link the top-most node 0 to the nO contractor nodes,
O1, . . . , OnO , which correspond to their respective manufacturing activities, and the
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Figure 5.1. The Supply Chain Network Topology with Outsourcing
next set of outsourcing links emanate from the contractor nodes to the demand mar-
kets and reflect the delivery of the outsourced product to the demand markets.
In Figure 5.1, the top set of links consists of the manufacturing links, whether
in-house or outsourced (contracted), whereas the next set of links consists of the
distribution links. For simplicity, let n = nM + nO denote the number of manufac-
turing plants, whether in-house or belonging to the contractors. The notation for the
model is given in Table 5.1. The vectors are assumed to be column vectors. The
optimal/equilibrium solution is denoted by “∗”.
The external failure cost mentioned in Table 5.1 is the compensation cost incurred
when customers are unsatisfied with the quality of the products. I assume that the
disrepute cost of the firm, dc(q′), is a monotonically decreasing function of the average
quality level.
As in Table 5.1, the transaction costs between the original firms and the contrac-
tors are also considered. It is the “cost of making each contract” (cf. Coase (1937)
and also Aubert, Rivard, and Patry (1996)), which includes the costs of evaluating
suppliers, negotiation costs, the monitoring and the enforcement of the contract in
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Table 5.1. Notation for the Supply Chain Network Model with Outsourcing and
Quality and Price Competition
Notation Definition
Qjk the nonnegative amount of product produced at manufac-
turing plant j and delivered to demand market Rk.
The {Qjk} elements are grouped into the vector Q ∈ RnnR+ .
dk the demand for the product at demand market Rk, as-
sumed known and fixed.
qj the nonnegative quality level of the product produced by
contractor j. The {qj} elements are grouped into the vec-
tor q ∈ RnO+ .
pijk the price charged by contractor j for producing and de-
livering a unit of the product to k. I group the {pijk}
elements for contractor j into the vector pij ∈ RnR+ and
then group all such vectors for all the contractors into the
vector pi ∈ RnOnR .
fj(
∑nR
k=1Qjk) the total production cost at manufacturing plant j; j =
1, . . . , nM owned by the firm.
q′ the average quality level.
tcj(
∑nR
k=1QnM+j,k) the total transaction cost associated with the firm trans-
acting with contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO.
cˆjk(Qjk) the total transportation cost associated with delivering
the product manufactured at j to k; j = 1, . . . , nM ;
k = 1, . . . , nR.
scjk(Q, q) the total cost of contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO, to produce
and distribute the product to demand market Rk; k =
1, . . . , nR.
cˆj(q) quality cost faced by contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO.
ocjk(pi) the opportunity cost associated with pricing the product
by contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO and delivering it to Rk;
k = 1, . . . , nR.
dc(q′) the cost of disrepute, which corresponds to the external
failure quality cost (cf. Section 1.1).
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order to ensure the quality (Franceschini et al. (2003), Heshmati (2003), and Liu and
Nagurney (2013)).
In addition, according to regulations (FDA (2002), U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, CDER, FDA, and CBER (2009), and the European Commission
Health and Consumers Directorate (2010)), before signing the contract, a firm should
have reviewed and evaluated the contractors’ ability to perform the outsourcing tasks.
Therefore, the production/distribution costs and the quality cost information of the
contractors are assumed to be known by the firm.
5.1.1 The Behavior of the Firm and Its Optimality Conditions
In this model, I assume that in-house activities can ensure a 100% perfect quality
conformance level. The quality conformance level of contractor j is denoted by qj,
which varies from a 0% conformance level to a 100% conformance level (cf. Section
1.1), such that
0 ≤ qj ≤ qU , j = 1, . . . , nO, (5.1)
where qU is the value representing perfect quality achieved by the firm in its in-house
manufacturing.
The quality level associated with the product of the firm is, hence, an average
quality level that is determined by the quality levels decided upon by the contractors
and the outsourced product amounts. Thus, the average quality level for the firm’s
product, both in-house and outsourced, can be expressed as
q′ =
∑n
j=nM+1
∑nR
k=1 Qjkqj−nM + (
∑nM
j=1
∑nR
k=1Qjk)q
U∑nR
k=1 dk
. (5.2)
(5.2) is a variant of the average quality measure developed in Chapter 3 to assess the
average quality level of homogeneous products from multiple firms with information
asymmetry in quality, but without outsourcing.
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The decision-making problem for the firm is to decide how much to do in-house
and how much to outsource to each potential contractor, that is, to select the product
flows Q. The firm can choose to outsource all of its products, or outsource some of
its products to any number of contracts, or chooce not to outsource. In contrast, the
contractors, who compete with one another in quality and the prices they charge the
firm, select their respective quality level qj and price vector pij.
The objective of the firm is to maximize its utility (cf. (5.3) below), represented
by minus its total costs that include the production costs, the transportation costs,
the payments to the contractors, the total transaction costs, along with the weighted
cost of disrepute, with the nonnegative term ω denoting the weight that the firm
imposes on the disrepute cost function (cf. Section 2.4). The firm’s utility function
is denoted by U0 and, hence, the firm seeks to
MaximizeQ U0(Q, q
∗, pi∗) = −
nM∑
j=1
fj(
nR∑
k=1
Qjk)−
nM∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
cˆjk(Qjk)−
nO∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
pi∗jkQnM+j,k
−
nO∑
j=1
tcj(
nR∑
k=1
QnM+j,k)− ωdc(q′). (5.3)
subject to:
n∑
j=1
Qjk = dk, k = 1, . . . , nR, (5.4)
Qjk ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n; k = 1, . . . , nR, (5.5)
with q′ in (5.3) as in (5.2).
Note that (5.3) is equivalent to minimizing the total costs. Also, according to
(5.4) the demand at each demand market must be satisfied. All the cost functions
in (5.3) are continuous, twice continuously differentiable, and convex. I define the
feasible set K0 as follows: K0 ≡ {Q|Q ∈ RnnR+ with (5.4) satisfied}. K0 is closed and
convex. The following theorem is immediate.
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Theorem 5.1
The optimality conditions for the firm, faced with (5.3) and subject to (5.4) and (5.5),
with q′ as in (5.2) embedded into dc(q′), and under the above imposed assumptions,
coincide with the solution of the following variational inequality (cf. Propositions 2.1
and 2.2 and Bazaraa, Sherali, and Shetty (1993)): determine Q∗ ∈ K0
−
n∑
h=1
nR∑
l=1
∂U0(Q
∗, q∗, pi∗)
∂Qhl
× (Qhl −Q∗hl) ≥ 0, ∀Q ∈ K0, (5.6)
with notice that: for h = 1, . . . , nM ; l = 1, . . . , nR:
− ∂U0
∂Qhl
=
[
∂fh(
∑nR
k=1Qhk)
∂Qhl
+
∂cˆhl(Qhl)
∂Qhl
+ ω
∂dc(q′)
∂Qhl
]
=
[
∂fh(
∑nR
k=1Qhk)
∂Qhl
+
∂cˆhl(Qhl)
∂Qhl
+ ω
∂dc(q′)
∂q′
qU∑nR
k=1 dk
]
,
and for h = nM + 1, . . . , n; l = 1, . . . , nR:
− ∂U0
∂Qhl
=
[
pi∗h−nM ,l +
∂tch−nM (
∑nR
k=1 Qhk)
∂Qhl
+ ω
∂dc(q′)
∂Qhl
]
=
[
pi∗h−nM ,l +
∂tch−nM (
∑nR
k=1 Qhk)
∂Qhl
+ ω
∂dc(q′)
∂q′
q∗h∑nR
k=1 dk
]
.
5.1.2 The Behavior of the Contractors and Their Optimality Conditions
The objective of the contractors is profit maximization. Their revenues are ob-
tained from the purchasing activities of the firm, while their costs are the costs of
production and distribution, the quality cost, and the opportunity cost.
Opportunity cost is defined as “the loss of potential gain from other alternatives
when one alternative is chosen” (New Oxford American Dictionary (2010)). I capture
the contractors’ opportunity costs as functions of the prices charged, since, if the
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values are too low, they may not recover all of their costs, whereas if they are too
high, the firm may select another contractor. In this model, opportunity costs are
the only costs that depend on the prices that the contractors charge the firm and,
hence, there is no double counting.
This is the first time that opportunity cost is considered in this dissertation. The
concept of opportunity cost (cf. Mankiw (2011)) is very relevant to both economics
and operations research. It has been emphasized in pharmaceutical firm competi-
tion by Grabowski and Vernon (1990), Palmer and Raftery (1999), and Cockburn
(2004). Gan and Litvinov (2003) also constructed opportunity cost functions that
are functions of prices as I consider here (see Table 5.1) in an energy application.
Interestingly, Leland (1979), inspired by the work of the Nobel laureate Akerlof
(1970) on quality, introduced opportunity costs that are functions of quality levels.
It is emphasized that general opportunity cost functions include both explicit and
implicit costs (Mankiw (2011)) with the explicit opportunity costs requiring monetary
payment, and including possible anticipated regulatory costs, wage expenses, and
the opportunity cost of capital (see Porteus (1986)), etc. Implicit opportunity costs
are those that do not require payment, but to the decision-maker, still need to be
monetized, for the purposes of decision-making, and can include the time and effort
put in (see Payne, Bettman, and Luce (1996)), and the profit that the decision-maker
could have earned, if he had made other choices (Sandoval-Chavez and Beruvides
(1998)).
Please note that, as presented in Table 5.1, scjk(Q, q) is contractor j’s cost function
associated with producing and delivering the firm’s product to demand market Rk.
It only captures the cost of production and delivery, and, similar as the production
cost functions (3.5a and 3.5b) and the transportation cost functions (3.6) in Chapter
3, it depends on both the quantities and the quality levels. However, cˆj(q), which
is a convex function in quality levels, is the quality cost associated with quality
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management (cf. Section 1.1), and is over and above the cost of production and
delivery activities. Thus, scjk(Q, q) and cˆj(q) are two entirely different costs, and
they do not overlap.
Each contractor has, as its strategic variables, its quality level, and the prices
that it charges the firm for production and distribution to the demand markets. I
denote the utility/profit of each contractor j by Uj, with j = 1, . . . , nO. Hence, each
contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO seeks to:
Maximizeqj ,pij Uj(Q
∗, q, pi) =
nR∑
k=1
pijkQ
∗
nM+j,k
−
nR∑
k=1
scjk(Q
∗, q)− cˆj(q)−
nR∑
k=1
ocjk(pi)
(5.7)
subject to:
pijk ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . , nR, (5.8)
and (5.1) for each j.
I assume that the cost functions in each contractor’s utility function are contin-
uous, twice continuously differentiable, and convex. Moreover, I assume that the
contractors compete in a noncooperative in the sense of Nash, with each one trying
to maximize its own profits.
I define the feasible sets Kj ≡ {(qj, pij)|pij satisfies (5.8) and qj satisfies (5.1) for j}.
I also define the feasible sets K1 ≡∏nOj=1Kj and K ≡ K0×K1. All the above-defined
feasible sets are closed and convex.
Definition 5.1: A Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium with Price and Quality Com-
petition
A quality level and price pattern (q∗, pi∗) ∈ K1 is said to constitute a Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium if for each contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO
Uj(Q
∗, q∗j , qˆ
∗
j , pi
∗
j , pi
∗
j ) ≥ Uj(Q∗, qj, qˆ∗j , pij, pi∗j ), ∀(qj, pij) ∈ Kj, (5.9)
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where
qˆ∗j ≡ (q∗1, . . . , q∗j−1, q∗j+1, . . . , q∗nO), (5.10)
pi∗j ≡ (pi∗1, . . . , pi∗j−1, pi∗j+1, . . . , pi∗nO). (5.11)
According to (5.9) (cf. Definition 2.7), a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is established
if no contractor can unilaterally improve upon its profits by selecting an alternative
vector of quality levels and prices charged to the firm.
Next, I present the variational inequality formulation of the Bertrand-Nash equi-
librium according to Definition 5.1 (see Bertrand (1883), Nash (1950, 1951), and
Nagurney (2006)), which follows directly from Theorem 2.7.
Theorem 5.2
Assume that, for each contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO, the profit function Uj(Q, q, pi) is
concave with respect to the variables {pij1, . . . , pijnR} and qj, and is continuous and
twice continuously differentiable. Then (q∗, pi∗) ∈ K1 is a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
according to Definition 5.1 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality:
−
nO∑
j=1
∂Uj(Q
∗, q∗, pi∗)
∂qj
× (qj − q∗j )−
nO∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
∂Uj(Q
∗, q∗, pi∗)
∂pijk
× (pijk − pi∗jk) ≥ 0,
∀(q, pi) ∈ K1. (5.12)
with notice that: for j = 1, . . . , nO:
−∂Uj
∂qj
=
nR∑
k=1
∂scjk(Q
∗, q)
∂qj
+
∂cˆj(q)
∂qj
, (5.13)
and for j = 1, . . . , nO; k = 1, . . . , nR:
− ∂Uj
∂pijk
=
nR∑
r=1
∂ocjr(pi)
∂pijk
−Q∗nM+j,k. (5.14)
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5.1.3 The Equilibrium Conditions for the Supply Chain Network with
Outsourcing and Quality and Price Competition
In equilibrium, the optimality conditions for all contractors and the optimality
conditions for the firm must hold simultaneously, according to the definition below.
Definition 5.2: Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Outsourcing and
with Price and Quality Competition
The equilibrium state of the supply chain network with outsourcing is one where both
variational inequalities (5.6) and (5.12) hold simultaneously.
The following theorem is then immediate.
Theorem 5.3
The equilibrium conditions governing the supply chain network model with outsourc-
ing are equivalent to the solution of the variational inequality problem: determine
(Q∗, q∗, pi∗) ∈ K, such that:
−
n∑
h=1
nR∑
l=1
∂U0(Q
∗, q∗, pi∗)
∂Qhl
× (Qhl −Q∗hl)−
nO∑
j=1
∂Uj(Q
∗, q∗, pi∗)
∂qj
× (qj − q∗j )
−
nO∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
∂Uj(Q
∗, q∗, pi∗)
∂pijk
× (pijk − pi∗jk) ≥ 0, ∀(Q, q, pi) ∈ K. (5.15)
Proof: Summation of variational inequalities (5.6) and (5.12) yields variational in-
equality (5.15). A solution to variational inequality (5.15) satisfies the sum of (5.6)
and (5.12) and, hence, is an equilibrium according to Definition 5.2.
I now put variational inequality (5.15) into standard form (cf. (2.1a)): determine
X∗ ∈ K where X is a vector in RN , F (X) is a continuous function such that F (X) :
X 7→ K ⊂ RN , and
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (5.16)
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where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product in the N -dimensional Euclidean space, and K is closed
and convex. I define the vector X ≡ (Q, q, pi). Also, here N = nnR + nO + nOnR.
Note that (5.16) may be rewritten as:
N∑
i=1
Fi(X
∗)× (Xi −X∗i ) ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (5.17)
The components of F are then as follows. The first nnR components of F are
given by: −∂U0(Q,q,pi)
∂Qhl
for h = 1, . . . , n; l = 1, . . . , nR; the next nO components of F
are given by: −∂Uj(Q,q,pi)
∂qj
for j = 1, . . . , nO, and the subsequent nOnR components of
F are given by: −∂Uj(Q,q,pi)
∂pijk
with j = 1, . . . , nO; k = 1, . . . , nR. Hence, (5.15) can be
put into standard form (2.1a).
5.2. The Underlying Dynamics and Stability Analysis
I now describe the underlying dynamics until the equilibrium satisfying variational
inequality (5.15) is achieved. I identify dynamic adjustment processes for the evolu-
tion of the firm’s product flows, both in-house and outsourced, and the contractors’
quality levels and prices charged to the firm. In Section 5.3, I provide a discrete-time
version of the continuous time adjustment processes in the form of an algorithm.
Observe that, for a current vector of product flows, quality levels, and prices at
time t, X(t) = (Q(t), q(t), pi(t)), −Fi(X(t)) = ∂U0(Q(t),q(t),pi(t))∂Qhl , for i = 1, . . . , nnR and
h = 1, . . . , n; l = 1, . . . , nR, and is given by minus the value of the expressions follow-
ing (5.6), is the marginal utility of the firm with respect to the product flow produced
at h and distributed to demand market Rl. Similarly, −Fi(X(t)) = ∂Uj(Q(t),q(t),pi(t))∂qj ,
given by minus the value in (5.13), is contractor j’s marginal utility (profit) with re-
spect to its quality level associated with the product that it produced and distributed
to the demand markets, with j = 1, . . . , nO and i = nnR + 1, . . . , nnR + nO. Finally,
−Fi(X(t)) = ∂Uj(Q(t),q(t),pi(t))∂pijk , given by minus the value in (5.14), is contractor j’s
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marginal utility (profit) with respect to its price charged for delivering the product
that it produced to k, with j = 1, . . . , nO; k = 1, . . . , nR, and i = nnR+nO +1, . . . , n.
It is imperative that the constraints be satisfied, consisting of the demand con-
straints for the firm, and the nonnegativity assumption on the product flows, as well
as the nonnegativity assumption on the contractors’ quality levels and the prices that
they charge.
Specifically, I propose the following pertinent ordinary differential equation (ODE)
(cf. (2.19)) for the adjustment processes of the product flows, quality levels, and
contractor prices, in vector form, as:
X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)), (5.18)
where, −F (X) = ∇U(Q, q, pi), where ∇U(Q, q, pi) is the vector of marginal utilities
as described above.
I now further interpret ODE (5.18) in the context of the supply chain network game
theory model with price and quality competition among the contractors. Observe
that ODE (5.18) guarantees that the product flows, quality levels, and the contractor
prices are always nonnegative and that the demand constraints (5.4) are also satisfied,
in contrast to the classic dynamical systems given in Section 2.3.
Recall now the definition of F (X) for the model, which captures the behavior of
all the decision-makers in the supply chain network with outsourcing and competition
in an integrated manner. ODE (5.18) states that the rate of change of the product
flows, quality levels, and contractor prices is greatest when the firm’s and contractors’
marginal utilities are greatest. If the marginal utility of a contractor with respect to
its quality level is positive, then the contractor will increase its quality level; if it
is negative, then it will decrease the quality. Note that the quality levels will also
never be outside their upper bound. A similar adjustment behavior holds for the
contractors in terms of the prices that they charge, but without an upper bound on
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the prices. This type of behavior is rational from an economic standpoint. Therefore,
ODE (5.18) corresponds to reasonable continuous adjustment processes for the supply
chain network game theory model with outsourcing and quality and price competition.
The question of existence of a solution to ODE (5.18) raises, since this ODE is
nonstandard due to its discontinuous right-hand side. The fundamental theory with
regards to existence and uniqueness of projected dynamical systems as defined by
(5.18) is provided in Theorem 2.13.
In addition, the necessary and sufficient condition for a pattern X∗ = (Q∗, q∗, pi∗)
to be an equilibrium, according to Definition 5.2, in that X∗ = (Q∗, q∗, pi∗) is a
stationary point of the adjustment processes defined by ODE (5.18), that is, X∗ is
the point at which X˙ = 0, as given in Theorem 2.12.
I now turn to the questions as to whether and under what conditions does the
adjustment processes defined by ODE (5.18) approach an equilibrium. I first note
that Lipschitz continuity of F (X) (cf. Definition 2.6) guarantees the existence of a
unique solution to (2.19), where X0(t) satisfies ODE (5.18) with product flow, quality
level, and price pattern (Q0, q0, pi0) (cf. Theorem 2.13).
Definitions of stability are recalled (see Definitions 2.11, 2.12, and 2.13). The
monotonicity of a function F is closely related to the positive-definiteness of its Ja-
cobian ∇F (cf. Nagurney (1999)). Specifically, if ∇F is positive-semidefinite, then
F is monotone; if ∇F is positive-definite, then F is strictly monotone; and, if ∇F
is strongly positive-definite, then F is strongly monotone. Definitions of positive-
semidefiniteness, positive-definiteness, and strong positive-definiteness are given in
Definition 2.2, with those of monotonicity in Definitions 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
In the context of this supply chain network game theory model with outsourcing,
where F (X) is the vector of negative marginal utilities, I note that if the utility
functions are twice differentiable and the Jacobian of the negative marginal utility
functions (or, equivalently, the negative of the Hessian matrix of the utility functions)
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for the integrated model is positive-definite, then the corresponding F (X) is strictly
monotone.
I now recall an existence and uniqueness result (cf. Theorem 2.6).
Theorem 5.4
Suppose that F is strongly monotone. Then there exists a unique solution to varia-
tional inequality (5.16); equivalently, to variational inequality (5.15).
The following theorem summarizes the stability properties of the utility gradient
processes, under various monotonicity conditions on the marginal utilities, as given
in Theorems 2.14, 2.15, and 2.16.
Theorem 5.5
(i). If F (X) is monotone, then every supply chain network equilibrium, as defined
in Definition 5.2, provided its existence, is a global monotone attractor for the utility
gradient processes.
(ii). If F (X) is strictly monotone, then there exists at most one supply chain network
equilibrium. Furthermore, given existence, the unique equilibrium is a strictly global
monotone attractor for the utility gradient processes.
(iii). If F (X) is strongly monotone, then the unique supply chain network equilibrium,
which is guaranteed to exist, is also globally exponentially stable for the utility gradient
processes.
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5.3. Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the
Supply Chain Network with Outsourcing and Quality
and Price Competition
For computational purposes, the Euler method (cf. Section 2.5.1) is utilized. It
is the first time that this algorithm is being adapted and applied for the solution of
supply chain network game theory problems under Bertrand-Nash competition and
with outsourcing.
Note that, as given in Section 2.5.1, at each iteration τ of the Euler method,
Xτ+1 in (2.34) is actually the solution to the strictly convexquadratic programming
problem given by:
Xτ+1 = MinimizeX∈K
1
2
〈X,X〉 − 〈Xτ − aτF (Xτ ), X〉. (5.19)
Because the strictly convexquadratic programming problem (5.19) with product flows
has a special network structure, one can apply the exact equilibration algorithm for
solving the product flows at each iteration τ (cf. Section 2.5.1).
Furthermore, in light of the structure of the underlying feasible set K, one can
obtain the values for the quality variables explicitly according to the following closed
form expressions for contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO:
qτ+1j = min{qU ,max{0, qτj + aτ (−
nR∑
k=1
∂scjk(Q
τ , qτ )
∂qj
− ∂cˆj(q
τ )
∂qj
)}}. (5.20)
Also, one can obtain the following explicit formulae for the contractor prices: for
j = 1, . . . , nO; k = 1, . . . , nR:
piτ+1jk = max{0, piτjk + aτ (−
nR∑
r=1
∂ocjr(pi
τ )
∂pijk
+QτnM+j,k)}. (5.21)
I now provide the convergence result. The proof is direct from Theorem 2.17 and
Nagurney and Zhang (1996).
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Theorem 5.6
In the supply chain network model with outsourcing, let F (X) = −∇U(Q, q, pi) be
strongly monotone. Also, assume that F is uniformly Lipschitz continuous. Then
there exists a unique equilibrium product flow, quality level, and price pattern (Q∗, q∗, pi∗)
∈ K and any sequence generated by the Euler method (2.34), where {aτ} satisfies∑∞
τ=0 aτ =∞, aτ > 0, aτ → 0, as τ →∞ converges to (Q∗, q∗, pi∗).
Note that convergence also holds if F (X) is monotone (cf. Theorem 8.6 in Nagur-
ney and Zhang (1996)) provided that the price iterates are bounded. The product
flow iterates as well as the quality level iterates will be bounded due to the constraints.
Clearly, in practice, contractors cannot charge unbounded prices for production and
delivery. Hence, one can also expect the existence of a solution, given the continuity
of the functions that make up F (X), under less restrictive conditions than strong
monotonicity.
I now provide a small example to clarify ideas, along with a variant, and also
conduct a sensitivity analysis exercise. The supply chain network consists of the firm,
a single contractor, and a single demand market, as depicted in Figure 5.2.
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?M1Firm’s Plant
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Figure 5.2. The Supply Chain Network Topology for an Illustrative Numerical
Example
The data are as follows. The firm’s production cost function is:
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f1(Q11) = Q
2
11 +Q11
and its total transportation cost function is:
cˆ11(Q11) = .5Q
2
11 +Q11.
The firm’s transaction cost function associated with the contractor is given by:
tc1(Q21) = .05Q
2
21 +Q21.
The demand for the product at demand market R1 is 1,000 and q
U is 100 and the
weight ω is 1.
The contractor’s total cost of production and distribution function is:
sc11(Q21, q1) = Q21q1.
Its total quality cost function is given by:
cˆ1(q1) = 10(q1 − 100)2.
The contractor’s opportunity cost function is:
oc11(pi11) = .5(pi11 − 10)2.
The firm’s cost of disrepute function is:
dc(q′) = 100− q′
where q′ (cf. (5.2)) is given by: Q21q1+Q11100
1000
.
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The convergence tolerance is set to 10−3 so that the algorithm is deemed to have
converged when the absolute value of the difference between each product flow, each
quality level, and each price is less than or equal to 10−3. So, in effect, a stationary
point has been achieved. The Euler method was initialized with Q011 = Q
0
21 = 500,
q01 = 1, and pi
0
11 = 0. The sequence {aτ} is set to: {1, 12 , 12 , 13 , 13 , 13 , . . .}.
The Euler method converges in 87 iterations and yields the following product flow,
quality level, and price pattern:
Q∗11 = 270.50, Q
∗
21 = 729.50, q
∗
1 = 63.52, pi
∗
11 = 739.50.
The total cost incurred by the firm is 677,128.65 with the contractor earning a profit
of 213,786.67. The value of q′ is 73.39.
The Jacobian matrix of F (X) = −∇U(Q, q, pi), for this example, denoted by
J(Q11, Q21, q1, pi11), is
J(Q11, Q21, q1, pi11) =

3 0 0 0
0 .1 −.001 1
0 1 20 0
0 −1 0 1

.
This Jacobian matrix is positive-definite, and, hence, -∇U(Q, q, pi) is strongly
monotone (see also Nagurney (1999)). Thus, both the existence and the uniqueness
of the solution to variational inequality (5.15) with respect to this example are guar-
anteed (Theorem 5.4). Moreover, the equilibrium solution, reported above, is globally
exponentially stable (Theorem 5.5).
I then construct a variant of this example. The transportation cost function is
reduced by a factor of 10 so that it is now:
cˆ11(Q11) = .05Q
2
11 + .1Q11
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with the remainder of the data as in the original example above. This could capture
the situation of the firm moving its production facility closer to the demand market.
The Euler method again requires 87 iterations for convergence and yields the
following equilibrium solution:
Q∗11 = 346.86, Q
∗
21 = 653.14, q
∗
1 = 67.34, pi
∗
11 = 663.15.
The firm’s total cost is now 581,840.07 and the contractor’s profit is 165,230.62.
The value of q′ is now 78.67. The average quality increases, with the quantity of
the product produced by the firm having increased. Also, the price charged by the
contractor decreases but the quality level of its product increases.
For both the examples, the underlying constraints are satisfied, consisting of the
demand constraint, the nonnegativity constraints, as well as the upper bound on the
contractor’s quality level. In addition, the variational inequality for this problem is
satisfied.
It is easy to verify that the Jacobian of F for the variant is positive-definite with
the only change in the Jacobian matrix above being that the 3 is replaced by 2.1.
I proceed to conduct a sensitivity analysis exercise. I return to the original example
and increase the demand for the product at R1 in increments of 1,000. The results of
the computations are reported in Figures 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 for the equilibrium product
flows, the quality levels and the average quality q′, and, finally, the equilibrium prices.
It is interesting to observe that, when the demand increases past a certain point,
the contractor’s equilibrium quality level decreases to zero and stays at that level.
Such unexpected insights may be obtained through a modeling and computational
framework developed in this chapter. Of course, the results in this subsection are
based on constructed examples. One may, of course, conduct other sensitivity analysis
exercises and also utilize different underlying cost functions in order to tailor the
general framework to specific firms’ needs and situations.
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Figure 5.3. Equilibrium Product Flows as the Demand Increases for the Illustrative
Example
Figure 5.4. Equilibrium Contractor Prices as the Demand Increases for the Illus-
trative Example
135
Figure 5.5. Equilibrium Contractor Quality Level and the Average Quality as the
Demand Increases for the Illustrative Example
5.4. Additional Numerical Examples and Sensitivity Analy-
sis
In this section, I applied the Euler method (cf. (5.19)-(5.21)) to compute solutions
to examples that are larger than those in the preceding section. I report all of the input
data as well as the output. The Euler method was initialized as in the illustrative
example, except that the initial product flows are equally distributed among the
available options for each demand market. I use the same convergence tolerance as
previously.
Example 5.1
Example 5.1 consists of the topology given in Figure 5.6. There are two manufacturing
plants owned by the firm and two possible contractors. The firm must satisfy the
demands for its product at the two demand markets. The demand for the product
at demand market R1 is 1,000 and it is 500 at demand market R2. q
U is 100 and the
weight ω is 1.
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Figure 5.6. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 5.1
The production cost functions at the plants are:
f1(
2∑
k=1
Q1k) = (Q11 +Q12)
2 + 2(Q11 +Q12),
f2(
2∑
k=1
Q2k) = 1.5(Q21 +Q22)
2 + 2(Q21 +Q22).
The total transportation cost functions are:
cˆ11(Q11) = 1.5Q
2
11 + 10Q11, cˆ12(Q12) = 1Q
2
12 + 25Q12,
cˆ21(Q21) = 1Q
2
21 + 5Q21, cˆ22(Q22) = 2.5Q
2
22 + 40Q22.
The transaction cost functions are:
tc1(Q31 +Q32) = .5(Q31 +Q32)
2 + .1(Q31 +Q32),
tc2(Q41 +Q42) = .25(Q41 +Q42)
2 + .2(Q41 +Q42).
The contractors’ total cost of production and distribution functions are:
sc11(Q31, q1) = Q31q1, sc12(Q32, q1) = Q32q1,
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sc21(Q41, q2) = 2Q41q2, sc22(Q42, q2) = 2Q42q2.
Their total quality cost functions are given by:
cˆ1(q1) = 5(q1 − 100)2, cˆ2(q2) = 10(q1 − 100)2.
The contractors’ opportunity cost functions are:
oc11(pi11) = .5(pi11 − 10)2, oc12(pi12) = (pi12 − 10)2,
oc21(pi21) = (pi21 − 5)2, oc22(pi22) = .5(pi22 − 20)2.
The firm’s cost of disrepute function is:
dc(q′) = 100− q′
where q′ (cf. (5.2)) is given by: Q31q1+Q32q1+Q41q2+Q42q2+Q11100+Q12100+Q21100+Q22100
1500
.
The Euler method converges in 153 iterations and yields the following equilibrium
solution. The computed product flows are:
Q∗11 = 95.77, Q
∗
12 = 85.51, Q
∗
21 = 118.82, Q
∗
22 = 20.27,
Q∗31 = 213.59, Q
∗
32 = 224.59, Q
∗
41 = 571.83, Q
∗
42 = 169.63.
The computed quality levels of the contractors are:
q∗1 = 56.18, q
∗
2 = 25.85,
and the computed prices are:
pi∗11 = 223.57, pi
∗
12 = 122.30, pi
∗
21 = 290.92, pi
∗
22 = 189.61.
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The total cost of the firm is 610,643.26 and the profits of the contractors are: 5,733.83
and 9,294.44. The value of q′ is 50.55.
In order to investigate the stability of the computed equilibrium for Example 5.1
(and a similar analysis holds for the subsequent examples), I construct the Jacobian
matrix as follows. The Jacobian matrix of F (X) = −∇U(Q, q, pi), for this example,
denoted by J(Q11, Q12, Q21, Q22, Q31, Q32, Q41, Q42, q1, q2, pi11, pi12, pi21, pi22), is
J(Q11, Q12, Q21, Q22, Q31, Q32, Q41, Q42, q1, q2, pi11, pi12, pi21, pi22)
=

5 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 3 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 −6.67× 10−4 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 −6.67× 10−4 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 −6.67× 10−4 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 −6.67× 10−4 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 20 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0 1

.
This Jacobian matrix is positive-semidefinite. Hence, according to Theorem 5.5,
since F (X) is monotone, every supply chain network equilibrium, as defined in Defi-
nition 5.2, is a global monotone attractor for the utility gradient process.
Interestingly, in this example, the firm pays relatively higher prices for the prod-
ucts with a lower quality level from contractor O2. This happens because the firm’s
demand is fixed in each demand market, and, therefore, there is no pressure for qual-
ity improvement from the demand side (as would be the case if the demands were
elastic (cf. Chapter 4). As reflected in the transaction costs with contractors O1 and
O2, the firm is willing to pay higher prices to O2, despite a lower quality level.
I then conduct sensitivity analysis. In particular, I investigate the effect of in-
creases in the demands at both demand markets R1 and R2. The results for the
new equilibrium product flows are depicted in Figure 5.7, with the results for the
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Figure 5.7. Equilibrium Product Flows as the Demand Increases for Example 5.1
Figure 5.8. Equilibrium Contractor Prices as the Demand Increases for Example
5.1
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Figure 5.9. Equilibrium Quality Levels as the Demand Increases for Example 5.1
equilibrium prices and the equilibrium quality levels in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9,
respectively. The contractors consistently provide the majority of the product to the
demand markets.
Observe from Figure 5.8 that as the demand increases the quality levels for both
contractors drops to zero.
Example 5.2
A disruption to the original supply chain in Example 5.1 is considered. No business is
immune from supply chain disruptions and, particularly, as noted by Purtell (2010),
pharmaceuticals are especially vulnerable since they are high-value, highly regulated
products. Moreover, pharmaceuticals disruptions may not only increase costs but
may also create hazards and expose the pharmaceutical companies to damage to
their brands and reputations (see also Nagurney, Yu, and Qiang (2011), Masoumi,
Yu, and Nagurney (2012), and Qiang and Nagurney (2012)).
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Figure 5.10. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 5.2
Specifically, I consider the following disruption. The data are as in Example 5.1
but contractor O2 is not able to provide any production and distribution services.
This could arise due to a natural disaster, adulteration in its production process,
and/or an inability to procure an ingredient. Hence, the topology of the disrupted
supply chain network is as in Figure 5.10.
The Euler method converges in 73 iterations and yields the following new equilib-
rium solution. The computed product flows are:
Q∗11 = 218.06, Q
∗
12 = 141.79, Q
∗
21 = 260.20, Q
∗
22 = 25.96,
Q∗31 = 521.74, Q
∗
32 = 332.25.
The computed quality level of the remaining contractor is:
q∗1 = 14.60,
and the computed prices are:
pi∗11 = 531.74, pi
∗
12 = 176.12.
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With the decrease in competition among the contractors, since there is now only
one, rather than two, as in Example 5.1, the quality level of contractor O1 drops, but
the prices that it charges increases. The new average quality level is q′=51.38. The
total cost of the firm is now 1,123,226.62 whereas the profit of the first contractor is
now 123,460.67, a sizable increase relative to that with competition as in Example
5.1.
Example 5.3
The data for Example 5.3 are the same as for Example 5.1, except that the opportunity
cost functions oc11, oc12, oc21, oc22 are all equal to 0.00.
The Euler method converges in 2915 iterations and yields the following equilibrium
solution. The computed product flows are:
Q∗11 = 451.17, Q
∗
12 = 396.50, Q
∗
21 = 548.73, Q
∗
22 = 103.39,
Q∗31 = 0.00, Q
∗
32 = 0.00, Q
∗
41 = 0.00, Q
∗
42 = 0.00.
The computed quality levels of the contractors are:
q∗1 = 100.00, q
∗
2 = 100.00,
and the computed prices are:
pi∗11 = 3, 060.70, pi
∗
12 = 2, 515.08, pi
∗
21 = 3, 060.56, pi
∗
22 = 2, 515.16.
The total cost of the firm is 2,171,693.16 and the profits of the contractors are 0.00
and 0.00. The value of q′ is 100.00.
Because the opportunity costs are all zero, in order to improve the total profit,
the contractors will charge the firm very large prices. Thus, the original firm would
rather produce by itself than outsource to the contractors.
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One can see, from this example, that, in addition to the total revenue term, each
contractor must consider an outsourcing price related term, such as the opportunity
cost, in its objective function. Without considering such a function, the outsourcing
quantities will all be zero (cf. (5.14)), and, hence, a contractor would not secure any
contracts from the firm.
Example 5.4
The data for Example 5.4 are the same as for Example 5.1, except the opportunity
cost functions and the demand. The demand in R1 is now 700, and the demand in
R2 is 100.
The contractors’ opportunity cost functions now become:
oc11(pi11) = .5(pi11 − 2)2 − 15265.29, oc12(pi12) = (pi12 − 1)2 − 513.93,
oc21(pi21) = (pi21 − 1)2 − 35751.25, oc22(pi22) = .5(pi22 − 2)2 − 613.20.
The Euler method converges in 93 iterations and yields the following equilibrium
solution. The computed product flows are:
Q∗11 = 69.12, Q
∗
12 = 19.65, Q
∗
21 = 77.99, Q
∗
22 = 0.00,
Q∗31 = 174.72, Q
∗
32 = 45.34, Q
∗
41 = 378.17, Q
∗
42 = 35.00.
The computed quality levels of the contractors are:
q∗1 = 77.99, q
∗
2 = 58.68,
and the computed prices are:
pi∗11 = 176.73, pi
∗
12 = 23.67, pi
∗
21 = 190.08, pi
∗
22 = 37.02.
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The total cost of the firm is 204,701.28 and the profits of the contractors are: 12,366.75
and 7,614.84. The incurred opportunity costs at the equilibrium prices are all zero.
Thus, in this example, the equilibrium prices that the contractors charge the firm are
such that they are able to adequately recover their costs, and secure contracts.
The value of q′ is 72.61.
5.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I developed a supply chain network game theory model, in both
equilibrium and dynamic versions, to capture contractor selection, based on the com-
petition among the contractors in the prices that they charge as well as the quality
levels of the products that they produce. I introduced a disrepute cost associated
with the average quality at the demand markets. It is assumed that the firm is
cost-minimizing whereas the contractors are profit-maximizing.
I utilized variational inequality theory for the formulation of the governing Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium conditions and then revealed interesting dynamics associated with
the evolution of the firm’s product flows, and the contractors’ prices and quality levels.
I provided stability analysis results as well as an algorithm that can be interpreted
as a discretization of the continuous-time adjustment processes. The methodological
framework was illustrated through a series of numerical examples for which I reported
the complete input and output data for transparency purposes. The numerical stud-
ies included sensitivity analysis results as well as a disruption to the supply chain
network in that a contractor is no longer available for production and distribution.
I also discussed the scenario in which the opportunity costs on the contractors’ side
are identically equal to zero and the scenario in which the opportunity costs at the
equilibrium are all zero.
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This chapter is a contribution to the literature on outsourcing with a focus on
quality. It also is an interesting application of game theory and associated method-
ologies.
In this chapter, only a single original firm is considered, and the in-house quality
level of the single original firm is assumed to be perfect. In contrast, in the next
chapter, Chapter 6, I consider quantity and quality competition among multiple firms,
whose products are differentiated by their brands. Moreover, instead of assuming
perfect in-house quality levels, quality levels are strategic variables of the firms in
Chapter 6. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are also provided.
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CHAPTER 6
A SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK MODEL WITH
PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, OUTSOURCING, AND
QUALITY AND PRICE COMPETITION
In this chapter, I develop a supply chain network game theory model with prod-
uct differentiation, possible outsourcing of production and distribution, quantity and
quality competition among the firms, and quality and price competition among the
contractors. The model in this chapter extends the one in Chapter 5.
This chapter, in contrast to Chapter 5, focuses on the supply chain network con-
sisting of multiple competing firms with product differentiation and their potential
contractors. For each contractor, the number of contracted original firms is not pre-
determined. In addition, unlike Chapter 5, the in-house quality levels are no longer
assumed to be perfect, and are considered as the strategic variables for the firms.
I assume that the original firms compete in the sense of Cournot-Nash. Each firm
aims at determining its equilibrium in-house quality level, in-house production quan-
tities and shipments, and outsourcing quantities, which satisfy demand requirements,
so as to minimize its total cost and the weighted cost of disrepute. The contractors,
in turn, are competing a la Bertrand-Nash in determining their optimal quality and
price levels in order to maximize their individual total profits. This model provides
each original firm with the equilibrium in-house quality level and the equilibrium
make-or-buy and contractor-selection policy, with the demand for its product being
satisfied in multiple demand markets. The demand of the product is still assumed to
be fixed in this model, as in Chapter 5.
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In this chapter, the governing equilibrium conditions of the model are formulated
as a variational inequality problem. The Euler method (cf. Section 2.5.1), which
provides a discrete-time adjustment process and tracks the evolution of the product
flows, quality levels, and prices over time, is, again, utilized and convergence results
given. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate how such a supply chain network
game theory model can be applied in practice.
This chapter is based on Nagurney and Li (2015). It is organized as follows.
In Section 6.1, I describe the decision-making behavior of the original firms, who
compete in quantity and quality, and that of the contractors, who compete in price and
quality. Then, I construct the supply chain network game theory model with product
differentiation, possible outsourcing of production and distribution, and quality and
price competition. I obtain the governing equilibrium conditions, and derive the
equivalent variational inequality formulation. In Section 6.2, I describe the closed
form expressions yielded by the Euler method for the prices and the quality levels, with
the product flows being solved exactly by an equilibration algorithm. Convergence
results are also provided. It is applied in Section 6.3 to compute solutions to numerical
examples, along with sensitivity analysis, in order to demonstrate the generality and
the applicability of the proposed framework. In Section 6.4, I summarize the results
and present the conclusions.
6.1. The Supply Chain Network Model with Product Differ-
entiation, Outsourcing, and Quality and Price Compe-
tition
In this section, I develop the supply chain network game theory model with prod-
uct differentiation, outsourcing, price and quality competition among the contractors,
and quantity and quality competition among the original firms. I consider a finite
number of I original firms, with a typical firm denoted by i, who compete noncoopera-
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tively. The products of the I firms are not homogeneous but, rather, are differentiated
by brands. Firm i; i = 1, . . . , I, is involved in the processes of in-house manufacturing
and distribution of its brand name product, and may subcontract its manufacturing
and distribution activities to contractors who may be located overseas. I seek to
determine the optimal product flows from each firm to its demand markets, along
with the prices the contractors charge the firms, and the quality levels of the in-house
manufactured products and the outsourced products.
For clarity and definiteness, I consider the supply chain network topology of the
I firms depicted in Figure 6.1. Each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I, is considering in-house and
outsourcing manufacturing facilities and serves the same nR demand markets. A link
from each top-tiered node i, representing original firm i, is connected to its in-house
manufacturing facility node M i. The in-house distribution activities of firm i, in turn,
are represented by links connecting M i to the demand nodes: R1, . . . , RnR .
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Figure 6.1. The Supply Chain Network Topology with Outsourcing and Multiple
Competing Firms
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In this model, I capture the possible outsourcing of the products from the I firms
in terms of their production and delivery. As depicted in Figure 6.1, there are nO
contractors available to each of the I firms. Each firm may potentially contract to
any of these contractors who then produce and distribute the product to the same
nR demand markets. In Figure 6.1, hence, there are additional links from each top-
most node i; i = 1, . . . , I, to the nO contractor nodes, O1, . . . , OnO , each of which
corresponds to the transaction activity of firm i with contractor j. The next set of
links, which emanates from the contractor nodes to the demand markets, reflect the
production and delivery of the outsourced products to the nR demand markets.
As shown in Figure 6.1, the outsourced flows of different firms are represented by
links with different colors, for convenience and clarity of depiction, which indicates
that, in the processes of transaction and outsourcing of manufacturing and distribu-
tion, the outsourced products are still differentiated by brands. In Figure 6.1, red
links are used to denote the outsourcing flows of firm 1 with blue links referring to
those of firm I. The mathematical notation given in Table 6.1 explicitly handles such
options.
In Figure 6.1, the top set of links consists of the manufacturing links, whether
in-house or outsourcing, whereas the next set of links consists of the associated dis-
tribution links. For simplicity, let n = 1 + nO, where nO is the number of potential
contractors, denote the number of manufacturing plants, whether in-house or belong-
ing to the contractors’.
The notation for the model is given in Table 6.1. The vectors are assumed to be
column vectors. The optimal/equilibrium solution is denoted by “∗”.
For consistency, I define and quantify quality levels, quality costs, production and
delivery/transportation costs, transaction cost, and the disrepute cost in a manner
similar to that in Chapter 5. However, unlike Chapter 5, the in-house quality levels
are now strategic variables for the firms, therefore, in this model, in addition to the
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Table 6.1. Notation for the Supply Chain Network Model with Product Differenti-
ation, Outsourcing, and Quality and Price Competition
Notation Definition
Qijk the nonnegative amount of firm i’s product produced at man-
ufacturing plant j, whether in-house or contracted, and deliv-
ered to demand market Rk, where j = 1, . . . , n. For firm i, its
own {Qijk} elements are grouped into the vector Qi, and all
such vectors for all original firms are grouped into the vector
Q, where Q ∈ RInnR+ . All in-house quantities are grouped into
the vector Q1 ∈ RInR+ , with all outsourcing quantities into the
vector Q2 ∈ RInRnO+ .
dik the demand for firm i’s product at demand market Rk; k =
1, . . . , nR.
qi the nonnegative quality level of firm i’s product produced in-
house. I group the {qi} elements into the vector q1 ∈ RI+.
qij the nonnegative quality level of firm i’s product produced by
contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO. I group all the {qij} elements for
firm i’s product into the vector q2i ∈ RnO+ . For each contractor
j, I group its own {qij} elements into the vector qj, and then
group all such vectors for all contractors into the vector q2 ∈
RInO+ .
q All the qi and qij are grouped into the vector q ∈ RIn+ .
piijk the price charged by contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO, for producing
and delivering a unit of firm i’s product to demand market
Rk. The {piijk} elements for contractor j are grouped into
the vector pij ∈ RInR+ , and group all such vectors for all the
contractors into the vector pi ∈ RInRnO+ .
fi(Q
1, q1) the total in-house production cost of firm i.
ci(q
1) the total quality cost of firm i.
tcij(
∑nR
k=1 Qi,1+j,k) the total transaction cost associated with firm i transacting
with contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO.
cˆik(Q
1, q1) the total transportation cost associated with delivering firm
i’s product manufactured in-house to demand market Rk; k =
1, . . . , nR.
scijk(Q
2, q2) the total cost of contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO, to produce and
distribute the product of firm i to demand market Rk.
cˆj(q
2) the total quality cost faced by contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO.
ocijk(pi) the opportunity cost associated with pricing the product of
firm i at piijk, and delivering to demand market Rk, by con-
tractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO.
q′i(Qi, qi, q
2
i ) the average quality level of firm i’s product (cf. (6.3)).
dci(q
′
i(Qi, qi, q
2
i )) the cost of disrepute of firm i.
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outsourcing production and distribution costs, I also express the in-house production
and distribution costs as functions that depend on both production quantities and
quality levels. These functions are assumed to be convex in quality and quantity.
6.1.1 The Behavior of the Firms and Their Optimality Conditions
Unlike Chapter 5, the in-house quality levels are not assumed to be perfect any-
more. As mentioned in Table 6.1, the quality level of firm i’s product produced
in-house is denoted by qi, where i = 1, . . . , I, and the quality level of firm i’s product
produced by contractor j is denoted by qij, where j = 1, . . . , nO. Both vary from a 0%
conformance level to a 100% conformance level (cf. Section 1.1), so that, respectively,
0 ≤ qij ≤ qU , i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , nO, (6.1)
0 ≤ qi ≤ qU , i = 1, . . . , I, (6.2)
where qU is the value representing perfect quality level associated with the 100%
conformance level.
The average quality level of firm i’s product is, hence, an average quality level
determined by the in-house quality level, the in-house product flows, the quality
levels of the contractors, and the outsourced product flows. Thus, the average quality
level for firm i’s product, both in-house and outsourced, can be expressed as
q′i(Qi, qi, q
2
i ) =
∑nR
k=1
∑n
j=2Qijkqi,j−1 +
∑nR
k=1Qi1kqi∑nR
k=1 dik
, i = 1, . . . , I. (6.3)
Compared to the average quality levels in Chapters 3 (cf. (3.7)) and 5 (cf. (5.2)), (6.3)
captures the average quality levels at the demand markets in a competitive supply
chain network with product differentiation and outsourcing.
Following Chapter 5, I assume that the disrepute cost of firm i, dci(q
′
i(Qi, qi, q
2
i )),
is a monotonically decreasing function of the average quality level. Here, however, I
152
no longer assume, as was done in Chapter 5, which considered only a single firm, that
the firms produce their branded products with perfect quality. Hence, the average
quality level in (6.3) is a generalization of (5.2).
Each original firm i selects the product flows Qi and the in-house quality level qi,
whereas each contractor j, who competes for contracts in quality and price, selects
its outsourcing quality level vector qj and outsourcing price vector pij.
Firm i’s utility function is denoted by U1i , where i = 1, . . . , I. The objective of
original firm i is to maximize its utility (cf. (6.4) below) represented by minus its
total costs that include the production cost, the quality cost, the transportation costs,
the payments to the contractors, the transaction costs, along with the weighted cost
of disrepute, with the nonnegative term ωi denoting the weight that firm i imposes
on the disrepute cost function (cf. Section 2.4).
As discussed in Chapter 5, the production and transportation cost functions only
capture the costs of production and delivery, and depend on both the quantities and
the quality levels. The production and the transportation costs and the quality cost
are entirely different costs, and they do not overlap.
Hence, firm i seeks to
MaximizeQi,qi U
1
i = −fi(Q1, q1)− ci(q1)−
nR∑
k=1
cˆik(Q
1, q1)−
nO∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
pi∗ijkQi,1+j,k
−
nO∑
j=1
tcij(
nR∑
k=1
Qi,1+j,k)− ωidci(q′i(Qi, qi, q2
∗
i )) (6.4)
subject to:
n∑
j=1
Qijk = dik, i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR, (6.5)
Qijk ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , n; k = 1, . . . , nR, (6.6)
and (6.2).
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As revealed by constraint (6.5), a fixed demand is assumed for each firm, in order
to capture the forecasted/projected demands at multiple demand markets. Note that,
according to (6.4), the prices and the contractors’ quality levels are evaluated at their
equilibrium values.
I assume that all the cost functions in (6.4) are continuous, twice continuously
differentiable, and convex. The original firms compete in a noncooperative in the
sense of Nash with each one trying to maximize its own utility. The strategic variables
for each original firm i are all the in-house and the outsourcing flows produced and
shipped by firm i and its in-house quality level.
I define the feasible set Ki as Ki = {(Qi, qi)|Qi ∈ RnnR+ with (6.5) satisfied and qi
satisfying (6.2)}. All Ki; i = 1, . . . , I, are closed and convex. I also define the feasible
set K1 ≡ ΠIi=1Ki.
Definition 6.1: Supply Chain Network Cournot-Nash Equilibrium with
Product Differentiation, Outsourcing, and Quality Competition
An in-house and outsourced product flow pattern and in-house quality level (Q∗, q1∗)
∈ K1 is said to constitute a Cournot-Nash equilibrium if for each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I,
U1i (Q
∗
i , Qˆ
∗
i , q
∗
i , qˆ
∗
i , q
2∗, pi∗i ) ≥ U1i (Qi, Qˆ∗i , qi, qˆ∗i , q2∗, pi∗i ), ∀(Qi, qi) ∈ Ki, (6.7)
where
Qˆ∗i ≡ (Q∗1, . . . , Q∗i−1, Q∗i+1, . . . , Q∗I),
qˆ∗i ≡ (q∗1, . . . , q∗i−1, q∗i+1, . . . , q∗I ).
According to (6.7) (cf. Definition 2.7), a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is established
if no firm can unilaterally improve upon its utility by selecting an alternative vector
of in-house or outsourced product flows and quality level.
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Next, I derive the variational inequality formulation of the Cournot-Nash equi-
librium with product differentiation and outsourcing according to Definition 6.1 (cf.
Cournot (1838), Nash (1950, 1951), Gabay and Moulin (1980), and Theorem 2.7) in
the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1
Assume that, for each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I, the utility function U1i (Q, q
1, q2
∗
, pi∗i ) is
concave with respect to its variables Qi and qi, and is continuous and twice continu-
ously differentiable. Then (Q∗, q1∗) ∈ K1 is a Counot-Nash equilibrium according to
Definition 6.1 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality:
−
I∑
i=1
n∑
h=1
nR∑
m=1
∂U1i (Q
∗, q1
∗
, q2
∗
, pi∗i )
∂Qihm
× (Qihm −Q∗ihm)
−
I∑
i=1
∂U1i (Q
∗, q1
∗
q2
∗
, pi∗i )
∂qi
× (qi − q∗i ) ≥ 0,
∀(Q, q1) ∈ K1, (6.8)
with notice that: for h = 1; i = 1, . . . , I; m = 1, . . . , nR:
− ∂U
1
i
∂Qihm
=
[
∂fi
∂Qihm
+
nR∑
k=1
∂cˆik
∂Qihm
+ ωi
∂dci
∂q′i
∂q′i
∂Qihm
]
,
for h = 2, . . . , n; i = 1, . . . , I; m = 1, . . . , nR:
− ∂U
1
i
∂Qihm
=
[
pi∗i,h−1,m +
∂tci,h−1
∂Qihm
+ ωi
∂dci
∂q′i
∂q′i
∂Qihm
]
,
for i = 1, . . . , I:
−∂U
1
i
∂qi
=
[
∂fi
∂qi
+
∂ci
∂qi
+
nR∑
k=1
∂cˆik
∂qi
+ ωi
∂dci
∂q′i
∂q′i
∂qi
]
.
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6.1.2 The Behavior of the Contractors and Their Optimality Conditions
The objective of contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO, is profit maximization. Their rev-
enues are obtained from the purchasing activities of the original firms, while their
costs are the costs of production and distribution, the total quality costs, and the
opportunity costs (cf. Section 5.1.2).
Similar as in Chapter 5, in this model, each contractor has, as its strategic vari-
ables, its quality levels for producing and distributing the original firms’ products,
and the prices that charges the firms. I denote the utility of each contractor j by U2j ,
with j = 1, . . . , nO, and note that it represents the profit. Hence, each contractor j;
j = 1, . . . , nO, seeks to:
Maximizeqj ,pij U
2
j =
nR∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
piijkQ
∗
i,1+j,k −
nR∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
scijk(Q
2∗, q2)− cˆj(q2)
−
nR∑
k=1
I∑
i=1
ocijk(pi) (6.9)
subject to:
piijk ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , nO; k = 1, . . . , nR, (6.10)
and (6.1) for each j. are at their equilibrium values.
According to (6.9), the original firms’ outputs are evaluated at the equilibrium,
since the contractors do not control these variables, and, hence, must respond to these
outputs.
The cost functions in each contractor’s utility function are continuous, twice con-
tinuously differentiable, and convex. The contractors compete in a noncooperative in
the sense of Nash, with each one trying to maximize its own profits.
The feasible sets are defined as Kj ≡ {(qj, pij)|qj satisfies (6.1) and pij satisfies (6.
10) for j}, K2 ≡ ΠnOj=1Kj, and K ≡ K1 × K2. All the above-defined feasible sets are
convex.
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Definition 6.2: A Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium with Price and Quality Com-
petition
A quality level and price pattern (q2
∗
, pi∗) ∈ K2 is said to constitute a Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium if for each contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO,
U2j (Q
2∗ , q∗j , qˆ
∗
j , pi
∗
j , pˆi
∗
j ) ≥ U2j (Q2
∗
, qj, qˆ
∗
j , pij, pˆi
∗
j ), ∀(qj, pij) ∈ Kj, (6.11)
where
qˆ∗j ≡ (q∗1, . . . , q∗j−1, q∗j+1, . . . , q∗nO),
pˆi∗j ≡ (pi∗1, . . . , pi∗j−1, pi∗j+1, . . . , pi∗nO).
According to (6.11) (cf. Definition 2.7), a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is established
if no contractor can unilaterally improve upon its profits by selecting an alternative
vector of quality levels or prices charged to the original firms.
I present the variational inequality formulation of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
according to Definition 6.2 (see, Bertrand (1883), Nash (1950, 1951), Gabay and
Moulin (1980), and Theorem 2.7) in the following theorem.
Theorem 6.2
Assume that, for each contractor j; j = 1, . . . , nO, the profit function U
2
j (Q
2∗ , q2, pi)
is concave with respect to the variables pij and qj, and is continuous and twice contin-
uously differentiable. Then (q2
∗
, pi∗) ∈ K2 is a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium according
to Definition 6.2 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality:
−
I∑
l=1
nO∑
j=1
∂U2j (Q
2∗ , q2
∗
, pi∗)
∂qlj
× (qlj − q∗lj)
−
I∑
l=1
nO∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
∂U2j (Q
2∗ , q2
∗
, pi∗)
∂piljk
× (piljk − pi∗ljk) ≥ 0,
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∀(q2, pi) ∈ K2. (6.12)
with notice that: for j = 1, . . . , nO; l = 1, . . . , I:
−∂U
2
j
∂qlj
=
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
∂scijk
∂qlj
+
∂cˆj
∂qlj
,
and for j = 1, . . . , nO; l = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR:
− ∂U
2
j
∂piljk
=
I∑
i=1
nR∑
r=1
∂ocijr
∂piljk
−Q∗l,1+j,k.
6.1.3 The Equilibrium Conditions for the Supply Chain Network with
Product Differentiation, Outsourcing, and Quality and Price Com-
petition
In equilibrium, the optimality conditions for all contractors and the optimality
conditions for all the original firms must hold simultaneously, according to the defi-
nition below.
Definition 6.3: Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Product Differ-
entiation, Outsourcing, and Quality and Price Competition
The equilibrium state of the supply chain network with product differentiation, out-
sourcing, and quality and price competition is one where both variational inequalities
(6.8) and (6.12) hold simultaneously.
Theorem 6.3
The equilibrium conditions governing the supply chain network model with product
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differentiation, outsourcing, and quality competition are equivalent to the solution of
the variational inequality problem: determine (Q∗, q1
∗
, q2
∗
, pi∗) ∈ K, such that:
−
I∑
i=1
n∑
h=1
nR∑
m=1
∂U1i (Q
∗, q1
∗
, q2
∗
, pi∗i )
∂Qihm
×(Qihm−Q∗ihm)−
I∑
i=1
∂U1i (Q
∗, q1
∗
, q2
∗
, pi∗i )
∂qi
×(qi−q∗i )
−
I∑
l=1
nO∑
j=1
∂U2j (Q
2∗ , q2
∗
, pi∗)
∂qlj
× (qlj − q∗lj)
−
I∑
l=1
nO∑
j=1
nR∑
k=1
∂U2j (Q
2∗ , q2∗, pi∗)
∂piljk
× (piljk − pi∗ljk) ≥ 0,
∀(Q, q1, q2, pi) ∈ K. (6.13)
Proof: The proof follows a manner similar to that for Theorem 5.3.
Variational inequality (6.13) can be put into standard form (cf. (2.1a)): determine
X∗ ∈ K such that:
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (6.14)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in N -dimensional Euclidean space, and N =
InnR + I + InO + InOnR. If the column vectors X ≡ (Q, q1, q2, pi) and F (X) ≡
(F1(X), F2(X), F3(X), F4(X)), such that:
F1(X) =
[
∂U1i (Q, q
1, q2, pii)
∂Qihm
; h = 1, . . . , n; i = 1, . . . , I;m = 1, . . . , nR
]
,
F2(X) =
[
∂U1i (Q, q
1, q2, pii)
∂qi
; i = 1, . . . , I
]
,
F3(X) =
[
∂U2j (Q
2, q2, pi)
∂qlj
; l = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , nO
]
,
F4(X) =
[
∂U2j (Q
2, q2, pi)
∂piljk
; l = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , nO; k = 1, . . . , nR
]
, (6.15)
then (6.13) can be re-expressed as (2.1a).
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6.2. Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the
Supply Chain Network with Product Differentiation, Out-
sourcing, and Quality and Price Competition
The algorithm employed for the computation of the solution for the supply chain
network game theory model is the Euler method (cf. Section 2.5.1).
Similar to the discussion in Chapter 5 (cf. (5.3)), at each iteration τ , the values of
the product flows can be determined by the exact equilibration algorithm of Dafermos
and Sparrow (1969) (cf. Sections 2.5.1 and 5.3). Furthermore, one can determine the
values for the in-house and the outsourced quality variables explicitly according to
the following closed form expressions: for each original firm i; i = 1, . . . , I:
qτ+1i = min{qU ,max{0, qτi − aτ (
∂fi(Q
1τ , q1
τ
)
∂qi
+
∂ci(q
1τ )
∂qi
+
nR∑
k=1
∂cˆik(Q
1τ , q1
τ
)
∂qi
+ωi
∂dci(q
′
i
τ )
∂q′i
∂q′i(Q
τ
i , q
τ
i , q
2τ
i )
∂qi
)}}; (6.16)
and for the contractor and firm pairs: l = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , nO:
qτ+1lj = min{qU ,max{0, qτlj − aτ (
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
∂scijk(Q
2τ , q2
τ
)
∂qlj
+
∂cˆj(q
2τ )
∂qlj
)}}. (6.17)
Also, the following are the explicit formulae for the outsourced product prices: for
l = 1, . . . , I; j = 1, . . . , nO; k = 1, . . . , nR:
piτ+1ljk = max{0, piτljk − aτ (
I∑
i=1
nR∑
r=1
∂ocijr(pi
τ )
∂piljk
−Qτl,1+j,k)}. (6.18)
I now provide the convergence result. The proof follows using similar arguments
as those in Theorem 2.17 and Nagurney and Zhang (1996).
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Theorem 6.4
In the supply chain network game theory model with product differentiation, out-
sourcing, and quality competition, let F (X) = −∇U(Q, q1, q2, pi), where I group all
U1i ; i = 1, . . . , I, and U
2
j ; j = 1, . . . , nO, into the vector U(Q, q
1, q2, pi), be strongly
monotone. Also, assume that F is uniformly Lipschitz continuous (cf. Definition
2.6). Then there exists a unique equilibrium product flow, quality level, and price pat-
tern (Q∗, q1
∗
, q2
∗
, pi∗) ∈ K, and any sequence generated by the Euler method as given
by (2.34), where {aτ} satisfies
∑∞
τ=0 aτ = ∞, aτ > 0, aτ → 0, as τ → ∞ converges
to (Q∗, q1
∗
, q2
∗
, pi∗).
As discussed in Section 5.3, one can also expect the existence of a solution, given
the continuity of the functions that make up F (X), under less restrictive conditions
that that of strong monotonicity.
The Euler method (cf. (5.19) and (6.16)-(6.18)), can be interpreted as a discrete-
time adjustment process in which each iteration reflects a time step (cf. Section
2.5.1). The original firms determine, at each time step, their optimal production
(and shipment) outputs and quality levels, whereas the contractors, at each time
step (iteration), compute their optimal quality levels and the prices that they charge.
The process evolves over time until the equilibrium product flows, quality levels, and
contractor prices are achieved, at which point no one has any incentive to switch their
strategies.
6.3. Numerical Examples and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I present numerical supply chain network examples for which I
applied the Euler method (cf. (5.19) and (6.16)-(6.18)) to compute the equilibrium
solutions. I present a spectrum of examples, accompanied by sensitivity analysis.
The supply chain network topology of the numerical examples is given in Figure
6.2. There are two original firms, both of which are located in North America. Their
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products are substitutes but are differentiated by brands in the two demand markets,
R1 and R2. Demand market R1 is in North America, whereas demand market R2
is in Asia. I use different colors to denote the outsourcing links of different original
firms, with red links denoting the outsourcing links of firm 1 and blue links denoting
those of firm 2.
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Figure 6.2. The Supply Chain Network Topology for the Numerical Examples
Each original firm has one in-house manufacturing plant and two potential con-
tractors. Contractor 1 and contractor 2 are located in North America and Asia,
respectively. Each firm must satisfy the demands for its product at the two demand
markets. The demands for firm 1’s product at R1 and at R2 are 50 and 100, respec-
tively. The demands for firm 2’s product at R1 and at R2 are 75 and 150.
For the computation of solutions to the numerical examples, I implemented the
Euler method using Matlab on a Lenovo Z580. The convergence tolerance is 10−6,
so that the algorithm is deemed to have converged when the absolute value of the
difference between each successive product flow, quality level, and price is less than
or equal to 10−6. The sequence {aτ} is set to: {1, 12 , 12 , 13 , 13 , 13 , . . .}. I initialized the
algorithm by equally distributing the product flows among the paths joining the firm
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top-node to the demand market, by setting the quality levels equal to 1 and the prices
equal to 0.
Example 6.1
The data are as follows.
The production cost functions at the in-house manufacturing plants are:
f1(Q
1, q1) = (Q111 +Q112)
2 + 1.5(Q111 +Q112) + 2(Q211 +Q212) + .2q1(Q111 +Q112),
f2(Q
1, q1) = 2(Q211 +Q212)
2 + .5(Q211 +Q212) + (Q111 +Q112) + .1q2(Q211 +Q212).
The total transportation cost functions for the in-house manufactured products
are:
cˆ11(Q111) = Q
2
111 + 5Q111, cˆ12(Q112) = 2.5Q
2
112 + 10Q112,
cˆ21(Q211) = .5Q
2
211 + 3Q211, cˆ22(Q212) = 2Q
2
212 + 5Q212.
The in-house total quality cost functions for the two original firms are given by:
c1(q1) = (q1 − 80)2 + 10, c2(q2) = (q2 − 85)2 + 20.
The transaction cost functions are:
tc11(Q121 +Q122) = .5(Q121 +Q122)
2 + 2(Q121 +Q122) + 100,
tc12(Q131 +Q132) = .7(Q131 +Q132)
2 + .5(Q131 +Q132) + 150,
tc21(Q221 +Q222) = .5(Q221 +Q222)
2 + 3(Q221 +Q222) + 75,
tc22(Q221 +Q222) = .75(Q231 +Q232)
2 + .5(Q231 +Q232) + 100.
The contractors’ total cost functions of production and distribution are:
sc111(Q121, q11) = .5Q121q11, sc112(Q122, q11) = .5Q122q11,
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sc121(Q131, q12) = .5Q131q12, sc122(Q132, q12) = .5Q132q12,
sc211(Q221, q21) = .3Q221q21, sc212(Q222, q21) = .3Q222q21,
sc221(Q231, q22) = .25Q231q22, sc222(Q232, q22) = .25Q232q22.
The total quality cost functions of the contractors are:
cˆ1(q11, q21) = (q11 − 75)2 + (q21 − 75)2 + 15,
cˆ2(q12, q22) = 1.5(q12 − 75)2 + 1.5(q22 − 75)2 + 20.
The contractors’ opportunity cost functions are:
oc111(pi111) = (pi111 − 10)2, oc121(pi121) = .5(pi121 − 5)2,
oc112(pi112) = .5(pi112 − 5)2, oc122(pi122) = (pi122 − 15)2,
oc211(pi211) = 2(pi211 − 20)2, oc221(pi221) = .5(pi221 − 5)2,
oc212(pi212) = .5(pi212 − 5)2, oc222(pi222) = (pi222 − 15)2.
The original firms’ disrepute cost functions are:
dc1(q
′
1) = 100− q′1, dc2(q′2) = 100− q′2,
where
q′1 =
Q121q11 +Q131q12 +Q111q1 +Q122q11 +Q132q12 +Q112q1
d11 + d12
,
and
q′2 =
Q221q21 +Q231q22 +Q211q2 +Q222q21 +Q232q22 +Q212q2
d21 + d22
.
ω1 and ω2 are 1. q
U is 100.
The Euler method converges in 255 iterations and yields the following equilibrium
solution.
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The computed product flows are:
Q∗111 = 13.64, Q
∗
121 = 26.87, Q
∗
131 = 9.49, Q
∗
112 = 9.34, Q
∗
122 = 42.85,
Q∗132 = 47.81, Q
∗
211 = 16.54, Q
∗
221 = 47.31, Q
∗
231 = 11.16, Q
∗
212 = 12.65,
Q∗222 = 62.90, Q
∗
232 = 74.45.
The computed quality levels of the original firms and the contractors are:
q∗1 = 77.78, q
∗
2 = 83.61, q
∗
11 = 57.57, q
∗
12 = 65.45, q
∗
21 = 58.47, q
∗
22 = 67.87.
The equilibrium prices are:
pi∗111 = 23.44, pi
∗
112 = 47.85, pi
∗
121 = 14.49, pi
∗
122 = 38.91,
pi∗211 = 31.83, pi
∗
212 = 67.90, pi
∗
221 = 16.16, pi
∗
222 = 52.23.
Notice that, although the North American contractor produces at a lower qual-
ity and at a higher price at equilibrium, it produces and distributes more than the
off-shore contractor to R1, who is located in North America. This happens for two
reasons. First, because of the fixed demands, no pressure for quality improvement is
imposed from the demand side. Secondly, as reflected in the transaction costs with
the North America contractor, firms are willing to outsource more to this contractor.
The Asian contractor, who produces at higher quality levels and at lower prices at
equilibrium, produces and distributes more to R2. This happens because the contrac-
tor who charges lower prices and produces at higher quality levels is highly preferable
in the demand market, R2, with the larger demand for which the original firms need
to outsource more.
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The total costs of the original firms’ are, respectively, 11,419.90 and 24,573.94,
with their incurred disrepute costs being 36.32 and 34.69. The profits of the con-
tractors are 567.84 and 440.92. The values of q′1 and q
′
2 are, respectively, 63.68 and
65.31.
I now conduct sensitivity analysis by varying the weights that the firms im-
pose on their disrepute costs, ω, which is the vector of ωi; i = 1, 2, with ω =
(0, 0), (1000, 1000), (2000, 2000), (3000, 3000), (4000, 4000), (5000, 5000).
I display the equilibrium product flows and the equilibrium quality levels, both
the in-house and the outsourced ones, and the average quality levels, in Figure 6.3,
with the equilibrium prices changed by each contractor, the disrepute cost, and the
total cost of each original firm displayed in Figure 6.4.
As the weights of the disrepute costs increase, there is more pressure for firms to
improve quality. Thus, all the quality levels increase. In addition, because the in-
house activities are more capable of guaranteeing higher quality, the outputs of both
firms are shifted in-house as the weights increase. As a result, the outsourcing prices
decrease (see (6.12)). Moreover, as shown in Figure 6.4, as expected, the values of
the incurred disrepute costs decrease as ω increases, but the total costs of the original
firms increase.
Example 6.2
In Example 6.2, both firms consider quality levels as variables affecting their in-house
transportation costs. The transportation cost functions of the original firms, hence,
now depend on in-house quality levels as follows:
cˆ11(Q111, q1) = Q
2
111 + 1.5Q111q1, cˆ12(Q112, q1) = 2.5Q
2
112 + 2Q112q1,
cˆ21(Q211, q2) = .5Q
2
211 + 3Q211q2, cˆ22(Q212, q2) = 2Q
2
212 + 2Q212q2.
The remaining data are identical to those in Example 6.1.
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Figure 6.3. Equilibrium Product Flows and Quality Levels as ω Increases for Ex-
ample 6.1
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Figure 6.4. Equilibrium Prices, Disrepute Costs, and Total Costs of the Firms as ω
Increases for Example 6.1
The Euler method converges in 298 iterations and yields the following equilibrium
solution.
The computed product flows are:
Q∗111 = 0.00, Q
∗
121 = 36.42, Q
∗
131 = 13.58, Q
∗
112 = 0.00, Q
∗
122 = 46.42,
Q∗132 = 53.58, Q
∗
211 = 0.00, Q
∗
221 = 60.13, Q
∗
231 = 14.87, Q
∗
212 = 3.83,
Q∗222 = 65.50, Q
∗
232 = 80.68.
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The computed quality levels of the original firms and the contractors are:
q∗1 = 80, q
∗
2 = 80.90, q
∗
11 = 54.29, q
∗
12 = 63.81, q
∗
21 = 56.16, q
∗
22 = 67.04.
The equilibrium prices are:
pi∗111 = 28.21, pi
∗
112 = 51.42, pi
∗
121 = 18.58, pi
∗
122 = 41.79,
pi∗211 = 35.03, pi
∗
212 = 70.50, pi
∗
221 = 19.87, pi
∗
222 = 55.34.
The total costs of the original firms are, respectively, 13,002.64 and 27,607.44,
with incurred disrepute costs of 41.45 and 38.80. The profits of the contractors are,
respectively, 967.96 and 656.78. The average quality levels of the original firms, q′1
and q′2, are 58.55 and 61.20.
I also conduct sensitivity analysis by varying the weights associated with the disre-
pute costs, ω, for ω = (0, 0), (1000, 1000), (2000, 2000), (3000, 3000), (4000, 4000), (5000,
5000). The results of this sensitivity analysis are displayed in Figures 6.5 and 6.6.
I now discuss the results of the sensitivity analysis for Example 6.2. As shown
in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, as the weights of the disrepute costs increase, the changing
trends of all the variables and costs in Figures 6.5 and 6.6 are the same as those in
Example 6.1, except the trends for Q∗231, q
∗
22, and pi
∗
221. As ω increases from 0 to 2000,
Q∗231 increases. However, as ω increases further, Q
∗
231 decreases. The trends of q
∗
22
and pi∗221 then change accordingly.
The reason is as follows. Because now in-house transportation costs more than
before, in order to satisfy the fixed demand d21, firm 2 tends to shift more production
and distribution to the contractor with a good quality level, when ω is small. This
is why Q∗231 increases as ω increases from 0 to 2000. Nevertheless, as ω increases
further, firm 2 is under greater pressure to improve quality. Therefore, firm 2 then
shifts more production in-house, and, as a result, Q∗231 decreases.
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Figure 6.5. Equilibrium Product Flows and Quality Levels as ω Increases for Ex-
ample 6.2
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Figure 6.6. Equilibrium Prices, Disrepute Costs, and Total Costs of the Firms as ω
Increases for Example 6.2
For firm 1, whose cost functions are completely distinct from those of firm 2, it
is always more cost-wise for it to improve quality by shifting product flows in-house.
Thus, the changing trends of all the variables and costs of firm 1 in Figures 6.5 and
6.6 are either monotonically increasing or decreasing.
I now compare Examples 6.1 and 6.2 with ω in both examples equal to 0. Please
refer to the preceding figures. This case is interesting and informative since it repre-
sents the scenario that neither firm 1 nor firm 2 cares about its possible reputation
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loss due to its product/brand having a lower quality. After the incorporation of qual-
ity levels into both firms’ in-house transportation costs, it now costs more for both
firms to transport the same amounts of their products manufactured in-house and
to maintain the same in-house quality levels as in Example 6.1, as reflected by the
in-house transportation functions in Examples 6.1 and 6.2. Thus, in Example 6.2,
the equilibrium in-house product flows are lower as compared to those in Example
6.1, and, in order to satisfy the demands, the equilibrium outsourced flows of both
firms are higher. The corresponding results are: the contractors charge more to the
firms; the outsourcing quality levels of the contractors are lower; the contractors’ total
profits increase, and the firms’ total costs are higher than those in Example 6.1.
Example 6.3
In Example 6.3, I consider the scenario that the in-house transportation from the
two firms to each demand market gets much more congested than before, and each
firm’s in-house quantities also affect the other firm’s in-house transportation costs.
The total in-house transportation cost functions of the two firms now become:
cˆ11(Q111, Q211, q1) = Q
2
111 + 1.5Q111q1 + 7Q211,
cˆ12(Q112, Q212.q1) = 2.5Q
2
112 + 2Q112q1 + 10Q212,
cˆ21(Q211, Q111, q2) = .5Q
2
211 + 3Q211q2 + 8Q111,
cˆ22(Q212, Q112, q2) = 2Q
2
212 + 2Q212q2 + 10Q112.
The remaining data are identical to those in Example 6.1.
The total costs of firm 1 and firm 2 associated with different ω values are displayed
in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, respectively. Note that, in Table 6.2, the total cost of firm 1
increases monotonically, whether ω1 or ω2 increases. The same result is inferred from
Table 6.3 for firm 2.
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Table 6.2. Total Costs of Firm 1 with Different Sets of ω1 and ω2
ω ω1 = 0 ω1 = 1000 ω1 = 2000 ω1 = 3000 ω1 = 4000 ω1 = 5000
ω2 = 0 12,999.09 45,135.09 61,322.22 71,463.36 77,437.89 80,462.63
ω2 = 1000 13,218.71 45,348.05 61,535.18 71,676.32 77,650.85 80,675.60
ω2 = 2000 13,425.67 45,571.40 61,758.53 71,899.67 77,874.20 80,898.94
ω2 = 3000 13,666.29 45,812.52 61,999.65 72,140.79 78,115.32 81,114.01
ω2 = 4000 14,091.85 46,034.08 62,221.20 72,362.34 78,336.88 81,361.62
ω2 = 5000 14,091.85 46,239.00 62,426.12 72,567.26 78,541.80 81,566.54
Table 6.3. Total Costs of Firm 2 with Different Sets of ω1 and ω2
ω ω1 = 0 ω1 = 1000 ω1 = 2000 ω1 = 3000 ω1 = 4000 ω1 = 5000
ω2 = 0 27,585.65 28,203.96 28,561.15 28,798.10 29,005.24 29,187.92
ω2 = 1000 62,896.33 63,626.00 63,983.19 64,220.14 64,427.28 64,609.96
ω2 = 2000 92,753.88 93,312.11 93,669.30 93,906.25 94,113.39 94,296.07
ω2 = 3000 116,378.40 116,981.94 117,339.13 117,576.08 117,783.22 117,965.90
ω2 = 4000 135,237.43 135,872.91 136,230.10 136,467.05 136,674.19 136,856.87
ω2 = 5000 150,231.01 150,886.51 151,243.69 151,480.65 151,687.79 151,870.47
The reason is the following. As discussed for Examples 6.1 and 6.2, when ωi; i =
1, 2, increases, the in-house production quantities of firm i increase. Now, in Example
6.3, because of the in-house production costs (as in Example 6.1) and the new in-house
transportation costs, the increase of firm i’s in-house quantities would also increase
the other firm’s total cost.
According to the results in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, strategically, if a firm has to increase
the weight of its own disrepute cost, it is more cost-wise to increase it before the other
firm does. If the firm increases its weight at the same time as, or after the other firm
does, it would incur more cost under the same disrepute cost weight.
6.4. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I developed a supply chain network game theory model with prod-
uct differentiation, outsourcing, and price and quality competition. The original firms
compete with one another in in-house quality levels and in-house and outsouced pro-
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duction (and shipment) flows in order to minimize their total costs and the weighted
disrepute costs. The contractors, in turn, compete in their quality levels and the prices
that they charge the original firms for manufacturing and distributing the products
to the demand markets. This model provides the optimal make-or-buy as well as
contractor selection decisions for each original firm.
I modeled the impact of quality on in-house and outsourced production and trans-
portation and on the reputation of each firm through the quantification of the quality
levels, quality cost, and the disrepute cost, with the production and the transportation
cost functions depending on both quantities and quality levels.
Variational inequality theory was employed in the formulations of the equilibrium
conditions of the original firms, the contractors, and the supply chain network game
theory model with product differentiation, possible outsourcing of production and
distribution, and quality and price competition. The algorithm adopted was the Euler
method, which provides a discrete-time adjustment process and tracks the evolution
of the in-house and outsourced production (and shipment) flows, the in-house and the
outsourced quality levels, and the prices over time. It also yields closed form explicit
formulae at each iteration with nice features for computation for all variables except
for the production/shipment ones, which are computed via an exact equilibration
algorithm.
In order to demonstrate the generality of the model and the computational scheme,
I provided solutions to a series of numerical examples, accompanied by sensitivity
analysis.
Unlike this chapter, in the next chapter, Chapter 6, a multitiered supply chain
network model with suppliers’ quality is developed. Different from contractors, which
produce and deliver products for firms, suppliers provide firms with the components
needed to assemble their products. In Chapter 6, I include the quality of suppliers and
firms in producing the components in the model. The preservation/decay of quality
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in the assembly process of each firm is also considered and modeled as a decision
variable. Numerical examples along with sensitivity analysis are provided.
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CHAPTER 7
A SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK MODEL WITH
SUPPLIER SELECTION AND QUALITY AND PRICE
COMPETITION
This chapter, unlike Chapters 5 and 6, focuses on the supply chain network prob-
lem with multiple competing firms and their potential suppliers. The competitive
behavior of each tier of decision-makers in the supply chain network is described
along with their strategic variables, which include quality of the components and, in
the case of the firms, the quality of the assembly process itself.
Specifically, the potential suppliers may either provide distinct components to the
firms, or provide the same component, in which case, they compete noncooperatively
with one another in terms of quality and prices. The firms, in turn, are responsible
for assembling the products under their brand names using the components needed
and transporting the products to multiple demand markets. They also have the op-
tion of producing their own components, if necessary. The firms compete in product
quantities, the quality preservation levels of their assembly processes, the contracted
component quantities produced by the suppliers, and in in-house component quan-
tities and quality levels. Each of the firms aims to maximize profits. The quality of
an end product is determined by the qualities and quality levels of its components,
produced both by the firms and the suppliers, the importance of the quality of each
component to that of the end product, and the quality preservation level of its as-
sembly process. Consumers at the demand markets respond to both the prices and
the quality of the end products. In addition, in this chapter, I provide a formula to
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quantify the quality of the finished product based on the quality of the individual
components.
The governing equilibrium conditions of the supply chain network are formulated
as a variational inequality problem and qualitative properties are presented. The
algorithm, which is the modified projection method (cf. Section 2.5.2), accompanied
with convergence results, is then applied to numerical supply chain network exam-
ples, along with sensitivity analysis in which the impacts of capacity disruptions and
complete supplier elimination are investigated.
This chapter is based on Li and Nagurney (2015). It is organized as follows. In
Section 7.1, I develop the multitiered supply chain network model with competing
suppliers and competing firms. The variational inequality formulations for each tier
followed by a unified variational inequality are derived. In Section 7.2, the qualitative
properties of the equilibrium pattern, in particular, existence and uniqueness results,
are presented. In Section 7.3, the explicit formulae for the computation of this sup-
ply chain network problem, which is solved by the modified projection method (cf.
Section 2.5.2), are presented, along with conditions for convergence, which is then
applied in Section 7.4 to compute solutions to numerical supply chain network ex-
amples accompanied by sensitivity analysis. I summarize the results and present the
conclusions in Section 7.5.
7.1. The Supply Chain Network Model with Supplier Selec-
tion and Quality and Price Competition
In this section, I develop a multitiered supply chain network game theory model
with suppliers and firms that procure components from the suppliers for their prod-
ucts, which are differentiated by brand. I consider a supply chain network consisting
of I firms, with a typical firm denoted by i, nS suppliers, with a typical supplier de-
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noted by j, and a total of nR demand markets, with a typical demand market denoted
by Rk.
The firms compete noncooperatively, and each firm corresponds to an individual
brand representing the product that it produces. Product i, which is the product
produced by firm i, requires nli different components, and the total number of different
components required by the I products is nl. Each supplier may be able to produce
a variety of components for each firm.
The I firms are involved in the processes of assembling the products using the
components needed, transporting the products to the demand markets, and, possibly,
producing the components of the products. The suppliers, in turn, are involved in the
processes of producing and delivering the components of the products to the firms.
Both in-house and contracted component production activities are captured in the
model. Firms’ and suppliers’ production capacities/abilities are also considered.
The network topology of the problem is depicted in Figure 7.1. The first two
sets of links from the top are links corresponding to distinct supplier components.
The links from the top-tiered nodes j; j = 1, . . . , nS, representing the suppliers, are
connected to the associated manufacturing nodes, denoted by nodes 1, . . . , nl. These
links represent the manufacturing activities of the suppliers. The next set of links
that emanates from 1, . . . , nl to the firms, denoted by nodes 1, . . . , I, reflects the
transportation of the components to the associated firms. In addition, the links that
connect nodes 1i, . . . , nili , which are firm i’s component manufacturing nodes, and
firm i are the manufacturing links of firm i for producing its components.
The rest of the links in Figure 7.1 are links corresponding to the finished products.
The link connecting firm i and node i′, which is the assembly node of firm i, represents
the activity of assembling firm i’s product using the components needed, which may
be produced by firm i, the suppliers, or both. Finally, the links joining nodes 1′, . . . , I ′
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Figure 7.1. The Multitiered Supply Chain Network Topology with Suppliers
with demand market nodes 1, . . . , nR correspond to the transportation of the products
to the demand markets.
In this chapter, the optimal component production quantities and quality levels,
both by the firms and by the suppliers, the optimal product shipments from the
firms to the demand markets, the optimal quality preservation levels of the assembly
processes of the firms, and the prices that the suppliers charge the firms for producing
and delivering the components are determined. The firms compete noncooperatively
under the Cournot-Nash equilibrium concept in product shipments, in-house and
contracted component production quantities, in-house component quality levels, and
the quality preservation levels of the assembly processes. The suppliers, in turn,
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compete in Bertrand fashion in the prices that they charge the firms and the quality
levels of the components produced by them. It is assumed that there is no information
asymmetry between the firms and the suppliers.
The notation for the variables and parameters in the model is given in Table 7.1.
The functions in the model are given in Table 7.2. The transaction cost is defined in
a manner similar to that in Chapters 5 and 6. The vectors are assumed to be column
vectors. The optimal/equilibrium solution is denoted by “∗”.
The following conservation of flow equation must hold:
Qik = dik, i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR. (7.1)
Hence, the quantity of a firm’s brand-name product consumed at a demand market
is equal to the amount shipped from the firm to that demand market. In addition,
the shipment volumes must be nonnegative, that is:
Qik ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR. (7.2)
The quality levels of the components are quantified as values between 0 and the
perfect quality (cf. Section 1.1), that is:
qUil ≥ qSjil ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , nS; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.3)
qUil ≥ qFil ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.4)
where qUil is the value representing the prefect quality level associated with firm i’s
component l; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli .
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Table 7.1. Notation for the Supply Chain Network Model with Supplier Selection
and Quality and Price Competition
Notation Definition
QSjil the nonnegative amount of firm i’s component l produced by supplier
j; j = 1, . . . , nS; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli . For firm i, I group its
{QSjil} elements into the vector QSi ∈ RnSnli+ . All the {QSjil} elements
are grouped into the vector QS ∈ RnS
∑I
i=1 nli
+ .
qSjil the quality of firm i’s component l produced by supplier j. For supplier
j, I group its {qSjil} elements into the vector qSj ∈ R
∑I
i=1 nli
+ , and group
all such vectors into the vector qS ∈ RnS
∑I
i=1 nli
+ .
CAP Sjil the capacity of supplier j for producing firm i’s component l.
pijil the price charged by supplier j for producing one unit of firm i’s
component l. For supplier j, its {pijil} elements are grouped into
the vector pij ∈ R
∑I
i=1 nli
+ , and group all such vectors into the vector
pi ∈ RnS
∑I
i=1 nli
+ .
QFil the nonnegative amount of firm i’s component l produced by firm i
itself. For firm i, I group its {QFil} elements into the vector QFi ∈ Rnli+ ,
and group all such vectors into the vector QF ∈ R
∑I
i=1 nli
+ .
qFil the quality of firm i’s component l produced by firm i itself. For firm
i, its {qFil } elements are grouped into the vector qFi ∈ Rnli+ , and group
all such vectors into the vector qF ∈ R
∑I
i=1 nli
+ .
CAP Fil the capacity of firm i for producing its component l.
qil the average quality of firm i’s component l, produced both by the firm
and by the suppliers.
Qik the nonnegative shipment of firm i’s product from firm i to demand
market Rk; k = 1, . . . , nR. For firm i, I group its {Qik} elements
into the vector Qi ∈ RnR+ , and group all such vectors into the vector
Q ∈ RInR+ .
αFi the quality preservation level of the assembly process of firm i. All
{αFi } elements are grouped into the vector αF ∈ RI+.
qi the quality associated with firm i’s product. I group all {qi} elements
into the vector q ∈ RI+.
dik the demand for firm i’s product at demand market Rk. I group all
{dik} elements into the vector d ∈ RInR+ .
θil the amount of component l needed by firm i to produce one unit
product i.
ωil the ratio of the importance of the quality of firm i’s component l in
one unit product i to the quality associated with one unit product i
(i.e., qi).
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Table 7.2. Functions for the Supply Chain Network Model with Supplier Selection
and Quality and Price Competition
Function Definition
fFil (Q
F , qF ) firm i’s production cost for producing its component l; i = 1, . . . , I;
l = 1, . . . , nl.
fi(Q,α
F ) firm i’s cost for assembling its product using the components needed.
cFik(Q, q) firm i’s transportation cost for shipping its product to demand market
Rk; k = 1, . . . , nR.
tcijl(Q
S) the transaction cost paid by firm i for transacting with supplier j;
j = 1, . . . , nS, for its component l.
fSjl(Q
S, qS) supplier j’s production cost for producing component l.
cˆSjil(Q
S, qS) supplier j’s transportation cost for shipping firm i’s component l.
ocjil(pi) the opportunity cost of supplier j associated with pricing firm i’s com-
ponent l at pijil for producing and transporting it.
ρik(d, q) the demand price for firm i’s product at demand market Rk.
The average quality level of product i’s component l is determined by all the
quantities and quality levels of that component, produced both by firm i and by the
suppliers, that is:
qil =
qFilQ
F
il +
∑nS
j=1Q
S
jilq
S
jil
QFil +
∑nS
j=1Q
S
jil
, i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli . (7.5)
Unlike the average quality levels developed in Chapters 3, 6, and 7, (7.5) measures
the average quality levels of components needed for assembling the final products,
which can be produced by the firm, the suppliers, or both.
The quality failure rate of a finished product was modeled as a weighted summa-
tion of those of its components by Chao, Iravani, and Savaskan (2009). In Economides
(1999), the quality of the composite good is the minimum quality of the quality lev-
els of its components. Reyniers and Tapiero (1995), Tagaras and Lee (1996), Hwang,
Radhakrishnan, and Su (2006), Baiman, Fischer, and Rajan (2000), Lim (2001), Hsieh
and Liu (2010) considered the quality of a product as the product of the quality effort
of the supplier and that of the firm. In this chapter, the quality level associated with
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product i is determined by the average quality levels of its components, the impor-
tance of the quality of the components to the quality of the product, and the quality
preservation level of the assembly process of firm i. It is expressed as:
qi = α
F
i (
nli∑
l=1
ωilqil), i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1. (7.6)
Note that αFi captures the percentage of the quality preservation of product i in the
assembly process of the firm and lies between 0 and 1, that is:
0 ≤ αFi ≤ 1, i = 1, . . . , I. (7.7)
The decay of quality can hence be captured by 1 − αFi . In Nagurney and Masoumi
(2012), Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney (2012), Nagurney and Nagurney (2012), Yu and
Nagurney (2013), and in Nagurney et al. (2013), arc multipliers that are similar to
αFi are used to model the perishability of particular products, such as pharmaceu-
ticals, human blood, medical nuclear products, and fresh produce, in terms of the
percentages of flows that reach the successor nodes in supply chain networks.
Assume that the importance of the quality levels of all components of product i
sums up to 1, that is:
nli∑
l=1
ωil = 1, i = 1, . . . , I. (7.8)
In view of (7.1), (7.5), and (7.6), the transportation cost functions of the firms
cFik(Q, q) and the demand price functions ρik(d, q); i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR, are
redefined in quantities and quality levels of the components, both by the firms and
by the suppliers, the quantities of the products, and the quality preservation levels of
the assembly processes, that is:
cˆFik = cˆ
F
ik(Q,Q
F , QS, qF , qS, αF ) = cFik(Q, q), i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR, (7.9)
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ρˆik = ρˆik(Q,Q
F , QS, qF , qS, αF ) = ρik(d, q), i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR. (7.10)
The demand price functions (7.10) are, typically, assumed to be monotonically de-
creasing in product quantities but increasing in terms of product quality levels.
As noted in Table 7.2, the assembly cost functions, the production cost functions,
the transportation cost functions, the transaction cost functions, and the demand
price functions are general functions in vectors of quantities and/or quality levels,
due to the competition among firms and the competition among suppliers for re-
sources and technologies. Furthermore, as in Chapters 3, 5, and 6, it is assumed that
transportation activities affect quality in terms of quality preservation, and, thus,
quality does not deteriorate during transportation. However, in this chapter, qual-
ity may deteriorate in the assembly processes. As in Chapter 3 (cf. (3.5a and b)),
the costs of quality (Section 1.1) of the suppliers and the firms are included in the
associated production costs.
This model is also capable of handling the case of outsourcing (cf. Chapters 5
and 6) by setting each nli ; i = 1, . . . , I, to 1. In such a case, the contractors do
the outsourced jobs of producing products and transporting them to the firms, and
the firms do the packaging and labeling for their products and may also produce
in-house.
7.1.1 The Behavior of the Firms and Their Optimality Conditions
Given the prices pi∗i of the components that the suppliers charge firm i, and the
quality qS
∗
of the components produced by the suppliers, the objective of firm i;
i = 1, . . . , I, is to maximize its utility/profit UFi . It is the difference between its total
revenue and its total cost. The total cost includes the assembly cost, the produc-
tion costs, the transportation costs, the transaction costs, and the payments to the
suppliers.
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Hence, firm i seeks to
MaximizeQi,QFi ,QSi ,qFi ,αFi U
F
i =
nR∑
k=1
ρˆik(Q,Q
F , QS, qF , qS
∗
, αF )dik − fi(Q,αF )
−
nli∑
l=1
fFil (Q
F , qF )−
nR∑
k=1
cˆFik(Q,Q
F , QS, qF , qS
∗
, αF )−
nS∑
j=1
nli∑
l=1
tcijl(Q
S)−
nS∑
j=1
nli∑
l=1
pi∗jilQ
S
jil
(7.11)
subject to:
nR∑
k=1
Qikθil ≤
nS∑
j=1
QSjil +Q
F
il , i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.12)
CAP Sjil ≥ QSjil ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , nS; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.13)
CAP Fil ≥ QFil ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.14)
and (7.1), (7.2), (7.4), and (7.7).
All the cost functions and demand price functions in (7.11) are continuous and
twice continuously differentiable. The cost functions are convex in quantities and/or
quality levels and have bounded second-order partial derivatives. The demand price
functions have bounded first-order and second-order partial derivatives. Constraint
(7.12) captures the material requirements in the assembly process. Constraints (7.13)
and (7.14) indicate that the component production quantities should be nonnegative
and limited by the associated capacities, which can capture the abilities of producing.
If a supplier or a firm is not capable of producing a certain component, the associated
capacity should be 0.
The firms compete in the sense of Nash. The strategic variables for each firm i are
the product shipments to the demand markets, the in-house component production
quantities, the contracted component production quantities, which are produced by
the suppliers, the quality levels of the in-house produced components, and the quality
preservation level of its assembly process.
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The feasible set is defined as K
F
i as K
F
i ≡ {(Qi, QFi , QSi , qFi , αFi )|(7.1), (7.2), (7.4),
(7.7), and (7.12)-(7.14) are satisfied}. All KFi ; i = 1, . . . , I, are closed and convex. I
define the feasible set KF ≡ ΠIi=1KFi .
Definition 7.1: A Cournot-Nash Equilibrium
A product shipment, in-house component production, contracted component produc-
tion, in-house component quality, and assembly quality preservation pattern (Q∗, QF ∗,
QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
) ∈ KF is said to constitute a Cournot-Nash equilibrium if for each firm
i; i = 1, . . . , I,
UFi (Q
∗
i , Qˆ
∗
i , Q
F ∗
i , Qˆ
F ∗
i , Q
S∗
i , Qˆ
S∗
i , q
F ∗
i , qˆ
F ∗
i , α
F ∗
i , αˆ
F ∗
i , pi
∗
i , q
S∗) ≥
UFi (Qi, Qˆ
∗
i , Q
F
i , Qˆ
F ∗
i , Q
S
i , Qˆ
S∗
i , q
F
i , qˆ
F ∗
i , α
F
i , αˆ
F ∗
i , pi
∗
i , q
S∗),
∀(Qi, QFi , QSi , qFi , αFi ) ∈ KFi , (7.15)
where
Qˆ∗i ≡ (Q∗1, . . . , Q∗i−1, Q∗i+1, . . . , Q∗I),
QˆF
∗
i ≡ (QF
∗
1 , . . . , Q
F ∗
i−1, Q
F ∗
i+1, . . . , Q
F ∗
I ),
QˆS
∗
i ≡ (QS
∗
1 , . . . , Q
S∗
i−1, Q
S∗
i+1, . . . , Q
S∗
I ),
qˆF
∗
i ≡ (qF
∗
1 , . . . , q
F ∗
i−1, q
F ∗
i+1, . . . , q
F ∗
I ),
and
αˆF
∗
i ≡ (αF
∗
1 , . . . , α
F ∗
i−1, α
F ∗
i+1, . . . , α
F ∗
I ).
According to (7.15) (cf. Definition 2.7), a Cournot-Nash equilibrium is established
if no firm can unilaterally improve upon its profit by selecting an alternative vector of
product shipments, in-house component production quantities, contracted component
production quantities, in-house component quality levels, and the quality preservation
level of its assembly process.
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I now derive the variational inequality formulation of the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium (see Cournot (1838), Nash (1950, 1951), and Gabay and Moulin (1980)) in the
following theorem.
Theorem 7.1
Assume that, for each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I, the utility function UFi (Q,Q
F , QS, qF , αF , pi∗i ,
qS
∗
) is concave with respect to its variables in Qi, Q
F
i , Q
S
i , q
F
i , and α
F
i , and is con-
tinuous and twice continuously differentiable. Then (Q∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, αF
∗
) ∈ KF is
a Counot-Nash equilibrium according to Definition 7.1 if and only if it satisfies the
variational inequality:
−
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
∂UFi (Q
∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗i , q
S∗)
∂Qik
× (Qik −Q∗ik)
−
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
∂UFi (Q
∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗i , q
S∗)
∂QFil
× (QFil −QF
∗
il )
−
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
∂UFi (Q
∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗i , q
S∗)
∂QSjil
× (QSjil −QS
∗
jil)
−
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
∂UFi (Q
∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, q¯F
∗
, pi∗i , q
S∗)
∂qFil
× (qFil − qF
∗
il )
−
I∑
i=1
∂UFi (Q
∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗i , q
S∗)
∂αFi
× (αFi − αF
∗
i ) ≥ 0,
∀(Q,QF , QS, qF , αF ) ∈ KF , (7.16)
with notice that: for i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR:
− ∂U
F
i
∂Qik
=
[
∂fi(Q,α
F )
∂Qik
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
∂Qik
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
∂Qik
× dih
−ρˆik(Q,QF , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
]
,
for i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli:
−∂U
F
i
∂QFil
=
 nli∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
F , qF )
∂QFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
∂QFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
∂QFil
× dih
 ,
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for j = 1, . . . , nS; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli:
− ∂U
F
i
∂QSjil
=
pi∗jil + nS∑
h=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂tcihm(Q
S)
∂QSjil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
∂QSjil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
∂QSjil
× dih
]
,
for i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli:
−∂U
F
i
∂qFil
=
 nli∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
F , qF )
∂qFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
∂qFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
∂qFil
× dih
 ,
for i = 1, . . . , I:
−∂U
F
i
∂αFi
=
[
∂fi(Q
F , αF )
∂αFi
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
∂αFi
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS
∗
, αF )
∂αFi
× dih
]
,
or, equivalently, in view of (7.1) and (7.12), (Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, λ∗) ∈ KF is a
vector of the equilibrium product shipment, in-house component production, contracted
component production, in-house component quality, and assembly quality preservation
pattern and Lagrange multipliers if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
[
∂fi(Q
∗, αF
∗
)
∂Qik
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂Qik
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂Qik
×Q∗ih
−ρˆik(Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
) +
n
li∑
l=1
λ∗ilθil
× (Qik −Q∗ik)
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
 nli∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
F∗ , qF
∗
)
∂QFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QFil
×Q∗ih − λ∗il
]
× (QFil −QF
∗
il )
+
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
pi∗jil + nS∑
h=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂tcihm(Q
S∗ )
∂QSjil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QSjil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QSjil
×Q∗ih − λ∗il
]
× (QSjil −QS
∗
jil )
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
 nli∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
F∗ , qF
∗
)
∂qFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂qFil
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−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂qFil
×Q∗ih
]
× (qFil − qF
∗
il )
+
I∑
i=1
[
∂fi(Q
F∗ , αF
∗
)
∂αFi
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂αFi
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂αFi
×Q∗ih
]
× (αFi − αF
∗
i )
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
 nS∑
j=1
QS
∗
jil +Q
F∗
il −
nR∑
k=1
Q∗ikθil
× (λil − λ∗il) ≥ 0, ∀(Q,QF , QS , qF , αF , λ) ∈ KF , (7.17)
where KF ≡ ΠIi=1KFi and KFi ≡ {(Qi, QFi , QSi , qFi , αFi , λi)|λi ≥ 0 with (7.2), (7.4),
(7.7), (7.13), and (7.14) satisfied}. λi is the nli-dimensional vector with component
l being the element λil corresponding to the Lagrange multiplier associated with the
(i, l)-th constraint (7.12). Both the above-defined feasible sets are convex.
Proof: For a given firm i, under the imposed assumptions, (7.16) holds if and only
if (see Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1989) page 287) the following holds:
nR∑
k=1
[
∂fi(Q
∗, αF
∗
)
∂Qik
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂Qik
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂Qik
×Q∗ih − ρˆik(Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
) +
n
li∑
l=1
λ∗ilθil
× (Qik −Q∗ik)
+
n
li∑
l=1
 nli∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
F∗ , qF
∗
)
∂QFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QFil
×Q∗ih − λ∗il
]
× (QFil −QF
∗
il )
+
nS∑
j=1
n
li∑
l=1
pi∗jil + nS∑
h=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂tcihm(Q
S∗ )
∂QSjil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QSjil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QSjil
×Q∗ih − λ∗il
]
× (QSjil −QS
∗
jil )
+
n
li∑
l=1
 nli∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
F∗ , qF
∗
)
∂qFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂qFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂qFil
×Q∗ih
]
× (qFil − qF
∗
il )
+
[
∂fi(Q
F∗ , αF
∗
)
∂αFi
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂αFi
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂αFi
×Q∗ih
]
× (αFi − αF
∗
i )
+
n
li∑
l=1
 nS∑
j=1
QS
∗
jil +Q
F∗
il −
nR∑
k=1
Q∗ikθil
× (λil − λ∗il) ≥ 0, ∀(Qi, QFi , QSi , qFi , αFi , λi) ∈ KFi . (7.18)
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Variational inequality (7.18) holds for each firm i; i = 1, . . . , I, and, hence, the
summation of (7.18) yields variational inequality (7.17).
7.1.2 The Behavior of the Suppliers and Their Optimality Conditions
Given the QS
∗
determined by the firms, the objective of supplier j; j = 1, . . . , nS,
is to maximize its total profit, denoted by USj . Its revenue is obtained from the
payments of the firms, while its costs are the costs of production and delivery and
the opportunity costs (cf. Section 5.1.2). The strategic variables of a supplier are
the prices that it charges the firms and the quality levels of the components that it
produces.
The decision-making problem for supplier j is as the following:
Maximizepij ,qSj U
S
j =
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
pijilQ
S∗
jil −
nl∑
l=1
fSjl(Q
S∗ , qS)−
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
cˆSjil(Q
S∗ , qS)
−
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
ocjil(pi) (7.19)
subject to:
pijil ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , nS; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.20)
and (7.3).
The cost functions of each supplier are continuous, twice continuously differen-
tiable, and convex, and have bounded second-order partial derivatives.
The suppliers compete in a noncooperative in the sense of Nash, with each one
trying to maximize its own profit. The feasible sets are defined as KSj ≡ {(pij, qSj )|pij ∈
R
∑I
i=1 nli
+ and q
S
j satisfies (7.3) for j}, KS ≡ ΠnSj=1KSj , and K ≡ K
F × KS. All the
above-defined feasible sets are convex.
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Definition 7.2: A Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium
A price and contracted component quality pattern (pi∗, qS
∗
) ∈ KS is said to constitute
a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium if for each supplier j; j = 1, . . . , nS,
USj (Q
S∗ , pi∗j , pˆi
∗
j , q
S∗
j , qˆ
S∗
j ) ≥ USj (QS
∗
, pij, pˆi
∗
j , q
S
j , qˆ
S∗
j ), ∀(pij, qSj ) ∈ KSj , (7.21)
where
pˆi∗j ≡ (pi∗1, . . . , pi∗j−1, pi∗j+1, . . . , pi∗nS)
and
qˆS
∗
j ≡ (qS
∗
1 , . . . , q
S∗
j−1, q
S∗
j+1, . . . , q
S∗
nS
).
According to (7.21) (cf. Definition 2.7), a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is established
if no supplier can unilaterally improve upon its profit by selecting an alternative vector
of prices that it charges the firms and the quality levels of the components that it
produces.
The variational inequality formulation of the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium according
to Definition 7.2 (see Bertrand (1883), Nash (1950, 1951), Gabay and Moulin (1980),
Nagurney (2006)) is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 7.2
Assume that, for each supplier j; j = 1, . . . , nS, the profit function U
S
j (Q
S∗ , pi, qS) is
concave with respect to the variables in pij and q
S
j , and is continuous and twice contin-
uously differentiable. Then (pi∗, qS
∗
) ∈ KS is a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium according
to Definition 7.2 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality:
−
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
∂USj (Q
S∗ , pi∗, qS
∗
)
∂pijil
× (pijil − pi∗jil)
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−
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
∂USj (Q
S∗ , pi∗, qS
∗
)
∂qSjil
× (qSjil − qS
∗
jil ) ≥ 0, ∀(pi, qS) ∈ KS, (7.22)
with notice that: for j = 1, . . . , nS; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli:
−
∂USj
∂pijil
=
I∑
g=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂ocjgm(pi)
∂pijil
−QS∗jil ,
for j = 1, . . . , nS; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli:
−
∂USj
∂qSjil
=
nl∑
m=1
∂fSjm(Q
S∗ , qS)
∂qSjil
+
I∑
g=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂cˆSjgm(Q
S∗ , qS)
∂qSjil
.
7.1.3 The Equilibrium Conditions for the Supply Chain Network with
Supplier Selection and Quality and Price Competition
In equilibrium, the optimality conditions for all firms and the optimality conditions
for all suppliers must hold simultaneously, according to the definition below.
Definition 7.3: Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Supplier Selection
and Quality and Price Competition
The equilibrium state of the multitiered supply chain network with suppliers is one
where both variational inequalities (7.16), or, equivalently, (7.17), and (7.22) hold
simultaneously.
Theorem 7.3
The equilibrium conditions governing the multitiered supply chain network model with
suppliers and quality competition are equivalent to the solution of the variational
inequality problem: determine (Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗, qS
∗
) ∈ K, such that:
−
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
∂UFi (Q
∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗i , q
S∗)
∂Qik
× (Qik −Q∗ik)
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−
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
∂UFi (Q
∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗i , q
S∗)
∂QFil
× (QFil −QF
∗
il )
−
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
∂UFi (Q
∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗i , q
S∗)
∂QSjil
× (QSjil −QS
∗
jil)
−
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
∂UFi (Q
∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗i , q
S∗)
∂qFil
× (qFil − qF
∗
il )
−
I∑
i=1
∂UFi (Q
∗, QF ∗, QS∗, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗i , q
S∗)
∂αFi
× (αFi − αF
∗
i )
−
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
∂USj (Q
S∗ , pi∗, qS
∗
)
∂pijil
× (pijil − pi∗jil)
−
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
nli∑
l=1
∂USj (Q
S∗ , pi∗, qS
∗
)
∂qSjil
× (qSjil − qS
∗
jil ) ≥ 0, ∀(Q,QS, QF , qF , αF , pi, qS) ∈ K,
(7.23)
or, equivalently: determine (Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, λ∗, pi∗, qS
∗
) ∈ K, such that:
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
[
∂fi(Q
∗, αF
∗
)
∂Qik
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂Qik
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂Qik
×Q∗ih − ρˆik(Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
) +
n
li∑
l=1
λ∗ilθil
× (Qik −Q∗ik)
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
 nli∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
F∗ , qF
∗
)
∂QFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QFil
×Q∗ih − λ∗il
]
× (QFil −QF
∗
il )
+
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
pi∗jil + nS∑
h=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂tcihm(Q
S∗ )
∂QSjil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QSjil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂QSjil
×Q∗ih − λ∗il
]
× (QSjil −QS
∗
jil )
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
 nli∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
F∗ , qF
∗
)
∂qFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂qFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂qFil
×Q∗ih
]
× (qFil − qF
∗
il )
+
I∑
i=1
[
∂fi(Q
F∗ , αF
∗
)
∂αFi
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂αFi
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, qS
∗
, αF
∗
)
∂αFi
×Q∗ih
]
× (αFi − αF
∗
i )
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+I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
 nS∑
j=1
QS
∗
jil +Q
F∗
il −
nR∑
k=1
Q∗ikθil
× (λil − λ∗il) + nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
 I∑
g=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂ocjgm(pi
∗)
∂pijil
−QS∗jil
× (pijil − pi∗jil)
+
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
 nl∑
m=1
∂fSjm(Q
S∗ , qS
∗
)
∂qSjil
+
I∑
g=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂cˆSjgm(Q
S∗ , qS
∗
)
∂qSjil
× (qSjil − qS∗jil ) ≥ 0,
∀(Q,QF , QS , qF , αF , λ, pi, qS) ∈ K, (7.24)
where K ≡ KF ×KS.
Proof: The proof follows a manner similar to that for Theorem 5.3.
I now put variational inequality (7.24) into standard form (cf. (2.1a)): determine
X∗ ∈ K where X is a vector in RN , F (X) is a continuous function such that F (X) :
X 7→ K ⊂ RN , and
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (7.25)
where 〈·, ·〉 is the inner product in the N -dimensional Euclidean space, N = InR +
3
∑I
i=1 nli + 3nS
∑I
i=1 nli + I, and K is closed and convex. Define the vector X ≡
(Q,QF , QS, qF , αF , λ, pi, qS) and the vector F (X) ≡ (F 1(X), F 2(X), F 3(X), F 4(X),
F 5(X), F 6(X), F 7(X), F 8(X)), such that:
F 1(X) =
[
∂fi(Q,α
F )
∂Qik
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS , αF )
∂Qik
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS , αF )
∂Qik
×Qih − ρˆik(Q,QF , QS , qF , qS , αF ) +
n
li∑
l=1
λilθil; i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR
 ,
F 2(X) =
 nli∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
F , qF )
∂QFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS , αF )
∂QFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS , αF )
∂QFil
×Qih − λil;
i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli ] ,
F 3(X) =
pijil + nS∑
h=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂tcihm(Q
S)
∂QSjil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS , αF )
∂QSjil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS , αF )
∂QSjil
×Qih
−λil; j = 1, . . . , nS ; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli ] ,
F 4(X) =
 nli∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
F , qF )
∂qFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS , αF )
∂qFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS , αF )
∂qFil
×Qih;
i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli ] ,
F 5(X) =
[
∂fi(Q
F , αF )
∂αFi
+
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS , αF )
∂αFi
−
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q,Q
F , QS , qF , qS , αF )
∂αFi
×Qih; i = 1, . . . , I
]
,
F 6(X) =
 nS∑
j=1
QSjil +Q
F
il −
nR∑
k=1
Qikθil; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli
 ,
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F 7(X) =
 I∑
g=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂ocjgm(pi)
∂pijil
−QSjil; j = 1, . . . , nS ; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli
 ,
F 8(X) =
 nl∑
m=1
∂fSjm(Q
S , qS)
∂qSjil
+
I∑
g=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂cˆSjgm(Q
S , qS)
∂qSjil
; j = 1, . . . , nS ; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli
 . (7.26)
Hence, (7.24) can be put into standard form (7.25).
Similarly, I also put variational inequality (7.23) into standard form: determine
Y ∗ ∈ K where Y is a vector in RM , G(Y ) is a continuous function such that G(Y ) :
Y 7→ K ⊂ RM , and
〈G(Y ∗), Y − Y ∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀Y ∈ K, (7.27)
where M = InR + 2
∑I
i=1 nli + 3nS
∑I
i=1 nli + I, and K is closed and convex. Define
Y ≡ (Q,QF , QS, qF , αF , pi, qS), G(Y ) ≡ (− ∂UFi
∂Qik
,−∂UFi
∂QFil
,− ∂UFi
∂QSjil
,−∂UFi
∂qFil
,−∂UFi
∂αFi
,− ∂USj
∂pijil
,
− ∂USj
∂qSjil
); j = 1, . . . , nS; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli . Hence, (7.23) can be put into
standard form (7.27).
The equilibrium solution (Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗, qS
∗
) to (7.27) and the (Q∗,
QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗, qS
∗
) in the equilibrium solution to (7.25) are equivalent for this
multitiered supply chain network problem. In addition to (Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗,
qS
∗
), the equilibrium solution to (7.25) also contains the equilibrium Lagrange mul-
tipliers (λ∗).
7.2. Qualitative Properties
In this section, I present some qualitative properties of the solution to variational
inequality (7.25) and (7.27), equivalently, (7.24) and (7.23). In particular, the exis-
tence result and the uniqueness result are presented. I also investigate the properties
of the function F given by (7.26) that enters variational inequality (7.25) and the
function G that enters variational inequality (7.27).
In a multitiered supply chain network with suppliers, it is reasonable to expect
that the price charged by each supplier j for producing one unit of firm i’s component
l, pijil, is bounded by a sufficiently large value, since, in practice, each supplier cannot
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charge unbounded prices to the firms. Therefore, the following assumption is not
unreasonable:
Assumption 7.1
Suppose that in our multitiered supply chain network model with suppliers and quality
competition, there exist a sufficiently large Π, such that,
pijil ≤ Π, j = 1, . . . , nS; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli . (7.28)
With this assumption, I have the following existence result.
Theorem 7.4
With Assumption 7.1 satisfied, there exists at least one solution to variational in-
equality (7.25) and (7.27), equivalently, (7.24) and (7.23).
Proof : I first prove that there exists at least one solution to variational inequality
(7.27) (cf. (7.23)). Note that, all the component quality levels, qSjil and q
F
il , and
quality preservation levels αi are bounded due to constraints (7.3), (7.4), and (7.7).
Because of constraint (7.12), all the product quantities Qik are also bounded, since
the components quantities are nonnegative and capacitated (cf. (7.13) and (7.14)).
Therefore, with Assumption 7.1, the feasible set of variational inequality (7.27) is
bounded, and, hence, the existence of a solution to (7.27) (cf. (7.23)) is guaranteed
(cf. Theorem 2.2). Because (7.27) and (7.25) (cf. (7.24)) are equivalent (Nagurney
and Dhanda (2000)), the existence of (7.25) is also guaranteed. 
I now present a monotonicity result.
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Theorem 7.5
Under the assumptions in Theorems 7.1 and 7.2, the F (X) that enters variational
inequality (7.25), is monotone (cf. Definition 2.3), that is,
〈F (X ′)− F (X ′′), X ′ −X ′′〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ′, X ′′ ∈ K, (7.29)
and the G(Y ) that enters variational inequality (7.27) is also monotone,
〈G(Y ′)−G(Y ′′), Y ′ − Y ′′〉 ≥ 0, ∀Y ′, Y ′′ ∈ K. (7.30)
Proof : Let Y ′ = (Q′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, pi′, qS
′
), Y ′′ = (Q′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
),
X ′ = (Q′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, λ′, pi′, qS
′
), andX ′′ = (Q′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, λ′′, pi′′, qS
′′
).
Then the left-had-side of (7.30) can be expended to:
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
[
(−∂U
F
i (Q
′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, pi′, qS
′
)
∂Qik
)− (−∂U
F
i (Q
′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂Qik
)
]
× (Q′ik −Q′′ik)
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
(−∂U
F
i (Q
′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, pi′, qS
′
)
∂QFil
)− (−∂U
F
i (Q
′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂QFil
)
]
× (QF ′il −QF
′′
il )
+
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
(−∂U
F
i (Q
′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, pi′, qS
′
)
∂QSjil
)− (−∂U
F
i (Q
′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂QSjil
)
]
×(QS′jil−QS
′′
jil )
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
(−∂U
F
i (Q
′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, pi′, qS
′
)
∂qFil
)− (−∂U
F
i (Q
′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂qFil
)
]
× (qF ′il − qF
′′
il )
+
I∑
i=1
[
(−∂U
F
i (Q
′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, pi′, qS
′
)
∂αFi
)− (−∂U
F
i (Q
′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂αFi
)
]
× (αF ′i − αF
′′
i )
+
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
(−
∂USj (Q
S′ , pi′, qS
′
)
∂pijil
)− (−
∂USj (Q
S′′ , pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂pijil
)
]
× (pi′jil − pi′′jil)
+
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
(−
∂USj (Q
S′ , pi′, qS
′
)
∂qSjil
)− (−
∂USj (Q
S′′ , pi′′, q′′)
∂qSjil
)
]
× (qS′jil − qS
′′
jil )
+
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
nli∑
l=1
λ′ilθil −
n
li∑
l=1
λ′ilθil
× (Q′ik −Q′′ik) + I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
nli∑
l=1
λ′′ilθil −
n
li∑
l=1
λ′′ilθil
× (Q′ik −Q′′ik)
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
λ′il − λ′il
]× (QF ′il −QF ′′il ) + I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
λ′′il − λ′′il
]× (QF ′il −QF ′′il )
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+nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
λ′il − λ′il
]× (QS′jil −QS′′jil ) + nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
λ′′il − λ′′il
]× (QS′jil −QS′′jil ). (7.31)
where λ′il, λ
′′
il ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , I, l = 1, . . . , nli . After combining terms, (7.31) reduces
to
I∑
i=1
nR∑
k=1
(−∂UFi (Q′, QS′ , QF ′ , qF ′ , αF ′ , pi′, qS′ )
∂Qik
+
n
li∑
l=1
λ′ilθil)− (−
∂UFi (Q
′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂Qik
+
n
li∑
l=1
λ′′ilθil)
× (Q′ik −Q′′ik)
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
(−∂U
F
i (Q
′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, pi′, qS
′
)
∂QFil
− λ′il)− (−
∂UFi (Q
′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂QFil
− λ′′il)
]
×(QF ′il −QF
′′
il )
+
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
(−∂U
F
i (Q
′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, pi′, qS
′
)
∂QSjil
− λ′il)− (−
∂UFi (Q
′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂QSjil
− λ′′il)
]
×(QS′jil −QS
′′
jil )
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
(−∂U
F
i (Q
′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, pi′, qS
′
)
∂qFil
)− (−∂U
F
i (Q
′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂qFil
)
]
× (qF ′il − qF
′′
il )
+
I∑
i=1
[
(−∂U
F
i (Q
′, QS
′
, QF
′
, qF
′
, αF
′
, pi′, qS
′
)
∂αFi
)− (−∂U
F
i (Q
′′, QS
′′
, QF
′′
, qF
′′
, αF
′′
, pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂αFi
)
]
× (αF ′i − αF
′′
i )
+
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
(−
∂USj (Q
S′ , pi′, qS
′
)
∂pijil
)− (−
∂USj (Q
S′′ , pi′′, qS
′′
)
∂pijil
)
]
× (pi′jil − pi′′jil)
+
nS∑
j=1
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
[
(−
∂USj (Q
S′ , pi′, qS
′
)
∂qSjil
)− (−
∂USj (Q
S′′ , pi′′, q′′)
∂qSjil
)
]
× (qS′jil − qS
′′
jil )
+
I∑
i=1
n
li∑
l=1
( nS∑
j=1
QS
′
jil +Q
F ′
il −
nR∑
k=1
Q′ikθil)− (
nS∑
j=1
QS
′′
jil +Q
F ′′
il −
nR∑
k=1
Q′′ikθil)
× (λ′il − λ′′il). (7.32)
The expression in (7.31), equivalently, (7.32), is greater than or equal to zero,
since it is assumed in Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 that the profit functions are concave with
respect to associated variables. (7.31) is derived from the left-hand-side of (7.30), so
(7.30) holds true, and, hence, the G(Y ) that enters variational inequality (7.27) is
monotone. Because (7.32) is also the left-hand-side of (7.29), the F (X) that enters
variational inequality (7.25) is also monotone. 
A uniqueness result is also presented (cf. Theorem 2.5).
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Theorem 7.6
Assume that the function G(Y ) in variational inequality (7.27) is strictly monotone
(cf. Definition 2.4) on K¯. Then, if variational inequality (7.27) admits a solution,
(Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗, qS
∗
), that is the only solution.
Theorem 7.7
The function that enters the variational inequality problem (7.25) is Lipschitz contin-
uous (cf. Definition 2.6), that is,
‖ F (X ′)− F (X ′′) ‖≤ L ‖ X ′ −X ′′ ‖, ∀X ′, X ′′ ∈ K, where L > 0. (7.33)
Proof : Since it is assumed that all the cost functions have bounded second-order
partial derivatives, and the demand price functions have bounded first-order and
second-order partial derivatives, the result is direct by applying a mid-value theorem
from calculus to the F (X) that enters variational inequality (7.25). 
7.3. Explicit formulae for the Modified Projection Method
Applied to the Supply Chain Network Model with Sup-
plier Selection and Quality and Price Competition
In this section, the realization of the modified projection method (cf. Section
2.5.2), for the computation of the solution to variational inequality (7.24) is described.
In particular, the explicit formulae for the solution to variational inequality (2.37)
with F (X) and X as defined in variational inequality (7.25) are as the following:
Q¯T −1ik = max{0, QT −1ik + a(−
∂fi(Q
T −1, αF
T−1
)
∂Qik
−
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)
∂Qik
+
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)
∂Qik
×QT −1ih
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+ρˆik(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)−
n
li∑
l=1
λT −1il θil)}; i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR, (7.34a)
Q¯F
T−1
il = min{CAPFil ,max{0, QF
T−1
il + a(−
n
li∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
FT−1 , qF
T−1
)
∂QFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)
∂QFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)
∂QFil
×QT −1ih + λT −1il )}}; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.34b)
Q¯S
T−1
jil = min{CAPSjil,max{0, QS
T−1
jil + a(−piT −1jil −
nS∑
h=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂tcihm(Q
ST−1 )
∂QSjil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)
∂QSjil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)
∂QSjil
×QT −1ih +λT −1il )}}; j = 1, . . . , nS ; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli ,
(7.34c)
q¯F
T−1
il = min{qUil ,max{0, qF
T−1
il + a(−
n
li∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q
FT−1 , qF
T−1
)
∂qFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)
∂qFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)
∂qFil
×QT −1ih )}}; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.34d)
α¯F
T−1
i = min{1,max{0, αF
T−1
i +a(−
∂fi(Q
FT−1 , αF
T−1
)
∂αFi
−
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)
∂αFi
+
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q
T −1, QF
T−1
, QS
T−1
, qF
T−1
, qS
T−1
, αF
T−1
)
∂αFi
×QT −1ih ; i = 1, . . . , I, (7.34e)
λ¯T −1il = max{0, λT −1il + a(−
nS∑
j=1
QS
T−1
jil −QF
T−1
il +
nR∑
k=1
QT −1ik θil)}; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.34f)
p¯iT −1jil = max{0, piT −1jil + a(−
I∑
g=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂ocjgm(pi
T −1)
∂pijil
+QS
T−1
jil )}; j = 1, . . . , nS ; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.34g)
q¯S
T−1
jil = min{qUil ,max{0, qS
T−1
jil + a(−
nl∑
m=1
∂fSjm(Q
ST−1 , qS
T−1
)
∂qSjil
−
I∑
g=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂cˆSjgm(Q
ST−1 , qS
T−1
)
∂qSjil
)}};
j = 1, . . . , nS ; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli . (7.34h)
In addition, the explicit formulae for the solution to variational inequality (2.38) are
as the following:
QTik = max{0, QT −1ik + a(−
∂fi(Q¯
T −1, α¯F
T−1
)
∂Qik
−
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)
∂Qik
+
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)
∂Qik
× Q¯T −1ih
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+ρˆik(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)−
n
li∑
l=1
λ¯T −1il θil)}; i = 1, . . . , I; k = 1, . . . , nR, (7.35a)
QF
T
il = min{CAPFil ,max{0, QF
T−1
il + a(−
n
li∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q¯
FT−1 , q¯F
T−1
)
∂QFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)
∂QFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)
∂QFil
× Q¯T −1ih + λ¯T −1il )}}; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.35b)
QS
T
jil = min{CAPSjil,max{0, QS
T−1
jil + a(−p¯iT −1jil −
nS∑
h=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂tcihm(Q¯
ST−1 )
∂QSjil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)
∂QSjil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)
∂QSjil
× Q¯T −1ih
+λ¯T −1il )}}; j = 1, . . . , nS ; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.35c)
qF
T
il = min{qUil ,max{0, qF
T−1
il + a(−
n
li∑
m=1
∂fFim(Q¯
FT−1 , q¯F
T−1
)
∂qFil
−
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)
∂qFil
+
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)
∂qFil
× Q¯T −1ih )}}; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.35d)
αF
T
i = min{1,max{0, αF
T−1
i +a(−
∂fi(Q¯
FT−1 , α¯F
T−1
)
∂αFi
−
nR∑
h=1
∂cˆFih(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)
∂αFi
+
nR∑
h=1
∂ρˆih(Q¯
T −1, Q¯F
T−1
, Q¯S
T−1
, q¯F
T−1
, q¯S
T−1
, α¯F
T−1
)
∂αFi
× Q¯T −1ih ; i = 1, . . . , I, (7.35e)
λTil = max{0, λT −1il + a(−
nS∑
j=1
Q¯S
T−1
jil − Q¯F
T−1
il +
nR∑
k=1
Q¯T −1ik θil)}; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.35f)
piTjil = max{0, piT −1jil + a(−
I∑
g=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂ocjgm(p¯i
T −1)
∂pijil
+ Q¯S
T−1
jil )}; j = 1, . . . , nS ; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli , (7.35g)
qS
T
jil = min{qUil ,max{0, qS
T−1
jil + a(−
nl∑
m=1
∂fSjm(Q¯
ST−1 , q¯S
T−1
)
∂qSjil
−
I∑
g=1
n
li∑
m=1
∂cˆSjgm(Q¯
ST−1 , q¯S
T−1
)
∂qSjil
)}};
j = 1, . . . , nS ; i = 1, . . . , I; l = 1, . . . , nli . (7.35h)
The convergence result is provided as below.
Theorem 7.8
If Assumption 7.1 is satisfied, the modified projection method described above con-
verges to the solution of variational inequality (7.25).
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Proof: Existence of a solution to variational inequality (7.25) follows from Theorem
7.4, monotonicity follows from Theorem 7.5, and Lipschitz continuity, in turn, follows
from Theorem 7.7. According to Theorem 2.18, the proof is complete. 
7.4. Numerical Examples and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I applied the modified projection method (cf. (7.34a)-(7.35h))
to several numerical examples accompanied by extensive sensitivity analysis. The
modified projected method was implemented in Matlab on a Lenovo Z580. I set
a = 0.003 in the algorithm with the convergence tolerance  = 10−4. The product
and component quantities were initialized to 30 and the prices, quality levels, quality
preservation levels, and the Lagrange multipliers to 0.
Example 7.1
Consider the supply chain network topology given in Figure 7.2 in which firm 1 serves
demand market R1 and procures the components of its product from supplier 1. The
firm also has the option of producing the components needed by itself. The product
of firm 1 requires only one component 11. 2 units of 11 are needed for producing one
unit of firm 1’s product. Thus,
θ11 = 2.
Component 11 corresponds to node 1 in the second tier and node 11 in the third tier
in Figure 2 below.
The capacity of the supplier is:
CAP S111 = 120.
The firm’s capacity for producing its component is:
CAP F11 = 80.
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Figure 7.2. Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 7.1
The value that represents the perfect component quality is:
qU11 = 75.
The supplier’s production cost is:
fS11(Q
S
111, q
S
111) = 5Q
S
111 + 0.8(q
S
111 − 62.5)2.
The supplier’s transportation cost is:
cˆS111(Q
S
111, q
S
111) = 0.5Q
S
111 + 0.2(q
S
111 − 125)2 + 0.3QS111qS111,
and its opportunity cost is:
oc111(pi111) = 0.7(pi111 − 100)2.
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The firm’s assembly cost is:
f1(Q11, α
F
1 ) = 0.75Q
2
11 + 200α
F 2
1 + 200α
F
1 + 25Q11α
F
1 .
The firm’s production cost for producing its component is:
fF11(Q
F
11, q
F
11) = 2.5Q
F 2
11 + 0.5(q
F
11 − 60)2 + 0.1QF11qF11,
and its transaction cost is:
tc111(Q
S
111) = 0.5Q
S2
111 +Q
S
111 + 100.
The firm’s transportation cost for shipping its product to the demand market is:
cF11(Q11, q1) = 0.5Q
2
11 + 0.02q
2
1 + 0.1Q11q1,
and the demand price function at demand market R1 is:
ρ11(d11, q1) = −d11 + 0.7q1 + 1000,
where q1 = α
F
1 ω11
QF11q
F
11+Q
S
111q
S
111
QF11+Q
S
111
and ω11 = 1.
The equilibrium solution obtained using the modified projection method is:
Q∗11 = 89.26, Q
F ∗
11 = 60.16, Q
S∗
111 = 118.38, q
F ∗
11 = 71.17,
qS
∗
111 = 57.25, pi
∗
11 = 184.53, α
F ∗
1 = 1.00, λ
∗
11 = 305.25.
with the induced demand, demand price, and product quality being
d11 = 89.26, ρ11 = 954.10, q1 = 61.94.
The profit of the firm is 33,331.69, and the profit of the supplier is 13,218.67.
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For this example, the eigenvalues of the symmetric part of the Jacobian matrix of
G(Y ) (cf. (7.27)) are 0.0016, 0.0101, 0.0140, 0.0169, 0.0439, 0.0503, 5.5468, which are
all positive. Therefore, ∇G(Y ) is positive-definite, and G(Y ) is strictly monotone.
The uniqueness of the solution (Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗, qS
∗
) (cf. Theorem 7.6)
and the convergence of the modified projection method (cf. Theorem 7.8) are then
guaranteed.
In Example 7.1, the capacities of the firm and the supplier do not constrain the
production of the components, since, at the equilibrium, the component quantities
are lower than the associated capacities. However, in some cases, due to disruptions
to capacities, such as disasters and strikes, firms and suppliers may not always be
able to operate under desired capacities. In this sensitivity analysis, I investigate the
impacts of the capacities that constrain the production of the components on the
quantities, prices, quality levels, and the profits of the firm and the supplier.
First, I maintain the capacity of the firm at 80, and vary the capacity of the
supplier from 0 to 20, 40, 60, 80, 100, and 120. The results of equilibrium quantities,
quality levels, prices, and profits are shown in Figures 7.3 and 7.4.
As indicated in Figure 7.3.b, when the capacity of the supplier is 0, the firm has
to produce the components for its product by itself, at full capacity, which is 80.
This production pressure limits the firm’s ability to produce with high quality, which
causes a low in-house component quality (cf. Figure 7.3.d). Based on the data in this
example, purchasing components from the supplier is always cheaper than producing
them in-house. Therefore, as the capacity of the supplier increases, the firm buys
more components from the supplier and tends to be more dependent on the supplier
in component production. Thus, the contracted component quantity increases (cf.
Figure 7.3.a), and the in-house component quantity decreases (cf. Figure 7.3.b).
In addition, with more components provided by the supplier, the firm is now able
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Figure 7.3. Equilibrium Component Quantities, Equilibrium Component Quality
Levels, Equilibrium Product Quantity (Demand), and Product Quality as the Capac-
ity of the Supplier Varies
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Figure 7.4. Equilibrium Quality Preservation Level, Equilibrium Lagrange Multi-
plier, Demand Price, Equilibrium Contracted Price, the Supplier’s Profit, and the
Firm’s Profit as the Capacity of the Supplier Varies
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to assemble more products for profit maximization, which leads to an increase in
demand (cf. Figure 7.3.e) and in profit (cf. Figure 7.4.f).
Since there is no competition on the supplier’s side, as the firm becomes more
dependent on the supplier, it charges more to the firm to maximize its profit (cf.
Figure 7.4.d). For the same reason, the supplier’s incentive to improve quality de-
creases, which leads to a reduction in contracted quality (cf. Figure 7.3.c). After the
capacity of the supplier achieves a certain value (e.g., 100), as the capacity of the
supplier increases, the contracted quantity and price keep increasing. This results in
an extremely high payment to the supplier and a large transaction cost, and hence a
decline in the profit of the firm (cf. Figure 7.4.f). The profit of the supplier always
increases as its capacity expands (cf. Figure 7.4.e).
Moreover, when the supplier’s capacity is 20, the in-house component quality
achieves a higher value than before (cf. Figure 7.3.d), because the firm is able to
pay for quality improvement for more profit at this point. However, it decreases ever
after, since, given the high payment to the supplier and the high transaction cost,
the firm is unable to produce a higher quality anymore. This also explains the trend
of the product quality (cf. Figure 7.3.f) and that of the demand price (cf. Figure
7.4.c). The highest product quality and the highest demand price are achieved when
the supplier’s capacity is 20, after which they decrease.
Therefore, in the case of this example, the supplier would want to prevent disrup-
tions to its own capacity in order to maintain a good profit. However, such disruptions
may be beneficial for the firm’s profit and the quality of the product at the demand
market. Hence, it may be wise for the firm to contract with competing suppliers who
have capacities that are not so high to harm the profit of the firm.
As already noted, when the capacity of the supplier is 0, the quantity of the in-
house produced component is bounded by the capacity of the firm, which is 80. This
happens because the firm can actually produce more to improve its profit with higher
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capacity. When the capacity of the firm is 80.78 or higher, the in-house component
production does not have to operate at full capacity.
I then maintain the capacity of the supplier at 120, and vary the capacity of the
firm from 0 to 20, 40, 60, and 80. The results are reported in Figures 7.5 and 7.6.
Most of the trends in Figures 7.5 and 7.6 follow a similar logic as that for Figures
7.3 and 7.4. However, as revealed in Figures 7.6.e and f, as the capacity of the firm
increases, the profit of the supplier decreases, but that of the firm increases. Now,
with higher capacity, the firm is more capable of producing more to satisfy the greater
demand by itself, which weakens its dependence on the supplier and leads to a decline
in the supplier’s profit. Therefore, disruptions to the firm’s capacity would benefit
the profit of the supplier, but jeopardize the profit of the firm and the quality of the
product at the demand market. Thus, the supplier would want to produce for firms
who have low capacities and are, hence, more dependent on suppliers in component
production.
As shown in Figure 7.5.a, when the capacity of the firm is 0, 20, and 40, the quan-
tity of contracted component production is bounded by the capacity of the supplier.
Actually, when the capacity of the supplier is no less than 141.71, 133.99, and 126.20,
respectively, the supplier does not need to operate at full capacity.
This sensitivity analysis further sheds light on the investments in capacity chang-
ing for the supplier and for the firm. If the investment is higher than the associated
profit improvement, it is not wise for the supplier or the firm to invest in themselves’
or each other’s capacity changing. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 below show the maximum
acceptable investments for capacity changing for this sensitivity analysis. The first
number in each cell is the maximum acceptable investment for the supplier, and the
second is that for the firm. In the italic cells, the two numbers are with different
signs.
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Figure 7.5. Equilibrium Component Quantities, Equilibrium Component Quality
Levels, Equilibrium Product Quantity (Demand), and Product Quality as the Capac-
ity of the Firm Varies
210
Figure 7.6. Equilibrium Quality Preservation Level, Equilibrium Lagrange Multi-
plier, Demand Price, Equilibrium Contracted Price, the Supplier’s Profit, and the
Firm’s Profit as the Capacity of the Firm Varies
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Table 7.3. Maximum Acceptable Investments (×103) for Capacity Changing when
the Capacity of the Firm Maintains 80 but that of the Supplier Varies
XXXXXXFrom
To
CAPS111=0 20 40 60 80 100 120
CAPS111=0 – 0.97, 5.89 2.86, 10.17 5.08, 13.09 7.57, 14.62 10.37, 14.77 13.22, 13.69
20 -0.97, -5.89 – 1.90, 4.28 4.09, 7.20 6.60, 8.73 9.40, 8.88 12.25, 7.80
40 -2.86, -10.17 -1.90, -4.28 – 2.20, 2.92 4.70, 4.45 7.51, 4.60 10.36, 3.52
60 -5.06, -13.09 -4.09, -7.20 -2.20, -2.92 – 2.50, 1.53 5.31, 1.68 8.16, 0.60
80 -7.57, -14.62 -6.60, -8.73 -4.70, -4.45 -2.50, -1.53 – 2.81, 0.15 5.66, -0.93
100 -10.37, -14.77 -9.40, -8.88 -7.51, -4.60 -5.31, -1.68 -2.81, -0.15 – 2.85, -1.08
120 -13.22, -13.69 -12.25, -7.80 -10.36, -3.52 -8.16, -0.60 -5.65, 0.93 -2.85, 1.08 –
Table 7.4. Maximum Acceptable Investments (×103) for Capacity Changing when
the Capacity of the Supplier Maintains 120 but that of the Firm Varies
PPPPPPFrom
To
CAPF11=0 20 40 60 80
CAPF11=0 – 0.00, 5.94 0.00, 9.77 -0.25, 11.10 -0.26, 11.10
20 0.00, -5.94 – 0.00, 3.83 -0.25, 5.16 -0.26, 5.16
40 0.00, -9.77 0.00, -3.83 – -0.25, 1.33 -0.26, 1.33
60 0.25, -11.10 0.25, -5.16 0.25, -1.33 – -0.01, 0.004
80 0.26, -11.10 0.26, -5.16 0.26, -1.33 0.01, -0.004 –
In Tables 7.3 and 7.4, for the cells in which both numbers are negative, it is not
wise for the firm or the supplier to change the capacities at all, because their profits
would decrease with the associated capacity change. For the italic cells that are with
two opposite-sign numbers, the one with the negative number should prevent the
other from investing in the associated capacity change, or, it should ask the other for
a compensation which will prevent its profit from being compromised. This situation
may occur only in 4 cases when the supplier’s capacity varies (cf. Table 7.3). However,
in Table 7.4, it happens very often when the firm’s capacity varies, which is consistent
with the results in the above sensitivity analysis. For the numbers that are 0, the
associated profits will not be affected by the corresponding capacity changes.
In addition, if there is a capacity changing offer that costs more than the summa-
tion of the two numbers in the associated cell, it is not worthwhile for the supplier
or the firm to accept the offer, since more profit cannot be obtained by doing so. If
the offer costs less, the two parties should consider investing in the associated ca-
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pacity change, and, if possible, negotiate on the separation of the payment between
themselves.
Example 7.2
In Example 7.2, there are 2 firms competing with each other with differentiated but
substitutable products in demand market R1. The firms can procure the components
for producing their products from suppliers 1 and 2 who also compete noncoopera-
tively, and they can also produce the components needed by themselves.
Two components are required by the product of firm 1, components 11 and 21. 1
unit of 11 and 2 units of 21 are required for producing 1 unit of firm 1’s product. In
order to produce 1 unit firm 2’s product, 2 units of 12 and 1 unit of 12 are needed.
Therefore,
θ11 = 1, θ12 = 2, θ21 = 2, θ22 = 1.
The ratio of the importance of the quality of the components to the quality of one
unit product is:
ω11 = 0.2, ω12 = 0.8, ω21 = 0.4, ω22 = 0.6.
The network topology of Example 7.2 is as in Figure 7.7. Components 11 and
21 are the same component, which correspond to nodes 1’s in the second tier of the
figure. Components 21 and 22 are the same component, and they correspond to nodes
2’s in the second tier.
The other data are as follows:
The capacities of the suppliers are:
CAP S111 = 80, CAP
S
112 = 100, CAP
S
121 = 100, CAP
S
122 = 60,
CAP S211 = 60, CAP
S
212 = 100, CAP
S
221 = 100, CAP
S
222 = 50.
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Figure 7.7. Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 7.2
The firms’ capacities for in-house component production are:
CAP F11 = 30, CAP
F
12 = 30, CAP
F
21 = 30, CAP
F
22 = 30.
The values representing the perfect component quality are:
qU11 = 60, q
U
12 = 75, q
U
21 = 60, q
U
22 = 75.
The suppliers’ production costs are:
fS11(Q
S
111, Q
S
121, q
S
111, q
S
121, q
S
211, q
S
221) = 0.4(Q
S
111 +Q
S
121) + 1.5(q
S
111 − 50)2 + 1.5(qS121 − 50)2 + qS211 + qS221,
fS12(Q
S
112, Q
S
122, q
S
112, q
S
122, q
S
212, q
S
222) = 0.4(Q
S
112 +Q
S
122) + 2(q
S
112 − 45)2 + 2(qS122 − 45)2 + qS212 + qS222,
fS21(Q
S
211, Q
S
221, q
S
211, q
S
221, q
S
111, q
S
121) = Q
S
211 +Q
S
221 + 2(q
S
211 − 31.25)2 + 2(qS221 − 31.25)2 + qS111 + qS121,
fS12(Q
S
212, Q
S
222, q
S
212, q
S
222, q
S
112, q
S
122) = Q
S
212 +Q
S
222 + (q
S
212 − 85)2 + (qS222 − 85)2 + qS112 + qS122.
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Their transportation costs are:
cˆS111(Q
S
111, q
S
111) = 0.2Q
S
111 + 1.2(q
S
111 − 41.67)2,
cˆS112(Q
S
112, q
S
112) = 0.1Q
S
112 + 1.2(q
S
112 − 37.5)2,
cˆS121(Q
S
121, q
S
121) = 0.2Q
S
121 + 1.4(q
S
121 − 39.29)2,
cˆS122(Q
S
122, q
S
122) = 0.1Q
S
122 + 1.1(q
S
122 − 36.36)2,
cˆS211(Q
S
211, q
S
211) = 0.3Q
S
211 + 1.3(q
S
211 − 30.77)2,
cˆS212(Q
S
212, q
S
212) = 0.4Q
S
212 + 1.7(q
S
212 − 32.35)2,
cˆS221(Q
S
221, q
S
221) = 0.2Q
S
221 + 1.3(q
S
221 − 30.77)2,
cˆS222(Q
S
222, q
S
222) = 0.1Q
S
222 + 1.5(q
S
222 − 30)2.
The opportunity costs of the suppliers are:
oc111(pi111, pi211) = 5(pi111 − 80)2 + 0.5pi211,
oc112(pi112, pi212) = 9(pi112 − 80)2 + pi212,
oc121(pi121, pi221) = 5(pi121 − 100)2 + pi221,
oc122(pi122, pi222) = 7.5(pi122 − 50)2 + 0.1pi222,
oc211(pi211, pi111) = 5(pi211 − 50)2 + 2pi111,
oc212(pi212, pi112) = 8(pi212 − 70)2 + 0.5pi112,
oc221(pi221, pi121) = 9(pi221 − 60)2 + pi121,
oc222(pi222, pi122) = 8(pi222 − 60)2 + 0.5pi122.
The firms’ assembly costs are:
f1(Q11, α
F
1 ) = 3Q
2
11 + 0.5Q11α
F
1 + 100α
F 2
1 + 50α
F
1 ,
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f2(Q21, α
F
2 ) = 2.75Q
2
21 + 0.6Q21α
F
2 + 100α
F 2
2 + 50α
F
2 .
Their production costs for producing components are:
fF11(Q
F
11, q
F
11) = Q
F 2
11 + 0.0001Q
F
11q
F
11 + 1.1(q
F
11 − 36.36)2,
fF12(Q
F
12, q
F
12) = 1.25Q
F 2
12 + 0.0001Q
F
12q
F
12 + 1.2(q
F
12 − 41.67)2,
fF21(Q
F
21, q
F
21) = Q
F 2
21 + 0.0001Q
F
21q
F
21 + 1.5(q
F
21 − 33.33)2,
fF22(Q
F
22, q
F
22) = 0.75Q
F 2
22 + 0.0001Q
F
22q
F
22 + 1.25(q
F
22 − 36)2.
The transaction costs are:
tc111(Q
S
111) = 0.5Q
S2
111 +Q
S
111 + 100, tc112(Q
S
112) = 0.5Q
S2
112 + 0.5Q
S
112 + 150,
tc121(Q
S
211) = 0.75Q
S2
211 + 0.75Q
S
211 + 150, tc122(Q
S
212) = Q
S2
212 +Q
S
212 + 100,
tc211(Q
S
121) = 0.75Q
S2
121 +Q
S
121 + 150, tc212(Q
S
122) = 0.5Q
S2
122 + 0.75Q
S
122 + 100,
tc221(Q
S
221) = 0.8Q
S2
221 + 0.25Q
S
221 + 100, tc222(Q
S
222) = 0.5Q
S2
222 +Q
S
222 + 175.
The firms’ transportation costs are:
cF11(Q11, q1) = 3Q
2
11 + 0.3Q11q1 + 0.25q1, c
F
21(Q21, q2) = 3Q
2
21 + 0.3Q21q2 + 0.1q2,
and the demand price functions are:
ρ11(d11, d21, q1, q2) = −3d11 − 1.3d21 + q1 + 0.74q2 + 2200,
ρ21(d21, d11, q2, q1) = −3.5d21 − 1.4d11 + 1.1q2 + 0.9q1 + 1800,
where q1 = α
F
1 (ω11
QF11q
F
11+Q
S
111q
S
111+Q
S
211q
S
211
QF11+Q
S
111+Q
S
211
+ω12
QF12q
F
12+Q
S
112q
S
112+Q
S
212q
S
212
QF12+Q
S
112+Q
S
212
) and q2 = α
F
2 (ω21
QF21q
F
21+Q
S
121q
S
121+Q
S
221q
S
221
QF21+Q
S
121+Q
S
221
+ ω22
QF22q
F
22+Q
S
122q
S
122+Q
S
222q
S
222
QF22+Q
S
122+Q
S
222
).
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The modified projection method converges to the following equilibrium solution:
Q∗11 = 93.56, Q
∗
21 = 71.34,
QF
∗
11 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
12 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
21 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
22 = 30.00,
QS
∗
111 = 27.37, Q
S∗
112 = 100.00, Q
S∗
121 = 45.44, Q
S∗
122 = 23.35,
QS
∗
211 = 36.19, Q
S∗
212 = 57.12, Q
S∗
221 = 67.24, Q
S∗
222 = 17.99,
qF
∗
11 = 38.26, q
F ∗
12 = 45.15, q
F ∗
21 = 34.93, q
F ∗
22 = 41.71,
qS
∗
111 = 46.30, q
S∗
112 = 42.19, q
S∗
121 = 44.83, q
S∗
122 = 41.94,
qS
∗
211 = 31.06, q
S∗
212 = 51.85, q
S∗
221 = 31.06, q
S∗
222 = 52.00,
pi∗111 = 82.74, pi
∗
112 = 85.56, pi
∗
121 = 104.54, pi
∗
122 = 51.56,
pi∗211 = 53.62, pi
∗
212 = 73.57, pi
∗
221 = 63.74, pi
∗
222 = 61.12,
αF
∗
1 = 1.00, α
F ∗
2 = 1.00,
λ∗11 = 109.83, λ
∗
12 = 187.06, λ
∗
21 = 172.34, λ
∗
22 = 76.58,
and the induced demands, demand prices, and product quality levels are:
d11 = 93.56, d21 = 71.34, ρ11 = 1, 901.07, ρ21 = 1, 504.22,
q1 = 44.06, q2 = 41.13.
The firms’ profits are 94,610.69 and 57,787.69, respectively, and those of the suppliers
are 15,671.13 and 6923.20.
The eigenvalues of the symmetric part of the Jacobian matrix of G(Y ) (cf. (7.27))
are 0.0089, 0.0098, 0.0100, 0.0102, 0.0107, 0.0135, 0.0147, 0.0151, 0.0158, 0.0164,
0.0198, 0.0198, 0.0201, 0.0224, 0.0254, 0.0298, 0.0409, 0.0492, 0.0540, 0.0564, 0.0578,
0.0605, 0.0650, 0.0660, 0.1000, 0.1000, 0.1000, 0.1063, 0.1500, 0.1600, 0.1600, 0.1600,
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0.1800, 0.1800, 2.0280, 2.1399, which are all positive. Therefore, the uniqueness
of the solution (Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗, qS
∗
) and the convergence of the modified
projection method are guaranteed.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the manufacturing plants of suppliers may
be located in different geographical locations around the globe, which increases the
vulnerability of the supply chain networks of the firms to the disruptions that happen
to the suppliers, such as those caused by natural disasters. In this analysis, I model
and analyze the impacts of the disruptions to suppliers 1 and 2 on the profits of the
firms and the demands, prices, and quality levels of the products.
I also evaluate the values of the two suppliers and which one of them is more
important to the firms. With the values of the suppliers and the importance level of
them to the firms, the firms can make more specific and targeted efforts in their sup-
plier management strategies and in the contingency plans in handling the disruptions
to their suppliers.
First, I present the following disruption. The data are as in Example 7.2, except
that supplier 1 is no longer available for the firms to contract with or to produce
or transport the components needed. The network topology with this disruption is
presented in Figure 7.8.
The equilibrium solution achieved by the modified projection method is:
Q∗11 = 65.00, Q
∗
21 = 65.00,
QF
∗
11 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
12 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
21 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
22 = 30.00,
QS
∗
111 = 0.00, Q
S∗
112 = 0.00, Q
S∗
121 = 0.00, Q
S∗
122 = 0.00,
QS
∗
211 = 35.00, Q
S∗
212 = 100.00, Q
S∗
221 = 100.00, Q
S∗
222 = 35.00,
qF
∗
11 = 38.26, q
F ∗
12 = 45.16, q
F ∗
21 = 34.93, q
F ∗
22 = 41.75,
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Figure 7.8. Supply Chain Network Topology With Disruption to Supplier 1
qS
∗
211 = 31.06, q
S∗
212 = 51.85, q
S∗
221 = 31.06, q
S∗
222 = 52.00,
pi∗211 = 53.50, pi
∗
212 = 76.25, pi
∗
221 = 65.56, pi
∗
222 = 62.19,
αF
∗
1 = 1.00, α
F ∗
2 = 1.00,
λ∗11 = 107.53, λ
∗
12 = 448.93, λ
∗
21 = 242.02, λ
∗
22 = 95.98,
and the induced demands, demand prices, and product quality levels are:
d11 = 65.00, d21 = 65.00 ρ11 = 1, 998.07, ρ21 = 1, 569.17,
q1 = 47.12, q2 = 41.14.
The firms’ profits are 80,574.83 and 57,406.47, respectively, and supplier 2’s profit is
13,635.49. The uniqueness of the solution (Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗, qS
∗
) is guaran-
teed.
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Without supplier 1 and with the firms’ limited in-house production capacities,
there is no competition on the suppliers’ side and the firms have to depend more on
the supplier in component production. Therefore, as shown by the results, 3 out of
the 4 contracted component quantities produced by supplier 2 increase. supplier 2
charges the firms more than before, and its profit improves. Without supplier 1, the
firms are not able to provide as many products as before, and hence, the demands at
the demand market decrease. The quality of the products of firms 1 and 2 increase,
and the prices at the demand market increase.
Under this disruption, the profit of firm 1 decreases by 14.84%, and that of firm
2 decreases by 0.66%. Therefore, from this perspective, supplier 1 is more important
to firm 1 than to firm 2. The value of supplier 1 to firm 1 is 14,035.86, and that to
firm 2 is 381.22, which are measured by the associated profit declines.
I then present the disruption in which supplier 2 is no longer available to the firms.
The other data are the same as in Example 7.2. The network topology is as in Figure
7.9.
The modified projection method converges to the following equilibrium solution:
Q∗11 = 65.00, Q
∗
21 = 63.79,
QF
∗
11 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
12 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
21 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
22 = 30.00,
QS
∗
111 = 35.00, Q
S∗
112 = 100.00, Q
S∗
121 = 97.58, Q
S∗
122 = 33.79,
QS
∗
211 = 0.00, Q
S∗
212 = 0.00, Q
S∗
221 = 0.00, Q
S∗
222 = 0.00,
qF
∗
11 = 38.26, q
F ∗
12 = 45.16, q
F ∗
21 = 34.93, q
F ∗
22 = 41.75,
qS
∗
111 = 46.30, q
S∗
112 = 42.19, q
S∗
121 = 44.83, q
S∗
122 = 41.94,
pi∗111 = 83.50, pi
∗
112 = 85.56, pi
∗
121 = 109.76, pi
∗
122 = 52.25,
αF
∗
1 = 1.00, α
F ∗
2 = 1.00,
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Figure 7.9. Supply Chain Network Topology With Disruption to Supplier 2
λ∗11 = 119.17, λ
∗
12 = 442.79, λ
∗
21 = 256.75, λ
∗
22 = 86.75.
The induced demands, demand prices, and product quality levels are:
d11 = 65.00, d21 = 63.79, ρ11 = 1, 996.05, ρ21 = 1, 570.59,
q1 = 42.82, q2 = 42.11.
The firms’ profits are 83,895.42 and 53,610.96, respectively, and supplier 1’s profit is
22,729.18. The uniqueness of the solution (Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗, qS
∗
) is guaran-
teed.
The impacts of the disruption to supplier 2 follow similar logic as those brought
about by the disruption to supplier 1. The contracted component quantities by
supplier 1 increase, and its profit increases. The demands at the demand market
decrease. Firm 1’s product quality decreases, and firm 2’s increases. The prices at
the demand market increase.
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Without supplier 2, firm 1’s profit declines by 11.33%, and that of firm 2 reduces
by 7.23%. Thus, supplier 2 is more important to firm 1 than to firm 2 under this
disruption. The value of supplier 2 to firm 1 is 10,715.27, and that to firm 2 is
4,176.73.
In addition, according to the above results, supplier 1 is more important than
supplier 2 to firm 1, and to firm 2, supplier 2 is more important.
For completeness, the disruption in which neither of the supplier is no longer
available to the firms is also considered. The other data are the same as in Example
7.2. The network topology is depicted in Figure 7.10.
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Figure 7.10. Supply Chain Network Topology With Disruption to Suppliers 1 and
2
The equilibrium solution obtained using the modified projection method is:
Q∗11 = 15.00, Q
∗
21 = 15.00,
QF
∗
11 = 15.00, Q
F ∗
12 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
21 = 30.00, Q
F ∗
22 = 30.00,
QS
∗
111 = 0.00, Q
S∗
112 = 0.00, Q
S∗
121 = 0.00, Q
S∗
122 = 0.00,
QS
∗
211 = 0.00, Q
S∗
212 = 0.00, Q
S∗
221 = 0.00, Q
S∗
222 = 0.00,
222
qF
∗
11 = 37.29, q
F ∗
12 = 45.08, q
F ∗
21 = 35.71., q
F ∗
22 = 37.90,
αF
∗
1 = 1.00, α
F ∗
2 = 1.00,
λ∗11 = 30.46, λ
∗
12 = 967.28, λ
∗
21 = 772.88, λ
∗
22 = 22.63.
The induced demands, demand prices, and the product quality levels are:
d11 = 15.00, d21 = 15.00, ρ11 = 2, 206.42, ρ21 = 1, 806.40,
q1 = 43.52, q2 = 37.02.
The firms’ profits are 30,016.91 and 24,391.32, respectively. The uniqueness of the
solution (Q∗, QF
∗
, QS
∗
, qF
∗
, αF
∗
, pi∗, qS
∗
) is guaranteed.
Compared to Example 7.2, without the suppliers, the demands at the demand
market decrease, the firms’ product quality levels decrease, and the prices at the
demand market increase. Firm 1’s profit deceases by 68.27%, firm 2’s reduces by
57.79%. The value of the suppliers to firm 1 is 64,593.78, and that to firm 2 is
33,396.37.
7.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I develop a general multitiered supply chain network equilibrium
model with a focus on quality in which suppliers compete to produce components that
are utilized by competing firms as they assemble final products that are differentiated
by brands. The firms can also produce components in-house, depending on their ca-
pacities. I model the competitive behavior of the two tiers of decision-makers as they
identify their optimal strategies in terms of quantity and quality with the assembling
firms also identifying their assembly quality preservation levels. The suppliers charge
the firms prices for the components that they supply.
The novelty of our framework lies in its generality and its computability. Rather
than focus, as some of the literature does, on one supplier-one manufacturer studies,
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the number of components needed for the finished product, the number of suppliers,
the number of firms, nor the number of demand markets are limited. Moreover, I
provide a framework for tracking the quality of the product from the component
level, through the assembly process into the final product, and ultimate distribution
to the demand markets.
I derive the unified variational inequality formulation of the governing equilibrium
conditions, provide qualitative properties of the equilibrium solution pattern, in terms
of existence and uniqueness results, and propose an algorithm along with conditions
for convergence. Our framework is illustrated with numerical examples, accompanied
by sensitivity analysis that explores such critical issues as the impacts of capacity
disruptions and the potential investments in capacity enhancements. I also conduct
sensitivity analysis to reveal the impacts of specific supplier unavailability along with
their values as reflected in the profits of the firms and in the quality of the finished
products. With knowledge of the values of the suppliers to the firms, the firms can
make more specific, targeted efforts in their supplier management strategies and in
their contingency plans in the case of supplier disruptions.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
8.1. Conclusions
The purpose of this dissertation was to contribute to the equilibrium and dy-
namics modeling and analysis of quality competition in supply chain networks under
four different scenarios: information asymmetry, product differentiation, outsourcing,
and supplier selection. In this dissertation, I demonstrated how to model, analyze,
and solve quality competition problems, as appropriate to the specific scenarios, in a
quantitative manner. The models developed are able to provide firms with the deci-
sions in production quality, component quality, prices, and/or the selections of their
contractors and suppliers, and the evolution of these decisions over time under the
above mentioned four scenarios. The models can also be utilized by policy makers to
study the impacts of quality standards, disrepute, and supply chain disruptions on
the behavior and decisions of firms, contractors, and suppliers. The methodologies
utilized in this dissertation included: variational inequality theory, projected dynamic
systems, game theory, optimization theory, and multicriteria decision-making.
In Chapter 3, I focused on quality competition in supply chain networks under
the information asymmetry associated with the knowledge of quality between firms
and consumers, when there is no product differentiation. I introduced an average
quality measure to capture consumers’ perception of quality at the demand markets
under such information asymmetry. In this chapter, each firm might have multiple
manufacturing plants, which might be located in different regions and therefore with
different quality levels. The firms competed in product quantity and quality with
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each firm aiming at maximizing its own profit in the competition. I also considered
minimum quality standards in the model. A unified variation inequality formulation
that provided the equilibrium conditions for the problem with minimum quality stan-
dards and the one without was presented. The impacts of different minimum quality
standards were studied numerically. Suggestions to the policy makers and regulators
in regards to the imposition of minimum quality standards were given accordingly.
In contrast to Chapter 3, Chapter 4 concentrated on quality competition under
the scenario of product differentiation, as firms are engaging in distinguishing their
product from the competitors’ in imperfect markets. I developed both equilibrium
and dynamic models, along with qualitative properties of the solution. The costs of
R&D activities and quality costs were included in the production cost functions. The
impacts of consumers’ attitude towards quality, which can be captured by the quality
coefficients in demand price functions, were studied numerically.
Chapters 5 and 6 were dedicated to quality competition in supply chain net-
works with outsourcing and fixed projected demand. The optimal make-or-buy and
contractor-selection decisions of the firms and the pricing and quality decisions of the
contractors were provided. An average quality level was constructed to measure the
average product quality under outsourcing. The models allowed each firm to weight
its disrepute cost, which measured the loss of reputation caused by poor quality
products, in its decision-making problem with the weight capturing the firm’s atti-
tude towards its reputation. In addition to the firms’ cost minimization behavior, the
behavior of the contractors was also modeled. The contractors competed in the prices
charged to the firms and their quality in producing and delivering each firm’s product,
aiming at maximizing their profits. The equilibrium conditions of the entire system
which includes both the firms and the contractors were presented. In the numerical
examples, sensitivity analyses in terms of demand were conducted, and a contractor
disruption case was modeled, solved, and discussed. Chapter 6 extended Chapter 5
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in considering the competition among firms in product quantity and quality. The
impacts of firms’ attitudes towards reputation were explored numerically. These two
chapters can be applied to solve supply chain network problems with outsourcing in
numerous industries, including the pharmaceutical industry, electronic industry, and
the apparel industry, where outsourcing is prevalent.
Chapter 8 concentrated on quality competition in multitiered supply chain net-
works with supplier selection. Both the behavior of the firms and the behavior of the
suppliers were modeled. Firms were responsible for assembling the products using
the components needed, which can be produced by the firms in house and/or by the
suppliers, and delivering the products to the demand markets. Firms competed in
in-house and contracted component production, in-house component quality, product
quantity and quality, and the quality preservation/decay level in the assembly process
of the product, in order to maximize their profits. Suppliers, in turn, competed in
the prices charged to the firms for producing and delivering the components and in
component quality. The equilibrium decisions of the firms and the suppliers were
presented. In this chapter, the quality of the final product was determined by the
quality of its components, the importance of the quality of them to the final products,
and the preservation/decay level of the assembly process. In the numerical examples,
the value of each supplier to each firm, which was measured by the profit drop after
associated supplier disruption, the impacts of capacity changing, and the investments
in capacity enhancement were studied numerically. The network topology and the
model in this model are able to capture the case of outsourcing as a special case.
In this dissertation, for each supply chain network model with quality competi-
tion, I stated the governing equilibrium conditions, derived the equivalent variational
inequality formulation, proposed an algorithm, presented convergence results, and
computed solutions to numerical examples in order to illustrate the generality and
applicability of the framework. For models in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, I also proposed
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the dynamic adjustment processes for the evolution of quality levels, and, as appro-
priated, product quantities and prices over time, with stability analysis results also
presented. The framework extended the literature since the models herein are not
limited to a fixed number of firms or demand markets nor to functions of specific
form.
8.2. Future Research
Following the work in this dissertation, several potential directions can be sug-
gested for future research. Some topics that I intend to pursue in the future are listed
below.
1. For new products, their quality takes time to be revealed to consumers. The
perception of the quality of new products would first depend only upon extrinsic
attributes, such as warranty, brand name, and package, and, as time goes, the true
quality which involves both extrinsic and intrinsic attributes, would be learned by
consumers (Zeithaml (1988)). In the future, I plan to extend the models in Chapter 3
to capture the quality information asymmetry caused by the time delay of consumer’s
learning process of quality in spatial price networks for new products. I hope to
provide insights regarding the impacts of such information asymmetry on demand,
price, quality, and consumer welfare over multiple periods in the planning horizon.
By comparing the consumer welfare under perfect information and the one under
information asymmetry, the value of perfect quality information for consumers can
be measured.
2. I would also like to extend Chapters 5 and 6, which concentrated on quality com-
petition in outsourcing, to incorporate the quality information asymmetry that lies
between firms and their potential contractors and the transaction costs and risk caused
by such information asymmetry. Specifically, I would like to further the understand-
ing of firm-contractor interactions in outsourcing with a focus on contractible and
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non-contractible information and the impacts of training and monitoring activities
conducted by the firms on such information asymmetry.
3. The quality of perishable products, such as food, some pharmaceuticals, and
human blood, decays, especially in the transportation and storage processes (Yu and
Nagurney (2013), Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney, (2012), and Nagurney, Masoumi,
and Yu (2012)). In the future, I plan to formulate quality degradation in competitive
transportation networks for perishable products. The study will focus on the influence
of multimodal transportation, different transportation/storage technologies, and the
costs of them on the quality preservation/decay of such products and on consumers’
demand to them at the demand markets.
4. Furthermore, the dynamics of quality competition in multitiered supply chain
networks with suppliers, on which Chapter 8 focused, can be developed using pro-
jected dynamical systems theory (cf. Section 2.3) with stability results presented.
Such a dynamic model, as those developed in Chapters 3, 4, and 5, can predict the
evolution of the decisions of firms and those of the suppliers over time based on the
discretization of the dynamics.
5. In addition, I would like to conduct empirical research to apply the models and
results in this dissertation to real-life quality competition problems in supply chain
networks under the four scenarios discussed and modeled. I also plan to develop
models and provide solutions and suggestions for specific organizations with their
own specific cost and demand information.
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